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Mansel Blackfords The Lost Dream 
explores the history of city planning in 
five Pacific Coast cities—Seattle, Port­
land, Oakland, San Francisco, and Los 
Angeles—during the Progressive Era. 
Although city planning had diverse roots, 
Blackford shows that much of the early 
planning originated with businessmen 
who viewed it as a way to shape their 
urban environments both economically 
and socially. 
During the opening years of the twen­
tieth century, the business and political 
leaders in each of these cities began 
developing comprehensive city plans 
encompassing harbor improvements, 
new street and transportation facilities, 
civic centers, and parks and boulevards. 
As Blackford shows, businessmen 
worked through both established politi­
cal channels and newly formed bodies 
outside of those channels to become 
leaders in the planning process. As the 
planning campaigns evolved, busi­
nessmen found themselves both joined 
and opposed by ever-changing coalitions 
of professionals, politicians, and workers. 
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Introduction

City Planning,

Businessmen, and Scholars

In the 1890s, residents of Pacific Coast cities—Seattle, Portland, 
Oakland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles in particular—mounted 
numerous significant, but disjointed, improvement efforts. Dur­
ing the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Progressive 
Era, their efforts coalesced into city planning movements. Pacific 
Coast urbanites considered adopting what they thought were com­
prehensive city plans encompassing harbor improvements, new 
street and transportation facilities, civic centers, and parks and 
boulevards. While many groups enhanced the planning move­
ments, businessmen were usually the leaders and major sup­
porters of planning. 
Although city planning had diverse roots, much of it originated 
with businessmen because they viewed planning as a means to 
shape their urban environments both economically and socially. 
Businessmen remained strong supporters of the city planning ef­
forts as the planning movements unfolded. Working through both 
established political channels and newly formed bodies outside 
of those channels, they played important roles in the planning 
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movements as they matured. As the planning campaigns evolved, 
businessmen found themselves joined and opposed by others—pro­
fessionals (especially architects, engineers, and lawyers), politi­
cians, and workers. Businessmen worked for their goals in political 
arenas. Politics lay at the heart of planning: the proposed city plans 
were accepted or rejected in citywide elections in which, to be 
successful, businessmen had to convince others to vote with them. 
In Pacific Coast cities, the politics of planning was pluralistic, 
but pluralistic only within certain limits.1 That is, no single group 
completely dominated the political processes involving city plan­
ning, but neither did everyone have equal access to those pro­
cesses.2 Business organizations played the largest roles; but other 
bodies—groups of architects and engineers, labor organizations, 
and neighborhood improvement associations—were also signifi­
cant. On the other hand, some people had almost no voice in how 
city planning developed. Once employed—sometimes engaged 
by the city governments, but often hired directly by the business 
groups— city planners initially drafted their plans with little input 
from others. Preliminary versions of the plans were then discussed 
with the public, and some revisions were made. But how were the 
plans discussed? Usually, representatives of various business, pro­
fessional, neighborhood, and labor groups met with the planners 
to review details of the plans and suggest changes. Reflecting the 
organizational thrust of much of twentieth-century American life, 
only people belonging to recognized associations usually had ac­
cess to the planners. Members of ethnic minorities and unorgan­
ized workers were generally excluded from the discussions. Only 
when it came time to vote could such people express their opinions 
in a meaningful way, and then only if they were registered voters. 
Businessmen of nearly all sorts were active at one time or 
another in the planning movements. Real estate men, bankers, 
newspaper men, and industrialists played roles in the planning 
campaigns. Merchants were, however, of most significance and 
provided much of the backbone for the city planning movements— 
except in Los Angeles where real estate developers were particu­
larly significant. Their importance should be expected, for Pacific 
Coast cities developed mainly as commercial centers, and mer­
chants saw in city planning—both in the general idea of planning 
and in the specific improvements they imagined would result from 
planning—a way to elevate their metropolises above rival cities. 
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For merchants, planning seemed to promise both progress for 
their cities and profits for their purses. This study thus differs in 
emphasis from those that have stressed the importance of real 
estate interests, housing reformers, and professional landscape ar­
chitects as the catalysts of changes in city planning. To be sure, 
they were all significant. In Pacific Coast cities, however, mer­
chants were of more central importance.3 
That businessmen were involved in city planning should not be 
surprising. Some businessmen have often worked on their own or 
with government officials in twentieth-century planning efforts 
when they have perceived the advantages of planning. Many busi­
nessmen were active participants in the development of federal 
and state regulation of the American economy in the Progressive 
Era. Businessmen remained active in various planning efforts dur­
ing the 1920s and were deeply involved in New Deal activities 
during the 1930s. As some accepted conservative Keynesian eco­
nomic ideas in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, business leaders con­
tinued their engagement in planning in the postwar years. Far 
from being simply staunch individualists, many businessmen 
looked to planning as one way to try to stabilize their economic 
environments.4 
Businessmen, City Growth, and 
City Planning 
Pacific Coast cities were quickly growing in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries; and with their development came 
both opportunities and problems for their residents, especially 
their business leaders. From small villages in the mid-nineteenth 
century, the Pacific Coast centers emerged only one or two gener­
ations later as booming metropolises. With diverse populations 
dispersed over large areas, the rapid growth of the cities chal­
lenged attempts by business leaders to maintain their influence 
over them. At the same time, even as they became part of Amer­
ica's national urban network, the cities remained tied to Pacific 
Coast developments. Even as they won national recognition for 
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themselves as centers more substantial than mining towns and 
lumber camps, the cities came into increasing conflict with each 
other for economic control over the Pacific Coast—a rivalry that 
disturbed established relations among the region's merchants, fi­
nanciers, and industrialists. It was in that context of economic and 
social flux that businessmen turned to city planning. Although the 
resulting plans were the products of what contemporary Ameri­
cans called the "city beautiful" movement, they were more than 
attempts to beautify the cities. They were designed to solve prob­
lems and take advantage of opportunities that the businessmen 
thought their cities faced. 
First and foremost, businessmen—especially merchants, but 
also bankers and industrialists—sought to heighten the economic 
power and reputations of their cities, and thus their own indi­
vidual economic positions. For them city planning was both a 
defensive and offensive weapon: a means to defend their cities' 
positions in the intercity contests that were developing on the 
Pacific Coast, while also extending their economic reach. Trade, 
industry, people, and capital would migrate to properly planned 
cities, business leaders believed. City planning was in their minds 
a tool by which they might win the urban sweepstakes of the 
Pacific Coast. Merchants were particularly concerned about the 
opening of the Panama Canal. The imminent completion of the 
canal heightened an already well-developed sense of urban rivalry 
on the Pacific Coast, as merchants in each city hoped to reap what 
they thought would be untold benefits from the canal, at the ex­
pense of their neighbors. 
More generally, through the civic improvements that they an­
ticipated would flow from planning, businessmen sought to gain 
national recognition for their cities. They wanted them to be ac­
cepted fully as parts of America's urban network. Civic pride was 
a large part of the planning efforts. Business leaders in Oakland 
caught well that feeling when they urged the passage of a bond 
issue as a way of signaling to the "outside world" that their me­
tropolis had "taken up her march on the high road of progress" 
and was about to assume "her proper place among cities."5 Civic 
pride could, businessmen thought, have practical benefits. Beau­
tiful and well-planned metropolises would attract new settlers, 
businesses, and capital. Beauty and economic growth would de­
velop hand in hand. 
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Social objectives mixed with the economic goals. Through 
planning, business leaders tried to maintain and increase their 
social and cultural influence in their cities. Businessmen saw 
planning, with its espousal of civic pride and civic patriotism, as a 
potent means by which to buttress their social as well as their 
economic power. A lessening of social conflict and the uniting of 
dispersed neighborhoods were important agendas for those in­
volved in city planning. Socially united cities, business leaders 
believed, would progress more rapidly than those rent by schisms. 
Thus, a San Francisco merchant lamented in 1909 that his city did 
"not display the same spirit of unity on local public questions" as 
did Seattle and blamed the "faction-torn" condition of his city for 
its lack of progress relative to that of its northern rival.6 
Both optimism and pessimism permeated the thoughts of the 
businessmen involved in planning: they were two sides of the same 
coin. Business leaders in all of the Pacific Coast cities were op­
timistic about the future of their metropolises, if proper actions 
were taken. They were pessimistic, however, in believing that if 
such actions were not taken (and not taken quickly), their cities 
would fall behind their Pacific Coast rivals and metropolises across 
the nation to become merely second- or third-rate centers. Simi­
larly, businessmen saw bright, harmonious futures for their cities, 
if only other groups could be persuaded to follow their lead in city 
planning. 
Scholars and City Planning 
During the past generation, historians have reevaluated pro­
gressivism. Beginning with studies in the 1950s and 1960s, histo­
rians increasingly have stressed the complexity of the progressive 
movement, seeing it as an attempt to reorder American life in the 
wake of the social and economic disruptions resulting from indus­
trialization, the rise of big business, and the development of large 
cities.7 City planning campaigns were often associated with pro­
gressivism on the Pacific Coast. Many of the general goals of the 
progessives, especially the desire to reestablish a sense of order 
and morality in America, were shared by the businessmen en­
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gaged in planning efforts. Moreover, many of the businessmen and 
business organizations involved in planning were active in the 
progressive movements in their cities. 
An interpretation known as the organizational synthesis,first put 
forward in the 1970s, has helped conceptualize late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century American history in terms of the growing 
organization of life and thought.8 That approach emphasizes the 
spread of bureaucratic organizations, the growth of professions, 
and a heightened awareness of a need for order and efficiency as 
the themes best explaining the course of American history in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Organizations had, 
of course, existed earlier; but their scale and scope increased dra­
matically after about 1850. Criticism of the organizational syn­
thesis developed in the mid-1980s. Some scholars claimed that its 
description of modern America embodied "an unmistakable aura 
of inevitability, a sense that in its broad outlines at least, what has 
happened had to happen." The approach, its critics asserted, did 
not allow enough room in history to protest movements and thus 
"consigns the experiences of vast segments of society to the pe­
riphery of historical analysis and, in the end, leaves incomplete 
our view of modern America."9 
The Pacific Coast city planning experience suggests that, its 
critics notwithstanding, the organizational synthesis approach of­
fers a fruitful way to think about the evolution of late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century America. It was primarily through the 
work of their organizations, usually voluntary associations, that 
businessmen and others worked for and against city planning. 
Chambers of commerce, merchant bodies, architectural and en­
gineering associations, neighborhood improvement groups, and 
labor organizations provided the vehicles through which planning 
advocates and opponents played out their ideas. Moreover, con­
cerns about making urban life more efficient, more orderly, and 
more subject to the desires of planning professionals ran through 
the city planning movements. 
The development of large cities constituted a major aspect of the 
modernization of the United States, and how Americans sought to 
shape their urban environments through planning has been a 
topic under investigation by a generation of historians. Writing in 
the 1960s, scholars prepared encyclopedic accounts of the history 
of city planning in America.10 Their works pointed the way for 
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more detailed research on the subject. Less wide-ranging studies, 
written primarily in the 1970s, examined the origins of the city 
planning movement. Those works showed that early city planning 
arose from diverse sources, ranging from municipal art move­
ments to the efforts of engineers to design new urban sewer sys­
tems.11 They reached less agreement, however, about the extent 
to which the city beautiful movement came to grips with the social 
and economic difficulties urbanites faced.12 
In the 1980s, scholars investigated more fully the questions of 
causation in the development of city planning, the political con­
flicts surrounding the unfolding of planning campaigns, and the 
results of the planning efforts. Historians and social scientists re­
newed their interest in the history of city planning, and approached 
the topic from different points of view. A growing concern over the 
perceived failures of American cities in particular led scholars to 
reexamine the origins and growth of the nation's city planning 
movement. 
Much of the interest initially originated with those who came to 
the topic from a Marxist or New-Left approach, deeply disillu­
sioned with American society, politics, and institutions. Christine 
Boyer found that in the first two decades of the twentieth century 
planning was directed at imposing social discipline upon an unruly 
urban populace and providing city services needed for private 
commercial and industrial growth.13 In the same vein, Richard 
Fogelsong saw in planning the unfolding of two contradictions: 
"the contradiction between the social character of land and its 
private ownership and control" and "a contradiction between the 
need to socialize the control of urban space . . . and the danger 
of truly socializing, that is, democratizing, the control of urban 
land."14 Fogelsong found in early twentieth century planning "an 
attempt to create social and moral cohesiveness in a heteroge­
neous urban society in which face-to-face methods of social con­
trol had proven unworkable."15 
One need not share Boyers and Fogelsong's orientation to 
agree that some of the planning movement was elitist in lead­
ership and that it sought to impose the values of middle-class 
businessmen and professionals upon other segments of society. 
Their analysis is, however, incomplete. It obscures much of the 
complexity of the planning movement, and particularly why it was 
only partially successful. Businessmen were far from unified in 
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their approaches to planning. They came into conflict with other 
groups of businessmen and with other professionals much more 
frequently than Boyer and Fogelsong suggest, and those divisions 
greatly weakened planning efforts. 
Less ideologically motivated have been the recent works of 
other scholars. In her examination of how Chicago, Boston, and 
Baltimore rebuilt after being destroyed by catastrophic fires, 
Christine Rosen has shown that, by eliminating old structures, 
natural disasters can clear the way for urban redevelopment. She 
has also demonstrated, however, that disasters may not remove all 
of the limitations to redevelopment, for political barriers may re­
main. Rosen's study is particularly compelling for suggesting a 
way of viewing events in San Francisco after that city's earthquake 
and fire in 1906.16 Stanley Schultz has surveyed improvement and 
planning efforts in the nineteenth century, focusing on the work of 
engineers to devise sewer and water systems. Here originated, 
Schultz has argued, the source of city planning efforts in the twen­
tieth century. Looking briefly at the city beautiful movement, 
Schultz has found in it far more "than mere aesthetics." Like the 
progressive movement—of which, according to Schultz, it was a 
part—the city beautiful movement sought to "restore order to a 
chaotic society, to render more efficient the functioning of all 
human endeavors, and above all, to reinstate morality as the core 
of human behavior."17 
The City Beautiful Movement by historian William Wilson offers 
the most thorough examination of city planning during the Pro­
gressive Era. Examining planning movements in Harrisburg, 
Denver, Seattle, Dallas, and Kansas City, Wilson concludes that 
the efforts were realistic attempts to handle urban problems. In 
their planning work "middle- and upper-middle-class Americans 
attempted] to refashion their cities into beautiful, functional en­
tities."18 The city beautiful movement was, Wilson has observed, 
at one and the same time "a cultural, aesthetic, political, and en­
vironmental movement" that achieved considerable success.19 In 
addition to its physical improvements, the movement gave Ameri­
cans a sense that comprehensive planning was possible. Taking an 
approach at variance with those of Boyer and Fogelson, Wilson 
views planning in the early twentieth century as a positive and 
optimistic effort to remake the nation's cities. 
The study of planning also contributes to our understanding of 
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the roles cities played in the development of American frontiers, 
especially in the trans-Mississippi West.20 Scholars have recog­
nized for some time now that cities were crucial to the opening of 
frontiers to settlement, and solid urban biographies exist for a 
number of Pacific Coast cities.21 Historians have also prepared 
broader studies emphasizing the significance of cities in the re­
gional development of the Far West.22 Recent interest has focused 
on western cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen­
turies and, in particular, the question of to what degree their de­
velopment may have differed from that of their eastern counter­
parts.23 
Particularly important have been the studies of Gunther Barth 
and Lawrence Larson. Writing about Denver and San Francisco, 
Barth has postulated that those cities developed differently from 
urban centers elsewhere. They grew up very rapidly as "instant 
cities," telescoping into just one or two generations the economic, 
social, and cultural developments that most cities required much 
longer to attain. Barth asserts, "The rapid rise of San Francisco 
and Denver distinguished them from most other American cities, 
which matured from settlement to town over many decades and 
even centuries."24 Moreover, because of the rapidity of their growth, 
Denver and San Francisco possessed much more fluid social, po­
litical, and cultural structures and norms than other metropolises. 
To the contrary, Larson has found in his study of the history of 
twenty-four western cities, including Denver and San Francisco, 
that western cities were similar to their eastern counterparts in 
most respects. He concludes, "In building cities western pioneers 
followed what they understood best . . . [and] they rigidly copied 
older concepts of urban planning."25 
Seattle, Portland, Oakland, and Los Angeles—like San Fran­
cisco and Denver—grew up very rapidly, perhaps justifying the 
application of the label "instant city" to them. More than any 
other single factor, their runaway growth and its influence on 
businessmen led to the development of planning movements in 
those cities. Nonetheless, the planning efforts were very similar to 
those that arose in eastern and midwestern cities at about the 
same time. In fact, most of the plans were prepared by well-known 
eastern planners who paid scant attention to the western settings 
of the Pacific Coast cities. 
The study of Pacific Coast city planning enhances our com­
9 
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prehension of how businessmen related to their changing social 
and economic environments. America's foremost business histo­
rians have examined the relationships between businessmen and 
their environments in different ways. In a number of broad-rang­
ing studies, Thomas Cochran has looked at national develop­
ments, illustrating well the growth of a business culture in the 
United States.26 More interested in the evolution of the business 
firm and its management, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., has written 
extensively about the rise of big business in America.27 Much 
remains to be learned about how businessmen related to their 
regional and local environments.28 Findings about the roles busi­
nessmen played in the planning movements of Pacific Coast cities 
suggest strongly that, just as they sought to make their business 
environments more predictable through the adoption of modern 
management techniques for their firms, so, too, did businessmen 
try to use city planning to stabilize their urban environments. Just 
as they were coming to view themselves as professionals and ex­
perts in the management of their companies, so, too, did business 
leaders view planners as experts in the running of cities. 
The Scope of This Study 
This work examines the genesis of city planning, looks at how 
businessmen and others sought through politics to put their ideas 
into practice, and examines the results of the planning efforts. 
Most importantly, this volume contributes to our understanding of 
the Progressive era in American history and the politics of city 
planning as part of the political ferment of that period. Second­
arily, it adds to our comprehension of the nature of western cities, 
especially the degree to which they were similar or different from 
their eastern counterparts. Finally, this volume increases our un­
derstanding of the roles businessmen have played in shaping 
American society and culture. 
Chapter 1 sets the stage for the examination of city planning by 
analyzing the social and economic development of Seattle, Port­
land, Oakland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. Those five me­
tropolises are logical cities to compare in their planning efforts, 
1 0 
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for in their economic roots and in their social origins—and how 
these changed over time—they shared many characteristics. While 
those centers participated in the spread of a national network of 
cities in America, the fact that they grew up on the Pacific Coast 
lent a commonality to their development. 
San Francisco, the subject of chapter 2, was one of the first 
American cities for which a Progressive-Era city plan was drafted. 
Moreover, because of the destruction caused by its 1906 earth­
quake and fire, San Francisco had an unusual chance to embrace 
planning as a guide for its growth in the twentieth century. Why 
San Franciscans passed up the opportunity to construct a new 
planned city reveals a great deal about the political, as opposed to 
the physical, limitations to city planning in the United States. 
Chapters 3,4, and 5 investigate the evolution of planning in the 
other major cities of the Pacific Coast. Chapter 3 looks at planning 
in Oakland and Los Angeles. Charles Mumford Robinson pre­
pared plans for both cities. Oakland and Los Angeles also pio­
neered in the use of zoning as a planning tool. Turning from Cal­
ifornia to the Pacific Northwest, chapter 4 examines the course of 
events in Seattle. Seattleites considered the most highly engi­
neered, the most technically proficient, plan drawn up for a Pa­
cific Coast city, only to reject it in the end. Chapter 5 looks at 
Portland. The voters of Portland approved the adoption of a city 
plan as a guide for the development of their metropolis, the only 
people on the Pacific Coast to do so; but they soon ignored the 
plan in the rapid expansion of their city. 
Finally, chapter 6 draws conclusions about the nature of city 
planning on the Pacific Coast. The chapter assesses what was and 
was not accomplished and compares the experiences of Pacific 
Coast cities with planning to those of cities elsewhere in the nation. 
1 1 
The Pacific Coast

San Francisco §  5 Oakland 
CALIFORNIA 
Los Angeles 
Pacific

Ocean

From Village to Metropolis

W,rriting in 1878, the historian John S. Hittell described San 
V Vnl Francisco as the "leading center of population, commerce, indus­
try, wealth, luxury. . . intellectual, political and financial activity" 
of the Pacific Coast. San Francisco was, he observed, "the most 
brilliant center of civilization in the bosom of the North Pacific 
and the metropolis of the western coast of the United States."1 As 
Hittell suggested, cities like San Francisco were supremely im­
portant in the development of the Pacific Coast. Urban centers 
acted as catalysts transforming the back country into settled areas. 
San Francisco, Oakland, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Portland led 
the growth of the Pacific Coast to become in the early twentieth 
century one of the more heavily urbanized sections of the United 
States.2 Even as they altered the Pacific Coast, the cities them­
selves changed. As they grew, they became more and more spa­
tially dispersed and increasingly diverse in terms of the social and 
economic backgrounds of their residents. 
While rapidly growing and changing, the Pacific Coast cities 
were hardly unique. The United States was becoming a distinctly 
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urban nation in the years between the Civil War and World War I. 
Through transportation improvements, especially the telegraph 
and railroad, America became more and more a nation of inter­
connected large cities, in which regional and national urban net­
works grew.3 The story of the rise of Pacific Coast cities is, in part, 
an account of the roles they played in the development of urban 
networks in the United States in general and in the Far West in 
particular. 
Economic Growth 
From the outset, the Pacific Coast grew up as largely urban, 
one of the more heavily urbanized regions in the United States.4 
In fact, Pacific Coast cities developed rapidly in the late nine­
teenth century—so quickly that some of them differed fundamen­
tally in their early development from the evolution of most other 
cities in the United States. They were "instant cities," centers 
compressing the process of urbanization normally requiring many 
decades to complete into just one or two generations.5 Such de­
velopment was most pronounced in San Francisco (and beyond 
the Pacific Coast in Denver and Chicago), but all of the other 
major Pacific Coast cities shared to some degree in that pattern of 
growth.6 
San Francisco quickly became the preeminent commercial 
center of the Pacific Coast. Possessing one of the two good natural 
harbors on the coast (Seattle had the other), San Francisco had 
Population Growth in Pacific Coast Cities 
189O 1900 1910 
SAN FRANCISCO 298,997 342,782 416,912 
OAKLAND 48,682 66,960 150,174 
LOS ANGELES 50,395 102,479 319,198 
SEATTLE 42,837 80,671 237,194 
PORTLAND 46,385 90,426 207,214 
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well-established trade connections with the Atlantic Coast, Eu­
rope, Mexico, Latin America, Hawaii, and the Far East even be­
fore the discovery of gold at Sutter's Mill in 1848. Nonetheless, it 
was the tremendous expansion of commerce resulting from the 
gold rush that provided the city with its initial spurt of growth. As 
the jumping-off point for the diggings, San Francisco controlled 
the gold rush of the late 1840s and early 1850s. While San Fran­
cisco's basic economic function as a transshipment point did not 
change from Mexican to American times, the goods handled did. 
Gold became the chief export, reaching $54 million in value at its 
highest point in 1853. Imports became increasingly varied: lum­
ber from Maine, agricultural goods and more lumber from the 
Pacific Northwest, flour from Chile, silk and rice from China, and 
manufactured products from the cities of the East Coast.7 From a 
hamlet of fewer than five hundred residents in 1846, San Fran­
cisco became a boomtown of fifty thousand a scant ten years later. 
By 1870 San Francisco was a city of nearly 150,000; and ten years 
later it had become a metropolis of 234,000, the ninth largest city in 
the United States. Trade continued to drive San Francisco's growth. 
Well into the late nineteenth century, the city controlled nearly all 
of the commerce within California, most of the coastal trade of the 
Pacific Coast, and much of the foreign trade of the region.8 San 
Francisco emerged as the financial center of the Pacific Coast. The 
actions of William Ralston, the president of the Bank of California, 
force-fed the growth of San Francisco in the early and mid-i87OS. 
An urban entrepreneur, Ralston used bank funds and his own in­
come, both derived from the control the bank exerted over the 
silver mines of Nevada's Comstock Lode, to finance the construc­
tion of theaters, hotels, carriage works, woolen mills, sugar refin­
eries, and furniture factories in San Francisco. Ever an optimist, 
Ralston eventually overreached himself, however. In 1875 the Bank 
of California was forced to close its doors, and Ralston was found 
dead a short time later, an apparent suicide.9 
Merchants, bankers, and real estate men—not manufacturers— 
made early San Francisco. Yet, although not as important as com­
merce in San Francisco's development, manufacturing rose in 
significance as time passed. As early as i860, San Francisco ranked 
ninth among American cities in the value of its manufactures, but 
52 percent of all of the manufacturing in the city had to do with 
the refining of gold and silver. During the next five decades, the 
FROM VILLAGE TO METROPOLIS

city developed a more varied industrial base in food processing, 
the fabrication of clothing, ironmaking, and shipbuilding. By 1910 
some 32 percent of the city's work force had manufacturing jobs, 
compared to 39 percent in trade and transportation.10 
Across San Francisco Bay, Oakland grew up as a bedroom sub­
urb of San Francisco, with many of its inhabitants embarking daily 
by ferry to work in the larger city. One real estate brochure of the 
1880s claimed that "seven thousand San Francisco merchants own 
superb homes in Oakland and educate their children here." Oak­
land's residents prided themselves on the bucolic nature of their 
town. Streets lined with oak trees and beautiful real estate subdivi­
sions won their praise and the accolades of visitors to their town. 
"We stopped at Oakland for the reason that we had heard so much 
of the beauty of the place," wrote a visitor from New York in 1880. 
"We found it beautiful indeed." A pamphlet distributed by the 
Board of Trade stressed the advantages of living in Oakland in 
terms of its climate, noting that "its atmosphere is pure, and at the 
same time mild; bracing, yet with an Italian softness."11 
Oakland emerged as a major Pacific Coast city in the years 
1890 through 1910. As late as 1890, Oakland possessed only one-
sixth of the population of San Francisco, but two decades later 
Oakland was one-third the size its larger neighbor. By 1910 Oak­
land possessed three-quarters as many residents as Portland, 
three-fifths as many as Seattle, and one-half of the number living 
in Los Angeles. The Oakland Chamber of Commerce closed one 
of its meetings in 1906 with the simple statement, "Oakland is to 
be the metropolis of the West."12 Both commercial and industrial 
developments lay behind Oakland's growth. Harbor improve­
ments allowed Oakland to take over much of the coastal and for­
eign trade once going through San Francisco, until by 1910 about 
30 percent of the freight tonnage passing through the Golden 
Gate was handled by Oakland merchants. Oakland also became a 
center of industry. The city had always possessed some local in­
dustries: breweries, canneries, and cotton mills. With better trans­
portation links resulting from the improvements to their harbor 
and the entrance of additional railroads to their city, Oakland 
manufacturers were able to increase the scope of their opera­
tions. They benefited as well from the earthquake and fire that 
destroyed much of San Francisco in 1906, since many of the dam­
aged city's industries relocated in relatively intact Oakland.13 
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Developments in Southern California seemed more difficult to 
explain. Writing in 1902, a San Francisco insuranceman won­
dered about the growth taking place in Los Angeles. Like many 
people of his time, he was baffled by the city's rapid expansion. 
Neither manufacturing, foreign trade, nor the possession of a pro­
ductive hinterland seemed to lie behind the city's development. 
Like many other San Franciscans, however, he viewed Los Ange­
les as a growing threat to his city's hegemony over the Pacific 
Coast. As he put it in a business magazine: 
The oftener one visits Los Angeles the more certain he be­
comes that it is a freak creation. There is really no actual 
reason for its being—i.e. as a handsome big city. It is not a 
manufacturing town, nor a commercial city; neither has it a 
big productive area around it. . .  . All the same there is no 
disputing the fact that it is here. A big fine-appearing city— 
architecturally infinitely superior to San Francisco or any 
other coast town.14 
Far from being a new settlement when California entered the 
Union in 1850, Los Angeles was almost seventy years old; but there 
was little about the town that foreshadowed its development as a 
great metropolis. Los Angeles was a nondescript agricultural vil­
lage of 1,610, geographically isolated from the rest of the United 
States. Nor did that status change quickly, for the gold rush passed 
Los Angeles by. Lacking San Francisco's good harbor and nearby 
natural resources, Los Angeles seemed destined to obscurity. In 
1876 the town still possessed only six thousand inhabitants.15 
The coming of the railroad changed the situation. In 1876 the 
residents of Los Angeles approved a $600,000 subsidy to attract 
the Southern Pacific Railroad. When the line was completed a 
few years later, Los Angeles possessed its first transcontinental 
connection, and a second was added when the Atchison, Topeka, 
and Santa Fe Railroad entered the town in 1883. To increase traf­
fic the railroads sought to attract settlers and mounted a national 
advertising campaign that pictured Southern California as a Gar­
den of Eden. Rate wars meant that cheap overland transportation 
was available (for a time in 1887 the cost of traveling from the 
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Mississippi Valley to Los Angeles was reduced to only one dol­
lar), w 
People came to Los Angeles in a series of booms. A health 
boom attracted many in the 1880s as they sought Southern Cal­
ifornia's year-long, mild, Mediterrean climate and natural beauty. 
With its "perpetual spring," Los Angeles was, its boosters de­
clared, "a veritable sanitorium." Still others came to Los Angeles 
to retire. By 1910, 21 percent of the city's residents were over the 
age of fifty-five, a proportion considerably higher than the 14 to 17 
percent in most American cities. The possibilities of growing 
fruit, especially oranges, drew others into the region. An oil boom 
beckoned to still more. By 1914 California had moved into first 
place among the oil-producing states of the nation, with much of 
the oil gushing from wells in Southern California.17 
More significant than either oil or oranges was real estate spec­
ulation. Beginning in the 1880s, the work of subdividers eager to 
attract buyers advanced the economy of Los Angeles in a series of 
booms and busts. The interaction of immigrants with real estate 
men was the force that seemed to create in Los Angeles its insub­
stantial quality. The work of Henry Huntington was of special im­
portance. In a manner similar to William Ralston several decades 
earlier in San Francisco, Huntington played the role of urban 
entrepreneur. Through his control of companies in a triad of in­
terrelated industries—real estate, electric street railroads, and 
electric power generation—Huntington both built up Los Ange­
les and bolstered his private fortune during the first two decades 
of the twentieth century.18 Only in the very late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries did Los Angeles start becoming a center 
for commerce and industry, and even then the activities of real 
estate developers remained more significant than those of mer­
chants and manufacturers in the city's advance.19 
What San Francisco was for the entire Pacific Coast, Portland 
was on a smaller scale for many years to the Pacific Northwest, 
the premier commercial city. Founded in 1844 on the banks of the 
Willamette River just upstream from its confluence with the Co­
lumbia River, Portland possessed valuable water connections to 
the Pacific Ocean. Portland's first significant burst of growth 
came with the gold rush to California. Abandoning the mines, 
some people settled in Oregon. More importantly, San Francis­
cans needed food grown in Oregon's rich Willamette Valley and 
18

FROM VILLAGE TO METROPOLIS 
lumber from the forests of the Pacific Northwest, and much of the 
trade in those goods passed through the hands of Portland's mer­
chants. Through their control of that commerce and of local trade, 
Portland businessmen were able in the 1850s and 1860s to achieve 
dominance over their rivals in nearby communities, boosting 
their town to a position of regional power.20 
Portland continued to develop as a commercial center for the 
next half century. When the demands of San Franciscans slack­
ened, Portland merchants extended their reach for markets; and 
in that action they were aided by the coming of transcontinental 
railroads to their city in the 1870s and 1880s. The railroads helped 
Portland's business leaders both participate in America's growing 
national market and extend their sway over a regional hinterland 
reaching from Oregon into eastern Washington and parts of west­
ern Idaho and Montana.21 As a center for increasingly diversified 
trade, Portland experienced steadier growth than Los Angeles or 
San Francisco for most of the nineteenth century and had a popu­
lation reaching forty-six thousand by 1890.22 
Growth soon accelerated. Portland's population doubled in 
the 1890s and then doubled again in the first decade of the twen­
tieth century to reach 207,000. Much of Portland's development 
continued to be based on trade. The expansion of farming in west­
ern Oregon and the upper Columbian Basin led to a population 
increase of 500,000 in Portland's interior hinterland in the open­
ing years of the twentieth century. Portland also benefited from a 
substantial increase in demand for Pacific Northwest lumber. 
Associated with the trade expansion was the growth of industry, 
as Portland businessmen set up furniture factories, canning plants, 
and flour mills to process the fruits of field and forest. Still more 
was involved. Portland became large enough to support manufac­
turing and service industries geared to its home market, which in 
turn helped set off a real estate boom that pushed the value of 
new building permits granted in Portland up 400 percent be­
tween 1905 and 1911. By 1910 Portland was in the midst of pros­
perity. There was, wrote one of the city's journalists, "no cloud on 
the horizon."23 
Such optimism was partially misplaced, for Seattle was rapidly 
replacing Portland as the leading center of commerce, industry, 
and population in the Pacific Northwest. Founded in 1851 on 
Elliot Bay in Puget Sound, Seattle was in its early days a lumber 
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town, with San Francisco as its major market. An Indian scare, 
poor transportation links to the rest of the country, a scarcity of 
women (only twenty of its two hundred inhabitants in i860 were 
women), and recurrent fires limited Seattle's growth. The town 
possessed only 3,533 inhabitants in 1880.24 
Seattle's rapid development, like that of Los Angeles and Oak­
land, began when the city acquired rail connections to the Mid­
west and East. In the 1880s, Seattle secured indirect links through 
the Northern Pacific; and in 1893 the Great Northern designated 
Seattle as its western terminal point, giving Seattle direct connec­
tions to eastern markets.25 The rail lines were completed just in 
time for Seattle to benefit from further developments in the 1890s. 
With much of the Great Lakes states cut over, America came to 
depend more heavily than before on the Pacific Northwest for its 
lumber; and Seattle, like Portland, helped supply that demand. 
Weyerhaueser Lumber made Seattle its new home as the firm 
moved west. Even more explosive, although also more short-
lived, was the impact on Seattle of the gold rush to Alaska. Pos­
sessing a fine natural harbor and ambitious merchants, Seattle 
benefited more than San Francisco or Portland as an outfitting 
point for the North.26 At the same time, local railroads opened 
coal mines and farming areas near Seattle. The exploitation of its 
regional hinterland was as important as the opening of national 
markets for Seattle's continuing development. Pushed by those 
events, Seattle's population reached forty-three thousand by 1890 
and eighty-one thousand ten years later.27 
Seattle's population then tripled to 237,000 in 1910. Much of 
the growth occurred as an extension of trends begun earlier. The 
lumber industry, a rich farming hinterland, and coastal and for­
eign trade remained important underpinnings in the city's devel­
opment. In addition, new industries developed beyond the small-
scale, local stage: shipbuilding, the salmon industry (Seattleites 
controlled the Alaskan as well as the local fishing industry), and 
ironmaking. Perhaps most importantly, as was taking place at 
about the same time in Portland, Seattle became a large enough 
market in and of itself to spur the growth of a wide variety of 
manufacturing and service businesses. As a result, Seattle's econ­
omy became more diversified than in earlier years.28 
All of the Pacific Coast cities thus grew initially as commercial 
cities exploiting natural resources in the hinterlands at their com­
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mand.29 San Francisco received its boost from the gold rush to 
California, and Oakland initially fed upon San Francisco's devel­
opment. Los Angeles benefited from a series of health, real estate, 
fruit-growing, and oil booms in Southern California. Portland and 
Seattle owed their growth to numerous causes, but most impor­
tantly to the control they exerted over the agricultural and lum­
ber industries of the Pacific Northwest. 
Commerce would long remain at the heart of the Pacific Coast 
cities, and, indeed, is still very important to them today. Unlike 
some eastern and midwestern cities, those on the Pacific Coast 
did not become national industrial centers. Commerce lay at 
their core into at least the 1920s. Nonetheless, the economies of 
the Pacific Coast cities became increasingly diversified with the 
passage of time. Industrial and service businesses developed to 
serve the growing populations of the cities and their hinterlands; 
and in some cases, most notably in that of San Francisco, the new 
businesses reached beyond local markets to regional and even 
national markets. In short, as time passed, Pacific Coast cities— 
like many cities elsewhere in the United States—moved beyond 
their origins to become complex centers of economic activity. 
Spatial and Population 
Development 
As the Pacific Coast cities developed, they spread outward to 
cover larger areas and their populations became more diverse. 
New methods of transportation, especially electric street rail­
roads, enabled the cities to cover more and more land, just as was 
happening in urban centers elsewhere in America. At the same 
time, the movement of immigrants into some of the Pacific Coast 
cities and the differentiation of their economies led to division of 
the populations into distinct groups. Neighborhoods distinguished 
by race or income level formed. The growth of industry, however 
hesitant, also contributed to social divisions, as socioeconomic 
classes began developing. Social conflict, both real and perceived, 
came to characterize the cities, as people of different classes and 
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backgrounds lived in spatially separated neighborhoods that 
seemed to have little in common. 
San Francisco never possessed a socially homogeneous popu­
lation. As a magnet for fortune-seekers of all sorts, the city at­
tracted a diverse citizenry from the first, and that diversity per­
sisted into the twentieth century.30 In 1900, 30 percent of the 
city's population was foreign-born, and an additional 40 percent 
had parents who were born abroad. While 94 percent of the pop­
ulation was white (5 percent was Chinese or Japanese, and 0.5 
percent black), many nationalities were represented—Irish, Ger­
mans, English, and Italians being the most common.31 Socio­
economic divisions also separated San Franciscans. By the early 
twentieth century, San Francisco was the most heavily unionized 
city on the Pacific Coast, and one of the more heavily unionized in 
the United States. Labor-management conflict was common, of­
ten going beyond the lines of single crafts to pit workers against 
employers throughout the city almost as warring groups, espe­
cially from 1901 onward.32 
Hemmed in by geographic barriers—San Francisco Bay to the 
north and east, high hills to the west—San Francisco was more 
densely populated than the other Pacific Coast cities, and in the 
1870s and 1880s distinct neighborhoods grew up. Most lasted with 
only a few changes into the twentieth century: the South of Mar­
ket District of young, unskilled men living in boardinghouses, the 
Mission District made up of skilled workers, often Irish, the Ital­
ian North Beach, Chinatown, the middle-class Western Addition, 
the upper-class Nob Hill and Pacific Heights, and so forth. In the 
early twentieth century tunnels were bored through the hills and 
streetcar lines built to open new areas to settlement—the Rich­
mond District, a middle-class area, being the most notable. Neigh­
borhood developments reinforced the economic and ethnic 
divisions perceived by some of San Francisco's business leaders, 
barriers they hoped to break down through city planning.33 
Across San Francisco Bay, Oakland possessed a more homoge­
neous population. However, small black, Japanese, and Chinese 
populations established themselves, each living in its own part of 
town; and, as the city developed an industrial base, a wider vari­
ety of whites settled there. More noticeable than the development 
of ethnic neighborhoods was the growth of middle-class and upper-
class areas—Piedmont, Montclair, Trestle Glen, the Crocker High­
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lands—within the existing city limits, a development made possi­
ble by the rapid adoption of the electric street railroad. Oakland 
also grew by annexation, especially in the years 1897 through 1910, 
when it acquired Temescal, Linda Vista, Peralta, Claremont, Fruit-
vale, Melrose, Fitchberg, and Elmhurst. Much less densely popu­
lated than San Francisco, Oakland covered sixty-three square miles 
by 1910, up from only a few square miles thirty years before.34 
Like Oakland, Los Angeles had a more uniform population 
than San Francisco. In the nineteenth century native white Amer­
icans and immigrants from western Europe comprised most of 
the population of Los Angeles, but the city's population grew 
more diversified in the early twentieth century as Los Angeles 
attracted immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, Mexico, 
and Japan. Even so, only 4 percent of the population was non­
white in 1910, and only 19 percent was composed of foreign-born 
whites. Much of the population was made up of farmers and small-
town folk who moved from the Midwest or Great Plains to retire. 
As the historian Robert Fogelson has noted, the great majority of 
the residents of Los Angeles "fit well within the broad range of 
the middle class, had rural midwestern, or at least native Ameri­
can backgrounds."35 
More than any other Pacific Coast city, Los Angeles sprawled. 
Real estate subdividers working with the owners of streetcar lines 
(often the same people, as in the case of Henry Huntington) led to 
an "unmatched residential dispersal" in Los Angeles. Already larger 
in area than its Pacific Coast rivals by 1910 (though still smaller in 
population than San Francisco), Los Angeles continued to out­
pace them in succeeding years. By 1930 Los Angeles trailed only 
New York in area among American cities, and it was nearly twice 
as large as the combined areas of San Francisco and Oakland.36 
Sharper divisions among different segments of its citizenry ac­
companied Portland's growth. By 1910 about 21 percent of the 
city's residents were of foreign birth and another 25 percent were 
of foreign or mixed parentage. Immigrant neighborhoods devel­
oped. Jewish communities, which had long existed, increased in 
importance to the point that they had their own newspaper and a 
leader acknowledged as their mayor. One section of the city be­
came the center of an Italian colony, and another was inhabited 
by Greek railroad workers. Substantial bodies of blacks, Chinese, 
and Japanese also lived in the town.37 
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When compared to the much more heavily unionized cities of 
San Francisco and Seattle, Portland was relatively free of labor-
management strife. Like Los Angeles, Portland was known as a 
nonunion town. Nonetheless, organized labor increased its strength 
in Portland during the opening decade of the twentieth century. In 
1908 the city's unions formed a Central Labor Council to coordi­
nate their activities, and a few months later business leaders set up 
the Employers Association of Oregon in opposition. Growing class 
divisions found political outlets. In 1909 the Portland Labor Press 
led a successful drive to deprive a real estate developer of the city's 
mayoralty because his "administration, if he is elected, will be a riot 
of business, big business." Two years later, the Longshoremen's 
Union spearheaded a movement that organized the Workingmen's 
Political Club, which endorsed candidates with "the labor point-of­
view" for election to city offices.38 
Like most of the other Pacific Coast cities, Portland experi­
enced rapid spatial expansion. In 1891 Portland, East Portland, 
and Albina consolidated, boosting Portland's area from seven to 
twenty-five square miles. During the next twenty years, the elec­
tric street railroad opened outlying areas to settlement; and, as 
real estate developers worked with the owners of streetcar com­
panies, suburbs grew up. Particularly important was the growth 
of the area east of the Willamette River, for conflict between 
businessmen in that newly developing area with those in the long-
established district west of the river would make it difficult for 
Portland's business community to reach agreements on city plan­
ning measures. At the same time, interurbans made Portland's 
downtown business district accessible to the residents of nearby 
communities. As those people began shopping in Portland, the 
economic bases of their towns eroded, and many of the formerly 
independent towns were annexed to Portland.39 
Those developments increased Portland's size to nearly fifty 
square miles by 1915. The spatial growth segmented Portland 
physically, for it was haphazard. Despite a consolidation move­
ment, Portland still possessed several competing streetcar lines 
serving the city in an uncoordinated manner in the early twen­
tieth century. The city's geography, like that of Seattle and San 
Francisco, also made geographic unity difficult to achieve. High 
hills and the Willamette River divided parts of the metropolis. 
As Seattle entered the twentieth century, its population lost 
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whatever homogeneity it may have had when the city was a fron­
tier town. As in Portland and Los Angeles, about 20 percent of 
Seattleites were of foreign birth in 1910. Most of the immigrants 
came from the German states in Seattle's early days; but many 
came from Scandinavia, Canada, China, and Japan as well. Ethnic 
neighborhoods grew up—a Chinatown, a Japantown, a Jewish 
area, a Little Italy, a Russian neighborhood, and Scandinavian 
enclaves—but they never assumed the importance of ethnic neigh­
borhoods in San Francisco or in many eastern cities. Despite the 
influx of some foreigners, Seattle, like Los Angeles, maintained 
something of a midwestern flavor, with about one-quarter of its 
residents having been born in the Midwest and with many of its 
foreign-born inhabitants having lived there for substantial periods 
before moving on to Seattle.40 
Although ethnicity became increasingly significant in seg­
menting Seattleites into different groups, occupational and eco­
nomic status was of greater importance.41 While some members 
of different groups were dispersed throughout Seattle, residential 
patterns based on occupation developed in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Moreover, like San Francisco, 
Seattle was heavily unionized and experienced much labor-man­
agement strife during the opening decades of the twentieth cen­
tury. As in San Francisco and Portland, geographic features, hills 
and bodies of water, also helped define neighborhoods. Finally, 
Seattle greatly expanded its area by annexing many previously 
independent towns—Ballard, Wallingford, Georgetown, and 
others—in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mak­
ing any sense of civic unity difficult to achieve.42 
Urban Networks and 
Intercity Rivalry 
Cities have always been important in the development of the 
United States, but their rapid growth after the Civil War greatly 
increased their significance. As early as the 1840s and 1850s, ac­
cording to the urban geographer Allan Pred, an urban network 
FROM VILLAGE TO METROPOLIS

was fast arising. By those decades, he observed, "the total pattern 
of interurban relationships, or interdependencies, that either 
continued or appeared for the first time was complex to a degree 
that suggests a more than rudimentary integration among the ex­
panding membership of the nation's city-system."43 Other schol­
ars have traced the emergence of such a network to the late nine­
teenth century. It was then, the urban historian Blake McKelvey 
has explained, that "a closely integrated galaxy of cities" grew up. 
In i860 the United States possessed 141 centers of at least eight 
thousand inhabitants, but by 1910 the number of such towns and 
cities had increased nearly sixfold. By 1920, for the first time in 
the history of their nation, more Americans lived in towns and 
cities of twenty-five hundred or more inhabitants than resided on 
farms or in villages.44 
Western cities were part of the urban network from their first 
days. San Francisco was connected to the East by sailing ships 
and was dependent upon eastern sources for all types of goods, 
from groceries to metal products. With the completion of trans­
continental railroads to the Pacific Coast cities in the late nine­
teenth century, the centers became increasingly linked to na­
tional developments. Pacific Coast businessmen were proud of 
the growing roles their cities played in the national urban net­
work. For them, it was a matter of some consequence that their 
cities be acknowledged as the equals of urban centers in the East 
and Midwest, for such recognition would, they thought, help 
them attract businesses and settlers. As a leading member of San 
Francisco's Chamber of Commerce explained in 1911, a time 
when the city's residents were considering civic improvements in 
preparation for the 1915 world's fair, "the eyes of the world are. . . 
upon San Francisco. Prospective real estate investors the world 
over are looking toward San Francisco . . . Let us prepare for our 
guests by cleaning house."45 
If Pacific Coast cities were part of a growing national urban 
network, they nonetheless remained tied to their West Coast 
heritages. They were members of a regional network of cities and 
towns. In fact, as their hinterlands developed, Pacific Coast cities 
became more and more active as regional centers. The impor­
tance of their regional hinterlands and their membership in a 
regional urban network was most apparent in the economic ri­
valry that developed among the cities of the Pacific Coast. Even 
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while they were concerned with the national reputations of their 
cities, the businessmen were also very interested in their regional 
rankings. To some extent, the intercity rivalry on the Pacific Coast 
mirrored rivalries that had grown between other groups of cities 
at earlier dates. Contests among Boston, Philadephia, and New 
York had enlivened the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen­
turies.46 Competition among Cincinnati, Lexington, St. Louis, 
Louisville, and Pittsburgh spurred the development of the Ohio 
Valley; and rivalry between St. Louis and Chicago contributed to 
the growth of the Midwest.47 
Central to the contest for hegemony over the Pacific Coast were 
battles to control its economic hinterland, with its rich resources in 
minerals, lumber, and agricultural products. The struggle for the 
interior took place in two overlapping stages. As they matured, 
Portland and Seattle eroded the control that San Francisco once 
maintained over the Pacific Northwest. Then contests developed 
at more local levels. Seattle and Portland battled for the Pacific 
Northwest, while Oakland and Los Angeles challenged San Fran­
cisco for dominance within California.48 San Franciscans were 
quick to bewail the change. As one merchant lamented in 1893: 
Our city is in a state of lethargy and passes her time musing 
upon the past. . .  . A visit to the southern part of the state 
must necessarily move the mind to a very serious considera­
tion of our present inertia. Los Angeles, in a very homely 
western phrase that is suggestive, if not altogether true, says 
that we are "not in it." Today Los Angeles imports directly 
and is competing with San Francisco in towns as far north as 
Merced. We have lost very largely our northern trade [to 
Portland and Seattle], and which country is fast becoming 
important in its commercial sense. Salt Lake and Ogden can 
today deal with the East to their advantage, and Mexico is 
now importing her mining machinery from that district, 
notwithstanding that our city could supply a superior ar­
ticle.49 
Until the 1880s, San Franciscans controlled most of the interior 
of the Pacific Coast as their economic hinterland. Before the com­
ing of the railroad, San Francisco served as the major distributing 
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point for supplies coming around Cape Horn for mining towns 
throughout the West. Even after the completion of the first trans­
continental railroad in 1869, San Francisco retained its dominant 
position when new mining strikes were made. By a circuitous 
water route, goods from San Francisco reached parts of eastern 
Washington, Idaho, and even Montana. In return, many of the 
products of the mines and farms of the Pacific Coast went east 
through San Francisco.50 
However, during the last two decades of the nineteenth cen­
tury Seattle and Portland merchants took over most of the trade 
with the interior of the Pacific Northwest. With the completion of 
the Northern Pacific and Great Northern Railroads, the business­
men of the two cities extended their reach into the countryside; 
and the economic hinterland of San Francisco merchants corre­
spondingly contracted. Although San Francisco merchants could 
wistfully consider competing with their northern counterparts 
for the trade of the Idaho Basin as late as 1912, such hopes had, in 
fact, proved illusory long before.51 Indeed, by the first decade of 
the twentieth century, Portland merchants, blessed by favorable 
railroad rates, had captured much of the trade of northern 
California.52 
As they broke the hold of San Franciscans over the Pacific 
Northwest, Seattle and Portland business leaders came into con­
flict with each other. Portland merchants viewed Seattleites as 
brash upstarts invading what should be their natural trade ter­
ritory—most of the Pacific Northwest, including eastern Wash­
ington. To combat the work of Seattle's businessmen, Portland's 
merchants mounted one trade excursion after another to try to 
keep the products of the interior flowing down the Columbia 
River to their city rather than across the Cascade Mountains by 
railroad to Seattle. In early May 1909, for example, seventy-five 
Portland merchants belonging to that city's Commercial Club 
traveled by train throughout eastern Washington "to advance the 
interests and influence of Portland throughout the territory."53 
Seattle's merchants countered with their own excursions and in 
time won much of the trade in agricultural goods that had pre­
viously traveled to Portland for processing and shipment to market. 
Shortly after they had lost control of the trade of the Pacific 
Northwest, San Francisco businessmen found themselves seri­
ously challenged within their own state by merchants from Los 
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Angeles. The contest for the interior of California centered upon 
the San Joaquin Valley, which became a valuable prize through 
the development of fruit and vegetable farming and by the discov­
ery of oil there. Los Angeles merchants took advantage of the 
confusion following the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906 
to penetrate far north into the valley. San Francisco jobbers soon 
spotted that threat to their livelihood, and in response petitioned 
the California Railroad Commission to restructure railroad rates 
into the valley in a way that would favor them over their southern 
counterparts.54 The effort was of no avail. Accepting arguments 
from Los Angeles businessmen, the commission reduced rates 
from the southern city into the valley on the grounds that increased 
traffic justified lower rates. In 1911 the frustrated secretary of San 
Francisco's Civic League, an organization of the city's leading 
merchants, sourly described the railroad system of California and 
much of the West as being "in the form of a large funnel. . . with 
its spout at Los Angeles."55 
Closely related to the contests for the interior were struggles 
to control the coastal commerce and foreign trade of the Pacific 
Coast. Although by the twentieth century much of the mineral, 
forest, and agricultural goods going to the Pacific Coast cities 
stayed in them to be processed and consumed locally, much was 
also shipped out to other destinations. The imminent completion 
of the Panama Canal in the early twentieth century added a fillip 
to the competition in foreign trade.56 The merchants of all of the 
Pacific Coast cities expected the opening of the canal to increase 
their trade greatly. They, however, tempered their optimism with 
the uneasy realization that they would be in fierce competition 
with each other for that commerce. By the early twentieth cen­
tury, Portland and Seattle, supported by their thriving hinter­
lands, were rivaling San Francisco as seaports. In 1910 the value of 
foreign trade passing through San Francisco was $87 million, that 
going through Seattle $66 million.57 Within California, Oakland 
and Los Angeles challenged San Francisco for trade. As part of 
their planning activities, the business groups sponsored a wide 
range of harbor improvements—new piers, breakwaters, and 
deepwater channels—and, prodded by shippers, city govern­
ments successfully wrested control of their harbors away from 
railroads, which, the merchants believed, were not doing enough 
to develop them. 
FROM VILLAGE TO METROPOLIS

The cities of the Pacific Coast developed primarily as trade 
centers, but in the twentieth century industry grew in signifi­
cance; and here, too, intercity rivalry was important. Portland and 
Seattle came increasingly into conflict with each other for indus­
trial markets. In 1911 and 1912, for example, Portland's manufac­
turers led a Made in Oregon movement, designed to persuade 
their state's residents to purchase products put together only in 
Oregon.58 In California the rivalry pitted manufacturers in San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, and Oakland against each other. The 
earthquake and fire of 1906 slowed San Francisco's industrial ad­
vance. Some firms moved to Oakland and Los Angeles, and rela­
tively few new ones located in San Francisco. To reverse that 
trend, San Francisco industrialists mounted a drive for "home 
patronage of home industry," but to little effect. Los Angeles, in 
particular, moved ahead as a center for oil refineries, rubber plants, 
aviation, and motion pictures, until by 1930 the value of those and 
other products surpassed that of San Francisco's manufacturers.59 
It was to remedy the perceived problems and to take advan­
tage of opportunities resulting from rapid economic, population, 
and spatial growth that some Pacific Coast urbanites, especially 
some businessmen, turned to civic improvements and city plan­
ning. Through planning they hoped to channel economic growth 
along desired lines and place their cities ahead of their urban 
rivals. Through planning they sought to win national recognition 
for their cities as mature members of the nation's expanding ur­
ban network. Through planning they sought to create a sense of 
civic patriotism, thereby healing the population divisions in their 
urban centers, and through planning they hoped to reunite their 
spatially dispersed metropolises. 
San Francisco Rejects the

Burnham Plan

Lt 5:14 A.M. on April 18, 1906, an earthquake less than one 
minute in duration rumbled through San Francisco, leveling build­
ings, rupturing gas pipes, and breaking water mains. The earth­
quake set the stage for disaster. Within just a few hours, local fires 
resulting from the broken gas pipes and overturned stoves co­
alesced into a major conflagration that burned unchecked for three 
days. Mary Austin, who like many others was forced from her home 
by thefire, vividly recounted the scene a few weeks later: 
Before the red night paled into murky dawn thousands of 
people were vomited out of the angry throat of the street far 
down toward Market [Street]. . . . There was a strange, hot, 
sickish smell in the street as if it had become the hollow slot of 
some fiery breathing snake. I came out and stood in the pale 
pinkish glow and saw a man I knew hurrying down toward the 
gutted district. . . "Bob," I said, "it looks like the day of Judg­
ment!"1 
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The fire destroyed the heart of San Francisco—almost five 
square miles encompassing the financial district, the major retail 
district, and much of the wholesale, factory, and entertainment 
sections of the city. Only the harbor facilities, which could be 
protected by streams of water from fireboats, survived in the 
downtown area. Burning an area one and one-half times as large as 
the great Chicago fire of 1871, the San Francisco fire gutted some 
28,000 buildings in 521 blocks. Between 500 and 3,000 people 
died, and another 250,000, about three-fifths of the population, 
were left homeless.2 
Despite its extensive destruction, San Francisco was function­
ing again within a remarkably short time. (The Golden Gate Ten­
nis Club, although handicapped by courts with cracked baselines, 
was able to hold a tournament just three weeks after the earth­
quake.) With immediate recovery under way, San Franciscans 
faced the larger tasks of reconstruction. How would they rebuild 
their city? Would they reconstruct San Francisco as the city had 
existed before the disaster or would they rebuild it along new 
lines? By the destruction they caused, the earthquake and fire re­
moved one of the main impediments to urban modernization. By 
destroying old structures, the disaster removed physical limita­
tions on city development. The opportunity to build anew along 
planned lines was thus most pronounced in San Francisco of all of 
the Pacific Coast cities. Yet, despite the availability of a city plan 
that had been drawn up just before the earthquake and fire, San 
Franciscans rebuilt in a largely unplanned manner, perpetuating 
many of the problems from which they had long suffered. 
Planning Begins in San Francisco 
Efforts to improve San Francisco preceded disaster by about a 
decade, and business organizations led the initial campaigns. 
Foremost among them was the San Francisco Merchants' Associa­
tion, established in 1894 by forty-seven leading merchants and 
bankers. From the first, members equated business development 
with civic progress. According to its constitution, the organization 
was set up "to further the best interests of San Francisco and 
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The 1906 earthquake and fire severely damaged San Francisco's old city hall. From 
the Burnham Plan for San Francisco. 
thereby prove beneficial to the mercantile community." Within

four years the body had 1,003 members and was working for better

street cleaning, lighting, and paving, the establishment of boule­

vards, improved fire protection, and a free public market.3

Businessmen formed other bodies that also pressed for city 
betterments. In 1897 the R-ea' Estate Dealers' Association came 
out for the establishment of a municipally owned water supply.4 
By 1899 San Francisco also possessed at least thirty active neighbor­
hood improvement clubs, composed primarily of local businessmen 
pledged to improving their city's streets, public buildings, sewers, 
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and water supply.5 Like members of the Merchants' Association, 
those belonging to the improvement clubs viewed civic and busi­
ness progress as identical. As one club member observed, the 
improvements "will bring an era of prosperity to San Francisco."6 
Beyond piecemeal improvements for their city, a few San Fran­
ciscans were beginning to think in terms of broader planning. By 
far the most important among these was James Duvall Phelan, Jr. 
Phelan was a second-generation San Franciscan whose father had 
come to the city as a forty-niner and had quickly made a fortune in 
trade, real estate, and banking. Born in 1861 and educated in San 
Francisco, Phelan inherited and added to the family fortune as a 
bank president and real estate developer. His interests soon ex­
tended beyond business to encompass civic affairs. Phelan served 
as the vice-president of the California World's Fair Commission in 
1893 a n d managed the states exhibit in Chicago. Like so many 
who saw the "White City," with its stately buildings grouped ac­
cording to an overall plan, Phelan was profoundly moved by the 
experience. Upon returning to San Francisco, he helped start the 
Mid-Winter Fair in 1894, a local continuation of the Chicago ex­
position.7 
Seeing in politics an arena in which he might leave his imprint 
upon San Francisco, Phelan won election as the city's mayor in 
1896,1898, and 1899. As mayor, Phelan found himself mixing pol­
itics with his desire to improve San Francisco. As a private citizen, 
Phelan had been the president of the San Francisco Art Associa­
tion in 1894 and 1895. While he was mayor, that organization peti­
tioned Phelan to appoint a committee to prepare a plan for the 
"adornment" of San Francisco. Phelan readily complied, setting 
up a committee of businessmen, lawyers, architects, and artists. 
Nothing immediately came of the effort, however.8 
Phelen was more successful in 1898 in winning approval for a 
new city charter from the electorate. Establishing a new board of 
supervisors elected at large (the older one had been elected by 
district), increasing the authority of the mayor, and giving the city 
the power to purchase utilities from private companies, the char­
ter greatly strengthened the city government. The increase in 
power, combined with the fact that the city had the authority in 
most cases to issue its own bonds without prior approval from the 
state legislature, set the stage for more vigorous actions by city 
officials. During the next decade and a half, city officials—prod­
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ded by businessmen—would use their bonding power to improve 
San Francisco (the bonds were general obligation bonds requiring 
a two-thirds favorable vote and paid for primarily by property 
taxes).9 By 1915, San Francisco ranked fourth among all of the 
cities in the United States in terms of per capita revenue receipts 
and outlays.10 
Although he was the most prominent individual to become in­
terested in civic improvements for San Francisco, Phelan was not 
alone. In 1899, for example, B. J. S. Cahill, an English-born archi­
tect who had moved to San Francisco and who had submitted a 
plan for the new University of California campus in Berkeley, put 
forward a plan for the creation of a civic center in San Francisco. 
Cahill called for the rerouting of Market Street, the city's main 
commercial thoroughfare, around an island of three blocks in the 
downtown area and the siting of public buildings on those blocks. 
While nothing resulted immediately from CahilPs urgings, they, like 
Phelan's activities, aroused public interest in civic improvements.11 
By the late 1890s, San Franciscans were, then, becoming in­
creasingly interested in civic improvements. Merchant groups, 
real estate bodies, local improvement associations, and some indi­
vidual businessmen and professionals like Phelan and Cahill were 
putting forward a growing number of ideas and were becoming 
involved in the political process. In 1898 the San Francisco Bul­
letin could accurately observe that "there seems to have arisen a 
general enthusiasm for the beautifying of the city."12 Whether the 
general ideas could be translated into concrete proposals capable 
of winning voter approval would soon be seen. The first test came 
in the 1899 C1ty election when San Franciscans voted on $10 mil­
lion in bonds for sewer, school, park, and hospital improvements. 
The bonds won strong backing from the Merchants' Associa­
tion and some thirty of San Francisco's improvement clubs, joined 
together as the Public Improvement Central Club.13 Through 
civic improvements San Francisco could win recognition for itself 
and, as Andrea Sbarboro, the president of the Italian-American 
Bank and the head of the Public Improvement Central Club, ex­
plained, assume its proper place in the nation's urban network. "It 
behooves all citizens to advance San Francisco to the place to 
which her natural advantages entitle her," he argued.14 Direct 
economic benefits were possible. "Beautifying a city pays enor­
mous returns on the expenditure . . . [as] demonstrated in the case 
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of Paris," Sbarboro noted. "In our case the proposed park system 
will enhance real estate values [and] as the years pass and our city 
is made more attractive, the increase in population and conse­
quent improvements will reduce taxes to a minimum."15 Then, 
too, the bonds were needed to allow San Francisco to catch up 
with Oakland and Los Angeles, cities, Sbarboro observed, that 
"lead us in schools."16 The only organized busines opposition came 
from the San Francisco Real Estate Association, whose members 
feared higher real estate taxes. 
Supporters added that passage of the bonds was needed to 
create public works jobs for laborers, though there was far from 
unanimity on that point. P. H. McCarthy, the president of the 
city's strong Building Trades Council put forward the argument 
for jobs most forcefully. He was joined by James Phelan, who ac­
tively worked for the bonds. Phelan observed that "the carpenter, 
the brickman, the plumber, the cabinetmaker, tradesman, and 
laborer will be direct beneficiaries. In the grading, bridge-build­
ing, and maintenance of the new grounds, labor will find employ­
ment." Nonetheless, the San Francisco Labor Council opposed 
the bonds as being "for the benefit of the rich" and because "the 
importation of labor [to work on the city projects] would injure the 
workingmen already here."17 
More than economic progress and civic recognition were at 
stake in the minds of the bond proponents, for a quest for civic 
unity also inspired them. Nowhere was that clearer than in the 
many speeches made by Phelan. The heart and soul of the bond 
campaign, Phelan linked civic patriotism to civic beauty, com­
merce, and jobs in talk after talk. In a public appeal for bonds to 
pay for new land for parks and boulevards, Phelan foreshadowed 
many of the arguments used during the next decade in favor of city 
planning in San Francisco: 
The people should patriotically arise to the occasion and not 
thwart a great public work by bickerings or lack of confi­
dence in the future of their city. By making San Francisco 
beautiful and attractive the outlay will be repaid many times 
by increasing population, flow of visitors, and a happy con­
tented people. Labor will get employment not only in the 
public works, but permanently in the demand for work which 
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comes to great cities when their attractions draw and hold a 
large number of people.18 
A broadside distributed by the improvement clubs summa­
rized the diverse social and economic reasons supporters favored 
the bonds: "Vote for progress and prosperity; vote for the adorn­
ment of the city; vote for health and recreation for the people; vote 
for the employment of labor."19 
The bonds won approval handily.20 At that time, most groups 
could agree that substantial city improvements were needed in 
San Francisco.21 Sbarboro spoke for a growing number of busi­
nessmen the day after the election when he said that "capitalists 
will now feel more confident and will invest money in improving 
the city . . . this will give new life to all industries and permanent 
employment for many years to come to our laborers."22 Phelan, 
always interested in making San Francisco one of Americas lead­
ing cities, asserted, "By the vote of today we have taken our posi­
tion confidently among the great cities and the people have shown 
a spirit that will carry them to success."23 Phelan and Sbarboro 
spoke too soon, however. The bonds were nullified on a legal tech­
nicality, and only a few improvements took place during the next 
four years. 
Almost the same scenario recurred in 1903, as San Franciscans 
voted on bonds for hospital, sewer, school, street, library, jail, play­
ground, and park improvements. Many of the same arguments 
employed in 1899 were used again. Civic pride, a desire to place 
their city among the first rank of American metropolises, remained 
very important to the bond supporters. Frank Symes, the presi­
dent of the San Francisco Merchants Association, decried the 
state of city services as "humiliating . .  . an absolute discredit to 
any first-class city" and called for the passage of the bonds to 
rectify the situation.24 F. W. Dohrman, one of San Francisco's 
leading merchants, argued in a similar vein that only through the 
improvements made possible by the bonds could San Francisco 
"step forward and take its rank and its position among the large 
cities of the world."25 Intercity rivalry led some to support the 
bonds. The head of the California Club noted that Seattle pos­
sessed "the most exquisite of Western parks," and called on San 
Franciscans to vote for the bonds to make their city "ready to 
meet her great destiny as a queen city."26 
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As in 1899, direct economic benefits were also seen as coining 
from the bonds by their supporters. Improvement clubs and the 
Merchants' Association backed the bonds as "a good business prop­
osition" because coordinated improvements would be cheaper 
than improvements made "piecemeal." Moreover, it was expected 
that "if we make the city more delightful, more people will come 
here to live" and that "San Francisco, under such stimulus, will go 
ahead."27 McCarthy of the Building Trades Council again favored 
the bonds as likely to provide employment for construction work­
ers, but he added, too, that "we ought to have a beautiful city in 
which we can all live and feel proud of it."28 Phelan, now a private 
citizen and no longer mayor, campaigned for the bonds. In addi­
tion to the arguments he had used in 1899, Phelan added the claim 
that improvements to San Francisco would make the city more 
"wholesome," thus encouraging people "to flock here from the 
suburbs where they now go for health."29 
Facing no organized opposition, the bonds once more easily 
won approval. However, when offered for sale in September 1904, 
the bonds found few takers because the interest rates had been set 
too low. At that point, a new civic group entered the fray: the 
Association for the Improvement and Adornment of San Francisco 
(AIASF), composed mainly of the city's leading merchants. At a 
meeting with bankers, the association s members convinced San 
Francisco's financiers to purchase some of the bonds.30 
Like their counterparts across the United States, San Francisco 
businessmen employed an organizational approach to problem 
solving in the opening years of the twentieth century. Intensified 
labor-management conflict was eroding popular support for busi­
ness-sponsored urban improvements in San Francisco, causing 
business leaders, especially merchants, to form their own organi­
zation explicitly devoted to bringing about civic improvements. A 
bitter two-month strike in 1901 pitted the merchants against the 
city's powerful teamsters and waterfront workers. When Mayor 
Phelan intervened on behalf of the employers, he began losing 
labor support for, among other things, his plans for civic improve­
ments. The strike ushered in a decade of conflict between man­
agement and labor in San Francisco. As part of the conflict, in 
1901 labor leaders organized their own political party, the Union 
Labor party; and that party succeeded in controlling much of city 
politics for the next nine years. Eugene Schmitz of the Union 
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Labor party became mayor; and Abe "Boss" Ruef, the real power 
in the party, ran city politics. When the Union Labor party proved 
to be not only unresponsive to their wishes but also corrupt, some 
of San Francisco's business elite looked for new methods by which 
to influence their city's development.31 
Some sought to reform their city's politics, and from this effort 
may be traced the origins of progressivism in San Francisco and 
California.32 Fremont Older, the editor of the San Francisco Bul­
letin; Rudolph Spreckels, whose family had made a small fortune in 
sugar refining; James Phelan; and other business leaders mounted a 
campaign to expose corruption in the Union Labor party. In a series 
of investigations lasting into 1907, they ultimately proved successful. 
Schmitz was removed from office, and Ruef was sent to the state 
prison at San Quentin. From 1907 onward the reform movement in 
San Francisco merged with similar developments elsewhere in Cal­
ifornia to give rise to the progessive movement in the state. 
At the same time that they were beginning to try to change 
politics in San Francisco, business leaders set up the AIASF in 
January 1904. A meeting of "about twenty gentlemen" called by 
Phelan, J. W. Byrne, the president of the Pacific Union Club, and 
Willis Davis, the president of the San Francisco Art Association, 
convened in the building of the San Francisco Merchants' Ex­
change to found the association. The letter of invitation to those 
founding the organization stated that "The object of the meeting 
is to formally discuss a plan for the improvement of San Francisco" 
and noted that "the plan contemplates making San Francisco a 
more desirable city in which to live."33 Phelan, who was the most 
important figure in the formation of the group, appealed to the 
civic pride of San Franciscans. "San Francisco is at a turning point 
of its growth," he observed. The city could either become a world 
leader or fall to second-class status. "It can either be a great and 
beautiful and attractive city where men and women of civilized 
tastes and wants will desire to live, or a great and ugly and forbid­
ding city which people will shun."34 
Composed mainly of members of San Francisco's merchant and 
banking elite (including the president of the Merchants' Associa­
tion and the head of the Merchants' Exchange), the AIASF grew 
rapidly, attaining 377 members within a year.35 Those joining the 
AIASF had in mind a multitude of individual civic improvements: 
the construction of an opera house, auditorium, and music conser­
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vatory, street and boulevard improvements, the creation of ter­
raced parks, and other projects.36 From the outset, however, the 
AIASF's overriding concern was the preparation of a "comprehen­
sive plan" for San Francisco as a means of achieving an "elevation 
of the public taste" and as a "great advertisement for our city."37 
In an open letter to the general public in late April 1904, the 
directors of the AIASF summed up its goals, which, like those of 
the Merchants' Association put forward a decade earlier, blended 
civic pride, business growth, and urban development: 
The main objects of the Association are to promote in every 
practical way the beautifying of streets, public buildings, 
parks, squares, and places of San Francisco; to bring to the 
attention of the officials and people of the city the best methods 
for instituting artistic municipal improvements; to stimulate 
the sentiment of civic pride in the improvement and care of pri­
vate property; to suggest quasi-public enterprises and, in short, 
make San Francisco a more agreeable city in which to live.38 
Elected president of the AIASF, Phelan moved quickly to make 
those ideas reality. Even before the association had been founded, 
Phelan had sounded out Daniel Burnham, America's best-known 
urban planner, about the possibility of coming to San Francisco to 
prepare a city plan. Burnham had been in overall charge of de­
signing the architecture of the World s Columbian Exposition in 
Chicago in 1893, n a d headed the commission to draw up a plan for 
Washington, D. C, in 1901 and 1902, and had been involved in 
planning the layout for new government buildings in Cleveland in 
1902 and 1903.39 In early February 1904, the AIASF extended an 
invitation to Burnham.40 
Burnham accepted with alacrity on the conditions that the 
association would pay his expenses and that he would be able to 
name his subordinates. Those conditions were met, and Burnham 
came to San Francisco in late spring, bringing with him his tal­
ented young assistant Edward Bennett. (This was Bennett s first, 
but not his last, experience with western cities. He would go on to 
design a city plan for Portland.) Welcoming Burnham to San Fran­
cisco at a dinner at the St. Francis Hotel in early May, Phelan 
caught the feeling of optimism of the day in observing that "a new 
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spirit has taken hold of San Francisco to make San Francisco live­
able and loveable—to make it worthy of its position and destiny," 
and the members of the AIASF endorsed a resolution calling upon 
Burnham "to draft a plan for the improvement and advancement 
of San Francisco."41 
Burnham and Bennett, assisted by the San Francisco architect 
Willis Polk, set up a studio atop the Twin Peaks from which they 
could view the city; and from that perch they labored throughout 
1904 and 1905 to draft a city plan for San Francisco. Burnham was 
away much of the time drawing up plans for a redesigned Manila 
and a new summer capital for the Philippines at Baguio. As a conse­
quence, much of the work devolved upon Bennett, Polk, and oth­
ers.42 As promised, the AIASF paid for the work, the cost of which 
came to sixteen thousand dollars, assisted by large donations from 
Phelan, Spreckels, the Southern Pacific Railroad, the United Rail­
roads of San Francisco (the city's private street railroad system), the 
San Francisco Lumber Dealers' Exchange, the San Francisco Gas 
and Electric Company, the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, the 
Brewers' Protective Association, the Emporium (the city's major 
department store), and several leading merchants.43 
The arrival of Burnham spurred the AIASF on to new efforts. 
The organization set up an advisory council to meet on a regular 
basis with Burnham and his assistants and arranged hearings at 
which representatives of business bodies, improvement clubs, and 
some labor groups presented ideas as the work progressed. The 
AIASF also continued its own efforts to improve San Francisco, 
mounting campaigns for the planting of flowers and trees, the ex­
tension of parks, the building of better streets, the prohibition of 
overhead trolley-car wires on Sutter and Market streets as not befit­
ting "the dignity and beauty of our principal streets," and the con­
struction of harbor improvements made "necessary by the growth 
of commerce and the increasing population" of San Francisco.44 
The Burnham Plan 
Completed late in the summer of 1905, the Burnham Plan for 
San Francisco set a pattern to be repeated in city plans prepared 
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throughout America during the Progessive Era in aiming at making 
radical changes in the physical layout of San Francisco. "We must 
remember that a meager plan will fall short of perfect achieve­
ment, while a great one will yield large results," Burnham trum­
peted. While visionary in his scope, Burnham could, nonetheless, 
be practical in how he thought his plan should be implemented. 
"It is not to be supposed that all the work indicated can or should 
be carried out at once," he wrote. Rather, he thought, "a plan 
beautiful and comprehensive enough for San Francisco can only 
be executed by degrees."45 
Influenced by his study of Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Moscow, and 
London, Burnham thought that a city should be laid out in series 
of concentric circles, with each circle having a different role in the 
life of the city. "The city may be divided into the following ele­
ments: ist—Administrative and Educational; 2nd—Economical; 
3rd—Residential," Burnham explained. The first "element," that 
is, the administrative and educational center, would be, he thought, 
"the real being of the city proper . .  . it guarantees the city's rela­
tion to the country and its civic character to the citizens."46 Be­
yond the first zone would be a second area for business and com­
mercial purposes and a third one for homes. 
Replanning San Francisco's street system occupied much of 
the Burnham Plan, for Burnham believed that wide streets cir­
cling cities should clearly delineate the various zones of activity in 
them. Joining the concentric streets would be arterials slicing 
diagonally through the city. In putting his ideas into practice in 
San Francisco, Burnham had to modify them to take account of 
the city's hilly topography. No single web of concentric streets and 
arterials was possible. Instead, Burnham proposed multiple sets 
of street webs radiating outward from a number of centers within 
San Francisco. Only two streets, a Perimeter of Distribution and 
an Outer Boulevard, completely circled San Francisco in Burn-
ham's plan. Beyond those grand designs, numerous proposals to 
relocate individual streets were laid out in the Burnham Plan. 
Burnham thus sought to modify greatly San Francisco's existing 
gridiron street plan.47 
Burnham also called for the construction of a civic center com­
posed of governmental and educational buildings arranged in 
such a way as to contribute to "public rest and recreation and 
adapted to celebrations, fetes, etc."48 Cahill, the architect who 
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Daniel Burnham's proposed civic center, viewed from the south side of Market Street. From the 
Burnham Plan for San Francisco. 
had drafted a plan for a civic center in 1899, anticipated the inclu­

sion of a civic center in the Burnham Plan. He reworked his plan,

moving the civic center off Market Street to a plaza to the west, and

presented it to Burnham and Bennett for their consideration. Burn-

ham and Bennett, however, rejected Cahill's proposal, favoring a

civic center consisting of a ring of buildings located at the intersec­

tion of Market Street and Van Ness Avenue a number of blocks

south of the major downtown area.49 At various points throughout

the city there would also be smaller public "places" removed "from

the direct flow and press of business" and designed "to strengthen

the public sense of the dignity and responsibility of citizenship."50

Parks and boulevards attracted Burnham's attention, as they
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did that of most city planners in the Progressive Era. Burnham sug­
gested the creation of large parks, smaller playgrounds, and park­
ways throughout San Francisco. They would, he argued, serve the 
practical purpose of acting as "an effective barrier" to the spread 
of fires. Moreover, parks would, he believed, instill desirable moral 
values in those who frequented them. In calling for a formal layout 
in the parks, Burnham noted that "in the smaller parks this amounts 
to a lesson of order and system, and its influence on the masses 
cannot be overestimated." Similarly, he hoped that public meet­
ings in playgrounds would "replace the old neighborhood stagna­
tion with . . . unity of purpose and development."51 Burnham 
shared the belief common in the Progressive period that the char­
acter of people could be altered by changing the environments 
within which they lived. Parks could be a major tool in that process. 
Burnham envisaged the development of an orderly San Fran­
cisco united by a sense of civic patriotism, a city whose different 
parts and people would all function together harmoniously. While 
a major advance in city planning for its day and while addressing 
real problems San Franciscans faced, the Burnham Plan, nonethe­
less, left much unsaid. Although recognizing that a city was com­
posed of different "elements," Burnham spent most of his plan 
discussing streets and parks. While some of San Franscico's mer­
chants were beginning to worry about the erosion of their city's 
hegemony over the Pacific Coast, the Burnham Plan did not ade­
quately address their concerns. Housing, the harbor, and the econ­
omy of San Francisco received scant attention. Like most city beau­
tiful plans of the Progressive Era, the Burnham Plan dealt 
incompletely with the economic life of the metropolis for which it 
was designed. Those deficiencies, while not fully recognized in 
1905, would cause problems for planning proponents later on. 
San Francisco and the Origins of 
City Beautiful 
With the preparation of the Burnham Plan, San Franciscans, 
despite the plan s shortcomings, assumed a position of leadership 
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in the city planning movement emerging in early twentieth-cen­
tury America. Americans generally were rediscovering the city 
and across much of the nation were reacting to the problems they 
found by advocating city planning. Like most Americans of the 
Progressive Era, those involved in the planning movement were 
optimistic about the future of cities. 
The nascent planning movement had diverse roots. Some plan­
ning proponents took their inspiration from Chicago's Columbian 
Exposition of 1893 an<^ the replanning of Washington, D.C., about 
a decade later. Burnham and Phelan clearly fit into that group. 
Others came to support planning as a result of their work as city 
engineers laying out street and sewer systems. While that ap­
proach to planning would be important in some other Pacific 
Coast cities—Seattle, for example—it was of less significance in 
San Francisco. Still other planning advocates began their efforts 
in local grass roots projects involving neighborhood improvement 
associations pushing for municipal art, civic improvements of vari­
ous sorts, and outdoor art. That approach to planning was of con­
siderable significance in San Francisco, as revealed in the 1899 
and 1903 bond campaigns.52 
Urban improvements were not new to America in the Progres­
sive Era. From the time of the building of the first North American 
cities in the colonial period, some people had worked to make 
their urban environments better places in which to live. Parks, 
boulevards, civic buildings and so on had all been parts of those 
early improvement efforts.53 What was new, at least for most of 
those involved in the Progressive-Era planning movements, was 
what they viewed as comprehensive planning: the notion that all of 
the various individual aspects of improvements should be coor­
dinated to reinforce each other. Planning proponents came in­
creasingly to think that cities should be developed along lines laid 
down by overall city plans. As the historian William Wilson has 
observed in his study of the city beautiful movement in five cities 
across America, "Its development of the comprehensive plan 
marked the City Beautiful era's great departure from the past."54 
As in the case of San Francisco, however, those plans rarely con­
sidered all of the needs of the residents of America's cities. Too 
often the plans were concerned too much with the sticks and 
stones of planning, the needs of the cities, and not enough with 
the social needs of their citizens. As Wilson has noted, "housing 
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details were outside of the purview of the comprehensive plan­
ning of the era."55 
San Francisco businessmen, like their counterparts elsewhere, 
were generally optimistic about the prospect of remaking their 
city. They sensed that man could control his environment, that 
almost anything could be accomplished. A beautiful planned city 
would, they thought, lessen discord among different groups and 
help their cities capture the national reknown they deserved. 
There was as well a more pessimistic underside to the feelings of 
San Franciscans, especially some merchants, about their city's 
destiny. Observing the rise of other Pacific Coast metropolises, 
they feared for their city's future and saw in planning a way to 
keep their city abreast of developments occurring elsewhere on 
the Pacific Coast. A relatively minor note in 1905, their concern 
would swell to become a mighty chorus as time progressed. 
Reconstruction and City Planning 
Calling Burnham's work "complete and satisfactory," the 
AIASF presented the Burnham Plan to the city government in 
September 1905 and sought immediate actions on park exten­
sions, the construction of a boulevard around San Francisco, and 
changes in Market Street. Accepting the plan on behalf of the city, 
Mayor Schmitz said that the plans gave him "the greatest plea­
sure" and that he believed in "beginning the work as soon as possi­
ble." The Board of Supervisors soon had the Burnham Plan printed 
as a public document and in mid-April copies were delivered to 
city hall. By the time of the earthquake and fire, Burnham's ideas 
were well known. City newspapers had published numerous ac­
counts of his plans for San Francisco, and a display to publicize 
the plan had been mounted at city hall.56 
Divisions already existed, however, that would hinder the im­
plementation of the plan. The rift between labor and manage­
ment, widened by the 1901 strike and subsequent events, con­
tinued to grow. The division manifested itself in politics. By this 
time the graft trials of Schmitz and Ruef were about to begin. 
Businessmen like Phelan and Spreckels, who were becoming 
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deeply involved in the collection of evidence and legal prosecu­
tion of the leaders of the Union Labor party, were unwilling to 
entrust the planning of their city to the politicians in power. 
At this point—in mid-April 1906—the earthquake and fire de­
stroyed much of San Francisco. Far from ending discussion on the 
Burnham Plan and the future development of San Francisco, the 
disaster heightened it. Building on their previous experiences, 
some San Franciscans called for intensified improvement efforts. 
The Burnham Plan and the future of San Francisco were much in 
the news in the months following the fire and earthquake. 
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, many San Francis­
cans were brimming with confidence that their city could be re­
built along the lines of the Burnham Plan.57 "Do away with all 
square blocks and stiff straight lines, and adopt curves, the lines of 
beauty," the superintendent of the Mountain View Cemetery wrote 
Phelan one week after the fire had died. "Now at the birth of the 
city it can be done."58 Charles Lathrop, the rector of the Church 
of the Advent and a planning advocate, similarly wrote Phelan a 
few days later that he hoped the Burnham Plan would be followed 
in the "marvelous and unique opportunity" to rebuild in a way to 
ensure not only "the enriching of this city" but also "the bringing 
up of future generations with blue sky and fields and out of doors 
to keep people healthy and normal in their ideals."59 
Organizations responded optimistically to the challenge of re­
building, capturing in the proclamations of their members some of 
the same connections between civic pride and economic growth 
that had characterized the statements of bond supporters in 1899 
and 1903. On May 4, the San Francisco Real Estate Board passed a 
resolution predicting that San Francisco would rise from her 
ashes "greater, more beautiful and more prosperous," well able 
"to take a still higher rank among the great cities of the world."60 
The president of the San Francisco Merchants' Exchange made 
the same point, asserting that "a city is more than a mere collec­
tion of houses and humanity. It is an organism . . . [that] can not be 
destroyed by the mere destruction of part of its physical environ­
ment."61 Similarly, the Outdoor Art League stressed the motto 
"San Francisco—today in ashes, tomorrow the city beautiful. 
Watch her grow."62 
Phelan, who remained at the center of San Francisco's planning 
movement, was initially confident about his city's future. "San 
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Francisco's calamity will enable us now to proceed to rebuild the 
city on the lines of the Burnham Plan," he wrote on April 30, and 
in early May he could still predict that "the new San Francisco will 
be finer and greater in every respect." By July, however, Phelan 
was becoming uncertain about how San Francisco would be re­
built. "Of course there is sentiment here that resumption of busi­
ness is the first consideration and an indisposition to make changes 
that will cost money," he observed in a letter to Andrew Crawford 
of the American Civic Association.63 As the course of events would 
soon show, Phelan's growing reservations were well deserved. 
Even as the fire raged across San Francisco, relief activities 
began. On the afternoon of April 18, Mayor Schmitz convened the 
Citizens' Committee of Fifty, composed mainly of San Francisco's 
business leaders, to provide food, clothing, and shelter for the 
homeless. Phelan headed the subcommittee on finance. The work 
of the committee was effective, and San Francisco, with its busi­
ness and political leadership intact, avoided the social disruption 
that has sometimes characterized cities after disasters.64 
In early May, a new group—the Committee of Forty, also called 
the Committee of Reconstruction—replaced the Committee of 
Fifty. The Committee of Reconstruction was to draft a plan for the 
rebuilding of San Francisco and report it to the city's Board of 
Supervisors for implementation. Although composed mainly of 
business leaders and professionals, the Committee of Reconstruc­
tion also included the presidents of the San Francisco Labor Coun­
cil, the Building Trades Council, and the Carpenters' Union. Phe­
lan chaired two subcommittees, that on boulevards and general 
beautification (on which he was joined by Spreckels) and that on 
the Burnham Plan. San Franciscans thus looked beyond their for­
mal system of government for plans and ideas to rebuild their city. 
An informal government by committee developed to plan for the 
future of San Francisco.65 
Optimism initially prevailed in the meetings of the Commit­
tee on Reconstruction and its subcommittees. A feeling existed 
that through planned reconstruction San Francisco could retain, 
and perhaps even bolster, its position on the Pacific Coast and in 
the United States. The chairman of the subcommittee on street 
widening claimed on May 9 that "San Francisco now resembles 
Paris more than any city in the world," and observed that "ours 
now are like the chances of youth, which never come again."66 
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Three weeks later, at a joint meeting of the subcommittee on streets 
with that on the Burnham Plan, the head of the University of 
California declared that San Francisco was destined to become 
"vastly bigger and better than ever before." Nevertheless, he 
warned that "to inspire the confidence of the world and the large 
financial interests that are expected to play an important part in 
the upbuilding of the city there should be no deferring of the 
broad plan."67 
Acrimony soon crept into the committee deliberations, how­
ever, as conflict separated those favoring rapid rebuilding with a 
minimum of planning as the best way to get San Francisco back on 
its feet from those desiring more comprehensive planning as bet­
ter for San Francisco in the long run, even if that meant slowing 
the process of reconstruction a bit. An editorial in the Architec­
tural Record, a national journal, summarized the difficult choice 
facing San Franciscans. "The conflagration, deplorable as it was, 
offers San Franciscans a chance to improve the lay out of the city 
at a much smaller expense than would formerly have been re­
quired," observed the editor. The editorial concluded that planned 
rebuilding might be difficult, however, because "it is possible that 
the city may not be able to afford such expenditures just now and 
that it will have to be rebuilt along the old lines."68 The issue 
found businessmen on both sides of the matter. Three specific 
disputes were especially divisive. 
Street reconstruction proved to be a particularly contentious 
issue, for until the locations of streets were fixed and the streets 
rebuilt, businesses could not fully resume operations. Merchants 
and other businessmen who had long supported planning now 
broke from it in the interest of getting back in business as soon as 
possible. At one point, for instance, the president of the Merchants' 
Association, who was also a member of the AIASF (which con­
tinued to support comprehensive planning), petitioned the sub­
committee on finance to speed up approval for street rebuilding 
in the downtown area, even if that meant proceeding in a make­
shift manner.69 
Another divisive matter was the proposed extension of new, 
strict ordinances governing the building of fireproof structures in 
the downtown district to new areas in an attempt to make San 
Francisco more secure against future blazes. The attempt led to 
vociferous opposition from small-business owners outside the 
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downtown fire limits as too expensive and as "a land-grabbing 
scheme on the part of the big capitalists." It would be better to 
have "a city that might burn than no city at all," argued one small 
retailer worried about the cost of rebuilding.70 
A third issue that immediately surfaced was that of the building 
of a civic center. Just one week after the earthquake and fire, 
Phelan issued a call to "all interested architects, engineers, and 
others" to come together to discuss the rebuilding of the city at a 
meeting of the AIASF. In May the association resolved that a new 
civic center should be constructed at Market and Van Ness, as 
specified in the Burnham Plan, and urged the Board of Super­
visors to purchase the necessary four and one-half blocks there. 
Some businessmen countered, however, that San Francisco could 
not afford the expense of such a luxury at that time.71 
Overarching all of those individual issues was, as the editor of 
the Architectural Record foresaw, a common fear on the part of 
many businessmen that with their property destroyed they could 
not afford the higher taxes they thought would be required by the 
improvements mandated by planning. An editorial in the San 
Francisco Chronicle three weeks after the earthquake caught that 
feeling well: 
Every individual in the city is practicing economy. So must 
the city itself. . . . Capital will not come here either on loan 
or for purchase if confronted with the prospect of excessive 
taxation. There must be the strictest economy in govern­
ment. There must be the strictest economy in improve­
ments. We all desire the city beautiful just as we desire the 
home beautiful, but the business man who at this juncture 
should attempt to borrow money to decorate his home would 
knock in vain at the doors of any bank in America.72 
Politics further muddied the waters, making agreements on 
rebuilding still more difficult. By 1906 and 1907, graft prosecu­
tions of Union Labor party leaders were under way.73 Even as the 
prosecutions were first contemplated and then begun, the boss of 
the party, Abe Ruef, sought to take advantage of San Francisco's 
disaster by enriching himself through real estate dealings involv­
ing political manipulations. Ruef s actions further widened the 
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gap between business and labor and made business leaders still 
more reluctant to entrust the rebuilding of their city to the politi­
cians in power. In late 1906 and early 1907, the Merchants' Associa­
tion, which continued to back rebuilding along the lines of the 
Burnham Plan, called for a "thorough moral regeneration" of San 
Francisco's politics and attacked grafters as "traitors" to their city.74 
By the spring of 1907, the organization's president was at one and 
the same time calling for the creation of "the San Francisco Beau­
tiful," praising Spreckels for his work in fighting graft, and noting 
that in times gone past corrupt politicians were "instantly shot."75 
With San Francisco's business leaders divided and with rifts 
between labor leaders and businessmen widening, the concept of 
comprehensive, coordinated planning was lost in the reality of 
piecemeal rebuilding. The Committee on Reconstruction recom­
mended numerous individual street, park, and building improve­
ments to the city government, and many of them were adopted. 
However, no real effort was made to follow the Burnham Plan in 
the reconstruction of San Francisco. Summoned back to San 
Francisco to offer advice on reconstruction, Burnham lamented at 
one point that the report of the Committee on Reconstruction had 
nothing to do with his plan but was designed simply to relieve the 
congestion of the downtown area.76 The plan could have been 
followed. Through newspaper coverage it was well known by this 
time, and it was detailed enough in its recommendations to have 
provided close guidance in the reconstruction of the city. 
Particularly disappointing to planning proponents was a failure 
to rebuild the industrial and commercial area south of Market 
Street along new lines suggested by Marsden Manson, a former 
city engineer, in a detailed report submitted to the Committee on 
Reconstruction in September 1906. Calling for new street layouts, 
better fire-fighting facilities, and the regrading of hills, the report 
would have adapted the Burnham Plan to a major renovation of 
the South of Market District. "Five or ten years from now it will be 
absolutely impossible to make these improvements," Manson 
argued. "They must be made now or they will never be made. . . . 
I earnestly recommend these improvements so that San Francisco 
may at least stand ready to hold her commercial supremacy on the 
Pacific Coast."77 Nonetheless, in their haste to rebuild, San Fran­
ciscans largely ignored his report. 
While eliminating physical limitations on urban development, 
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Daniel Burnham proposed terracing Telegraph Hill. From the Burnham Plan for San Francisco. 
the earthquake and fire left political and social impediments in­
tact. Although not apparent in the first burst of relief and recov­
ery activities, political and social divisions surfaced when San 
Franciscans turned to the issue of long-range reconstruction. 
Divisions separating different groups within San Francisco made 
comprehensive planning impossible to achieve. As Thomas 
Maggee, the head of the Merchants' Association and a strong 
supporter of the Burnham Plan, lamented, "Men are mostly 
moved by selfish interests. . .  . I thought after the fire that at last 
San Francisco was going to pull together. For a few weeks it 
appeared that way, but I must confess that today we seem to 
be splitting apart wider than ever. What is going to pull us to­
gether?"78 
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Private and Public Planning, 
1907-1912 
Nonetheless, a desire for urban improvements persisted. 
Throughout 1907 and 1908, San Franciscans labored through a 
growing number of neighborhood improvement associations for 
street improvements, better lighting, and the creation of neigh­
borhood parks—all deemed necessary for comfortable urban life, 
and all seen as needed to stay abreast of what other Pacific Coast 
cities were doing.79 Moreover, San Franciscans supported what 
they viewed as essential, practical citywide services. They hesi­
tated, however, at more grandiose proposals and never returned 
fully to the idea of comprehensive planning embodied in the 
Burnham Plan. 
In 1908 San Franciscans approved $18 million worth of bonds 
for their water supply, sewer system, hospitals, hall of justice and 
jail, schools, and garbage collection system. Solidly supported by 
the Chamber of Commerce, the Merchants' Association, and the 
Board of Trade, the bonds won the backing of San Francisco's 
business and political leaders (by this time the Union Labor party 
and Mayor Schmitz were being ousted from power) as a matter of 
civic pride. "It comes down to a question of whether San Fran­
cisco shall admit its impotence or whether it shall rise and be the 
great city it can," observed one supporter.80 The San Francisco 
Chronicle editorialized in a similar fashion. "Shall this city be­
come known as utterly incorrigible?" the paper asked. "Is there 
nothing on earth on which its inhabitants can agree?"81 The bond 
issue received a mixed reception from labor groups, some of whose 
members feared higher taxes. While the District Council of Car­
penters backed them, the Labor Council, divided, took no official 
stand, and the Building Trades Council opposed them. Like the 
bond issues of five years before, the 1908 measures passed by 
overwhelming majorities in all parts of San Francisco.82 
Despite the bond victories, San Franciscans continued to op­
pose matters they deemed less crucial to their city's reconstruc­
tion, as revealed in a contest over bonds to build a new civic cen­
ter a year later. San Francisco's city hall had been heavily damaged 
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by the earthquake and fire and was unusable. The city razed the 
structure and in 1909 proposed replacing it with a new city hall 
sited as specified in the Burnham Plan at Market and Van Ness. 
Buildings to be put up later—a library, public auditorium, and 
others—would complete the civic center. An $8.48 million bond 
issue was to pay for the city hall-civic center complex.83 
Proponents of planning viewed the bond issue as a chance to 
rescue part of the Burnham Plan. Groups long supporting plan­
ning, such as the Merchants' Association and the AIASF, cam­
paigned strongly for the bonds. They were joined by newer city­
wide bodies like the San Francisco Art Institute and by business 
groups that stood to gain the most, such as the Down Town Asso­
ciation and the Mission Promotion Association.84 Those favoring 
the bonds discerned a positive link between art and commerce. 
They saw in a beautiful planned city a way to put San Francisco 
ahead of its urban rivals, and they viewed passage of the bonds as a 
way to win national recognition for their city. Phelan, still active in 
civic affairs, called the bonds a "necessity," if San Francisco was to 
be a leading American metropolis; and a pamphlet issued by the 
AIASF claimed that a well-constructed city hall would serve as a 
model to "encourage private enterprise and give employment to 
our people."85 Temporarily called back to San Francisco by the 
AIASF to work for the bonds, Burnham argued that the civic cen­
ter would "attract attention to San Francisco from all corners of 
the globe." Moreover, it would "make of itself a magnet attracting 
from every quarter those men and fortunes which bring lasting 
prosperity to a great commercial center."86 Willis Polk, the San 
Francisco architect who had assisted Burnham and Bennett and 
who was a leading member of the AIASF, may have best explained 
what the bonds meant to their supporters when he spoke to an 
appreciative audience at a meeting of the Merchants' Association: 
In the days of Pericles, when Athens was at the zenith of her 
commercial prosperity and had just commenced to feel the 
rivalry and competition of Syracuse, Pericles cast about for 
some method by which Athens could retain her commercial 
supremacy. Finally, merely as a matter of statesmanship, 
they decided to make Athens beautiful; not for any inherent 
love of beauty itself, but purely and simply as a business 
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proposition. . . . If Pericles as a matter of statesmanship did 
what he did for Athens, don't you think it is up to San Fran­
cisco to develop a little statesmanship?87 
Despite such appeals, opposition quickly developed to the 
bonds. Many San Franciscans agreed with a speaker addressing 
the Commonwealth Club, a body composed of businessmen and 
professionals, who noted that voters had approved $18 million in 
bonds the year before and therefore could not afford the "frillery 
and frumpery" of a new city hall.88 Moreover, as San Francisco 
recovered from the earthquake and fire and began expanding out­
ward again, numerous local improvement clubs representing sub­
urban neighborhoods opposed the bonds because their members, 
mainly businessmen, could see no immediate benefits flowing to 
their localities from the building of the city hall. They were more 
interested in the extension of city services—water, sewers, police 
and fire protection—into their neighborhoods. "Why should our 
taxes be increased for a civic center we don't want when the city 
has no money to help us out in this district?" asked the president 
of the Bay View and Visitacion Valley Improvement Club.89 "When 
we have no bread," wondered the head of another neighborhood 
association, "why should we go into debt for pie?"90 
Faced with widespread opposition, the bonds failed to win 
approval. Although a majority of voters—12,804 t  o 1O>5°4—fa­
vored them, the bonds fell short of the necessary two-thirds ma­
jority. It was the strongly negative votes of the city's outlying sub­
urban residence districts that killed the issue.91 
With the failure of the city hall-civic center bonds, improve­
ment and planning efforts temporarily shifted to small-scale pri­
vate projects. For those who could afford to live in them, beauti­
fully laid-out suburbs influenced by British garden city work— 
Miguel Rancho, Ingleside, and St. Francis Wood—beckoned. 
Urban rivalry played a role in the planning of those divisions. "San 
Francisco's outlying residence districts," noted the newsletter of 
the Merchants' Association in 1911, should be designed to have 
"the winsome beauty and strong attractiveness of suburbs across 
the bay and the towns of Southern California."92 Using both pri­
vate covenants and city ordinances, real estate community build­
ers sought to create planned enclaves within or just outside of San 
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Francisco. Similarly, neighborhood improvement efforts in such 
realms as street lighting and street repairs continued.93 
From their neighborhood efforts, San Franciscans soon found 
themselves returning to citywide projects. Preparations for the 
growth expected to occur in their city with the opening of the 
Panama Canal, readying their city for visitors attending the Pan­
ama-Pacific International Exposition, and changes in city politics 
all lured San Franciscans to once again enter the realm of city­
wide planning. This return was, nonetheless, less concerned with 
comprehensive planning than the campaign for the Burnham Plan 
had been. Although calling for improvements throughout all of 
San Francisco, it was more limited in the scope and range of its 
proposals than had been the Burnham Plan. Ultimately, the new 
campaign came to focus mainly on building a new civic center and 
on cleaning up San Francisco for the world's fair. Largely gone was 
the idea of the coordinated construction of a civic center, parks, 
boulevards, and streets. 
The coming completion of the Panama Canal spurred San Fran­
ciscans to reconsider the need for civic improvements. Busi­
nessmen in particular wanted to be ready to benefit from what 
they thought would be a tremendous increase in trade, business, 
and immigration and were eager to make urban improvements. 
Merchants, especially, viewed the canal as their salvation in the 
growing commercial rivalry their city was encountering from 
other Pacific Coast metropolises. They never tired of pointing out 
that their community lay astride the shortest circle route through 
the canal to the Orient and fervently believed that the canal would 
secure "the permanent installation of San Francisco as a great 
center of world commerce on the Pacific Ocean."94 
Business and political leaders realized, however, that the canal 
would not automatically benefit their city, for other Pacific Coast 
cities were also getting ready for its opening. As one merchant 
warned, "Portland, like Seattle, is thoroughly awake to the pos­
sibilities of a tremendous increase in business and population fol­
lowing the completion of the Panama canal and is bending every 
energy in preparing herself for that event. . . . Portland may well 
be classed as a rival of San Francisco."95 The message was clear: San 
Franciscans must also take steps to prepare their city for future 
growth. One of the city supervisors made that point at the dinner 
at which a new Chamber of Commerce was formed (in late 1911 
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the Chamber absorbed the Merchants' Exchange, the Merchants' 
Association, and the Down Town Association). Noting that the 
canal would increase trade and manufacturing in San Francisco, 
he observed that those benefits would materialize only if the city's 
residents got ready for them through city planning. "Broader 
streets and brighter parks, a great civic center . .  . a new city hall" 
were needed, he exhorted. Moreover, he thought, "Our hills must 
be tunnelled to open up new districts to the home seeker."96 The 
president of the Chamber of Commerce made many of the same 
points in his inaugural address in early 1913. Referring to the com­
pletion of the canal, he observed that "no American city has ever 
confronted a period like this. What these years will bring forth 
depends upon what we do now." He then proceeded to urge 
chamber members to support city improvements of all types.97 
The most immediate result of this concern was the boring of a 
tunnel through the Twin Peaks to open a vast new area to residen­
tial development in western San Francisco. The Merchants' Asso­
ciation and some fifty local improvement clubs pushed for the 
tunnel as a way to prepare their city for "the floodgates of pros­
perity" they expected to materialize with the opening of the Pan­
ama Canal. Unless the tunnel were built, an officer of the Mer­
chant's Association warned, San Francisco would be "outstripped 
by the smaller cities of the coast."98 Civic pride was involved. As 
one San Francisco newspaper observed, "When Seattle finds a hill 
in her way, she washes it down. Under the same conditions Los 
Angeles tunnels the hills. . . . What are the people of the earth 
going to think of us, when they come trooping through the Pan­
ama Canal?" He concluded, "We'd better go about a little, take a 
few lessons in civic pride and patriotism from our sister cities on 
the coast and then get busy."99 Only then could San Francisco 
remain a leading city on the Pacific Coast and in the nation. The 
city government approved the project in 1912, and work on it 
began two years later. 
The second event igniting interest in citywide improvements 
was the Panama-Pacific International Exposition. In 1911 San 
Francisco defeated New Orleans for the right to sponsor this 
world s fair, due to open its doors in 1915. San Francisco's business 
leaders quickly came to see the exposition as a chance to show the 
world how fully their city had recovered from the earthquake and 
fire. The exposition would, they thought, place their city back on 
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the map. There had already been two forerunners to this exposi­
tion. The Portola Festival of 1909 attracted 300,000 visitors to San 
Francisco and, according to the Merchants' Association, gave the 
city "the greatest 'ad' it has ever enjoyed."100 Four years later, the 
Balboan Exposition provided a further boost. 
Even greater results were expected from the Panama-Pacific 
International Exposition. Warren Manley of the Chamber of 
Commerce praised it as "a golden opportunity . . . that will un­
doubtedly never occur again."101 A desire for civic unity, as well as 
material progress, motivated some working for the exposition. As 
early as 1910, the house organ of the Merchants' Association edi­
torialized with approval about preparations for the world's fair, "If 
eloquence can bury the hatchet, that overworked implement of 
civic strife and faction is by this time rusting to uselesness in its 
unmarked grave."102 Nonetheless, as in the case of the Panama 
Canal, it was recognized that public improvements would have to 
be made to prepare their city for the fair. As the head of the San 
Francisco Real Estate Board explained in late 1911, "The eyes of 
the world are now and will for the next several years be upon San 
Francisco. Prospective real estate investors the world over are 
looking toward San Francisco and California for investment. . . . 
Let us prepare for our guests by cleaning house."103 Or, as another 
San Franciscan noted, "We have invited the world here for 1915. 
. . . They must not make their way through streets like those of 
some smoky factory town."104 
The third change was political. In the 1911 city elections, the 
Union Labor party was thoroughly ousted from office when James 
"Sunny Jim" Rolph won the first of five terms as mayor. A banker 
and shipowner who, nonetheless, had the respect and support of 
many of San Francisco's workers, Rolph campaigned as a "mayor 
of all the people, employee as well as employer" and called upon 
San Franciscans to rise above factionalism. As mayor, he worked 
hard to unite his city's different groups and restore public confi­
dence in city government. His administration did much to heal 
the political divisions in San Francisco and thus helped create a 
political environment within which some city planning efforts 
could be revived.105 
Lending structure to the renewed citywide planning campaign 
was the Civic League of Improvement Clubs. Formed one month 
after the earthquake and fire to help with the tasks of immediate 
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recovery, the Civic League soon broadened its work. By 1911 the 
Civic League was composed of delegates from sixty-seven im­
provement clubs boasting an aggregate membership of eight thou­
sand. The organization hoped to create "a new, clean city, business 
prosperity, industrial peace, increased commerce, and a pull to­
gether to build up San Francisco."106 
The City Beautiful, the Civic 
Center, and the Exposition 
In 1912 the Civic League led a campaign to beautify San Fran­
cisco by dividing the city into twelve districts and presenting 
prizes to the areas that sponsored the most improvements. Beauty 
and profits, it was thought, could and should coexist in this cam­
paign. As L. C. Mullgardt, an architect working on the exposition, 
explained to members of the Down Town Committee of the Cham­
ber of Commerce: "As to the commercial value of beauty, we can 
not overestimate its vital importance. . . . Numberless American 
citizens annually flood Asiatic and European towns with their 
dollars in search for the beautiful. . .  . A pecuniary reason is al­
ways a good one for doing commendable things."107 Supported by 
the new Chamber of Commerce and the Labor Council, the Civic 
League brought the campaign to a climax with a May Day parade 
of school children carrying flowers through San Francisco. Once 
again civic pride, a desire that their city win recognition as a part 
of the nation's and the world's urban network, motivated San Fran­
ciscans. At the conclusion of the parade, Mayor Rolph caught the 
mood of many when he asserted that San Francisco "will be to 
America what Florence is to Italy and Paris is to France." He 
urged his listeners to make San Francisco "the real Exposition 
City, the City Beautiful."108 
In 1912, too, San Franciscans reversed their stance of just three 
years before and approved $8.8 million in bonds to construct a 
new civic center. To be located at the site of the old city hall, not at 
the site recommended in the Burnham Plan, the civic center had 
come to be seen in a new way by most San Franciscans. What they 
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had viewed as a luxury they could not afford in 1909 they now saw 
as a necessity to prepare their city for the exposition and the ca­
nal. "In view of the era of tremendous constructive development 
before San Francisco," Mayor Rolph told a meeting of neigh­
borhood improvement clubs, "it will be nothing less than a calam­
ity if these bonds are defeated."109 Civic pride also dictated sup­
port for the bonds. Noting that Denver, St. Paul, and Kansas City 
had recently constructed civic auditoriums, Rolph urged passage 
for the bonds to allow San Francisco to do the same.110 Luisa 
Tetrazzini, the famous opera singer, echoed the mayor, "Other 
cities, not as large as 'my' city, have it [a civic auditorium] already. 
Why not here?"111 
Endorsed by both the Chamber of Commerce and the Labor 
Council, the civic center bonds faced no organized opposition. 
With their city well along the road to reconstruction and with city 
services to the suburbs greatly improved, even most neighbor­
hood improvement clubs, now united in the Civic League, came 
out for the bonds. The bonds won approval by a margin often to 
one, and construction quickly began on the first buildings of the 
center. By the time the exposition opened, the city hall and an 
auditorium had been completed.112 
Finally, the Panama-Pacific International Exposition, tran­
sitory though it was, came to be seen as a climax of the pre-World 
War I planning movement in San Francisco. Composed of roman­
tically colored buildings grouped together at a waterfront location 
(what is now the Marina in San Francisco), the exposition, like 
Chicago's "White City" of twenty-two years before, was an inspi­
ration for the future for many. As one San Franciscan observed, 
"The Exposition in its ground plan, in its architecture, in its color­
ing and in its sculpture is the accomplishment of a Utopian ideal 
in city planning."113 After visiting the exposition, Burnham was 
struck by how the fair might reinvigorate the city planning move­
ment in San Francisco. He wrote, "If the Herculean task of devel­
oping an Exposition of such classic grandeur, will forever prove an 
incentive for a more harmonious expansion of our city, San Fran­
cisco's millions will have been well spent."114 
Many business leaders expected the exposition to bring pros­
perity to their city. They hoped it would win recognition for their 
city throughout the United States and place it ahead of its urban 
rivals. The manager of the Bank of California, headquartered in 
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San Francisco, spoke for many of his colleagues when he pre­
dicted that the exposition "will give many businessmen, who have 
had a hard struggle since the fire a chance to get squarely on their 
feet again and look the world in the face with considerable cheer­
fulness."115 The vice-president of the Chamber of Commerce 
expanded on this theme when addressing a crowd at the exposi­
tion's Chamber of Commerce Day. The exposition would, he 
thought, "call the attention of the world to this powerful western 
empire and its chief city and glorious harbor."116 
More was involved in the exposition, however, than material­
istic aspirations. Harkening back to what they incorrectly imag­
ined to have been a time of social unity in the immediate after­
math of the earthquake and fire, some San Franciscans thought 
they discerned a moral value in the world's fair. They hoped that 
the fair would unify their city's discordant population. One wrote 
that "another noticeable phase of the Exposition crowd is a return 
of that spirit of camaraderie which was peculiar to San Francisco 
directly after the big fire of 1906. That was a time when social 
barriers were leveled, an interval of pure democracy."117 Another 
warned that "personal ambitions, personal gain, the glorification 
of the individual must come second to the welfare of the whole . . . 
commercialism, as merely the glorification of the dollar, must not 
be allowed to gain a foothold."118 Some members of the Chamber 
of Commerce were caught up in that feeling. Exhorting San Fran­
ciscans to join in an opening-day parade, the organization's news­
letter observed, "Everybody will march. There will be no horses, 
automobiles, floats, fancy dress, uniforms, or display of any kind." 
The bulletin went on to claim that "it is the duty of every citizen 
and businessman to join in this wondrous demonstration. The very 
future of the city depends upon the success of this undertaking."119 
Some San Franciscans, especially businessmen, thought they 
could renew the city's leading role in the economic development 
of the Pacific Coast through planning. Likewise, they hoped in a 
more general sense to reassert their city's place in America's ur­
ban network. 
Such expectations were only partially filled. San Franciscans 
did achieve some of the separate elements of city planning. New 
parks and boulevards were established, and beginnings were 
made on the building of a civic center. With the civic center San 
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Franciscans came, in the words of the scholar Joan Draper, as "as 
close as almost anybody to realizing the dream of the City Beau­
tiful."120 Nonetheless, comprehensive planning was not realized. 
In their haste to rebuild, San Franciscans reconstructed their city 
in an uncoordinated manner. The social unity sought for by the 
city's business leaders proved elusive, as renewed group conflicts 
were to show in the war years and later. Nor were the economic 
goals fully realized. With the maturation of Los Angeles, Oakland, 
Seattle, and Portland, San Francisco's dominance over the econ­
omy of the Pacific Coast was forever ended. 
Beyond the civic center and some park and boulevard improve­
ments, San Franciscans gained little of tangible value from their 
first efforts at planning. They continued to reject major changes in 
the layout of their city. In 1913 the consulting engineer Bion Arnold 
drafted a new plan for the improvement of streets and transporta­
tion facilities in San Francisco, but, like the plan drafted by Man-
son seven years before, it failed to win acceptance. Once again, 
divisions among different groups hindered its implementation. 
While parts of the plan were adopted, much of it was ignored.121 
Thus, by the time of the First World War, many proponents of 
planning believed that they had missed a golden opportunity to 
rebuild in a comprehensive way after the fire and earthquake. The 
Burnham Plan had been abandoned. "We used to hear a great deal 
about the 'City Beautiful' and the opportunity we have for munici­
pal adornment," mused the publication of the Civic League in 
1915, "but somehow the city planning pendulum seems to have 
swung the other way."122 
6 2 
City Planning in Oakland

and Los Angeles

Influenced by the planning efforts in San Francisco, but affected 
even more by local developments, the residents of Oakland and 
Los Angeles participated in city planning campaigns. As in San 
Francisco, the planning movements had diverse origins; but busi­
nessmen again played central roles. Business organizations were 
very active in promoting improvements, and businessmen com­
posed the bulk of the membership in various civic improvement 
bodies in both cities. Businessmen were not alone in sponsoring 
the planning campaigns. Charles Mumford Robinson, a well-
known eastern planning advocate, prepared a city plan for Oak­
land in 1906 and a similar one for Los Angeles a year later. City 
planning in those cities involved more than the Robinson plans, 
however. In Los Angeles in particular planning assumed varied 
forms, including one of the pioneering efforts at citywide zoning 
in the United States. 
CITY PLANNING IN OAKLAND AND LOS ANGELES 
The Origins of Planning in Oakland 
The most powerful initial impetus for the planning movement 
in Oakland lay in a desire by business leaders to maintain their 
city's attractiveness as a bedroom suburb of San Francisco. Pam­
phlets distributed by the Board of Trade in the 1880s and 1890s 
advertised Oakland as "largely a city of homes" where "almost 
every dwelling is provided with an ever-green lawn and an ever­
blooming garden."1 Oaklanders soon came to see the creation of 
parks and boulevards as a way to protect and enhance the appear­
ance of their city, and thus the values of their own private prop­
erty, and it was with an effort to improve upon and add to the city's 
parks that planning began in Oakland. 
Oaklanders were not alone in that approach. Parks were often 
included in the agendas of proponents of city improvements and 
city plans during the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen­
turies. Parks and boulevards were components in the Burnham 
Plan for San Francisco. They would become, as well, significant 
parts of the planning campaigns in Portland and Seattle. Taking 
their cue from landscape architects like Frederick Law Olmsted, 
planners throughout the nation saw parks as improving the urban 
landscape in myriad ways. As Oaklanders asserted, parks could 
enhance the value of nearby private property, thus boosting the 
city's tax base. Parks could also improve a city's economic base by 
attracting tourists and settlers. Social considerations were also 
important. As Burnham argued, parks could instill certain values 
and ways of thinking in those who used them, especially children. 
Parks could, as well, serve as alternatives to saloons and street 
gangs—an argument put forward especially in Seattle. A human­
itarian concern could thereby mix with an economic one, the 
desire to combat disorderly conduct and crime. 
As early as the 1860s, less than twenty years after the founding 
of Oakland, Olmsted, who was already well known nationally for 
his design of Central Park in New York and for his work on the 
capitol grounds of Washington, D.C., visited Oakland and recom­
mended the establishment of a park system. Olmsted was in Cal­
ifornia to view Yosemite, which he was trying to convince Con­
gress to preserve as a national park. While there, he agreed to 
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Oaklanders wanted a city of tree-lined streets and single-family houses. From the Robinson Plan 
for Oakland. 
come to Oakland to design the Mountain View Cemetery; and he

took advantage of his trip to call upon Oaklanders to establish a

park system. Olmsted envisioned a belt of parks along the crest of

the Oakland hills, extending down through the town along can­

yons and creeks. Nothing came of Olmsted's ideas at the time, but

they would influence twentieth-century planners.2

Lake Merritt, a saltwater estuary connected to San Francisco

Bay and extending inland into the center of Oakland, lay at the

heart of subsequent plans to improve the city's parks. Private ac­

tions both aided and hampered the development of Lake Merritt

as a recreation area. A private citizen, Dr. Samuel Merritt, formed

the "lake" by damming its outlet to the bay in 1868. By the 1880s

and 1890s, however, population growth in Oakland and the spread
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of private residences around the banks of Lake Merritt threatened 
the body of water with sewage.3 For several years, Lake Merritt 
had, as one contemporary writer put it, "a reputation of being 
unhealthy on account of defective sewerage, which caused a great 
deal of sickness in the shape of diphtheria and low malarial fever."4 
The city acquired Lake Merritt from its private owners in 1891, 
setting the stage for its possible development as a park. The first 
major effort to use public funds for park improvements in Oakland 
occurred in 1892. In that year the city council placed two park 
bond issues, each for $400,000, before the voters. One provided 
for the dredging of Lake Merritt and its encirclement by a scenic 
boulevard, according to plans drawn up by the city engineer. The 
other called for the draining of marshes in West Oakland and the 
conversion of the wetlands into a park, including areas for tennis, 
baseball, and football. Particularly noteworthy at a time when the 
playground movement was just beginning in the United States was 
the proposition that a part of the West Oakland park consist of "a 
large open meadow dotted here and there with groups of trees, 
and dedicated to the children for a play and picnic ground."5 
The park bond issues won strong backing from Oakland's busi­
ness organizations. The Board of Trade, the Federated Trades 
Association, and the Retail Clerks Association (an organization of 
middle-level store managers) came out for them. Employing argu­
ments that would become the standard ones used by park advo­
cates in Pacific Coast cities, members of those associations equated 
parks with economic gain. The president of the Board of Trade 
noted that the cost of the bonds was "not burdensome" when 
compared to the anticipated benefits. Similarly, one of Oakland's 
leading merchants, Hugo Abrahamson, claimed that "the building 
of a boulevard about Lake Merritt and the transformation of the 
West Oakland marsh into a park will attract people, and every­
thing that draws people to the city makes business of all sorts 
better." Labor leaders also supported the bonds. The head of the 
Carpenters' Union explained that the passage of the bonds would 
"mean work and wages for a long period to several hundred men 
in all ranks of labor."6 
Oakland's leading businessmen formed the Oakland Improve­
ment League to push for the bonds. Its members equated busi­
ness development with civic progress and quickly came to view 
approval of the park bonds as one way to place Oakland on an 
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equal footing with its counterparts on the Pacific Coast and across 
the nation. Passage of the bonds would, they thought, signal that 
their city had arrived as a major force in America's growing urban 
network. Civic pride, as well as economic growth, was at stake. 
The organization's chairman summed up the reasons many busi­
nessmen thought the bonds should be approved in a pamphlet 
titled Vote for Progress published on the eve of the election: 
It will increase the volume of local trade, give work to our 
idle laboring men, stimulate private enterprise, and add a 
large sum of money in local circulation. Better than all, vot­
ing the bonds will give notice to the outside world that Oak­
land has taken up her march on the high road of progress. 
. . . We trust every citizen will sink all petty considerations 
and resolve to do his best to give Oakland her proper place 
among cities.7 
Despite such support, the bonds failed to win approval. Like 
most of the bonds issued by Pacific Coast cities, they were general 
obligation bonds requiring a favorable two-thirds vote. Although a 
majority of voters favored the bonds, they did not secure the nec­
essary two-thirds vote. Some voters feared that the city govern­
ment might waste the money, while others were opposed to any 
possible increase in their tax rates. In spite of the defeat, the city 
government made some improvements to Lake Merritt over the 
next few years by constructing sewers and directing their outflow 
away from the lake into San Francisco Bay. 
After being sidetracked by the depression of the mid-i8gos, the 
issue of park improvements was revived in 1898 when the city 
council placed a park bond issue of $320,000, most of which was 
designated for the purchase and improvement of sixty-two acres 
on the shores of Lake Merritt, on the ballot. The city council, 
Board of Trade, and Merchants' Exchange all came out publicly 
for the bonds. As they had six years before, park bond proponents 
formed an umbrella committee—headed by the secretary of the 
Oakland Gas and Light Company and composed of merchants, 
manufacturers, city officials, lawyers, and the president of the 
Pacific Theological Seminary—to campaign for the bonds. 
In public presentations and widely distributed broadsides, the 
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committee members praised parks for their social and moral in­
fluences. "A park has a distinct influence in favor of public moral­
ity," claimed one advocate, for "in a public place, under the eyes of 
his fellows, surrounded by healthful outdoor influences, a person 
can not be engaged in anything very wrong." Moreover, he con­
tinued, "A park is a humanizing institution, because it brings all 
the people together. It is a neutral ground of ranks and classes. 
The poorest man owns as much of the public park as the richest. 
. . . But for it the two extremes in the social scale in our largest 
cities would never see each other."8 
The expected economic benefits of parks also continued to win 
the attention of the supporters of the park bonds. Parks would 
increase the value of nearby private properties and, more gener­
ally, of land throughout Oakland. "Investment in parks has proven 
remunerative to every city which has been wise enough to make 
provision in this direction," explained one of the broadsides. "The 
purchase and improvement of this tract will add to the attrac­
tiveness of Oakland as a place of residence, and thus increase the 
value of every foot of land in the city." Still more was involved, for, 
as in 1892, bond supporters argued that nothing less than the fate 
of their city was at stake. They claimed that approval of the bonds 
would "show the world that we have faith in ourselves, faith in the 
future of our beautiful city."9 
Nonetheless, the bonds again went down to defeat at the polls. 
As they had six years before, the park bonds won a simple majority 
but not the required two-thirds of the votes. With that defeat, the 
Oakland Enquirer concluded that Oakland had "lost its last oppor­
tunity to create a park on the shores of the lake."10 Such predic­
tions proved wrong. Oakland was just entering a period of hectic 
civic improvements. 
The Robinson Plan for Oakland 
As Oakland moved out from beneath the shadow of San Fran­
cisco in the opening years of the twentieth century, its residents 
turned to civic improvements and city planning as ways of claim­
ing what they viewed as their rightful place in the sun. The Oak­
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land Board of Trade continued to trumpet the city as a place where 
"many of the residences are palatial and . . . surrounded by either 
lawn or flowers" and as "a city of homes, commerce, culture and 
churches." Increasingly, however, the board advertised Oakland 
as a port city and manufacturing center: "the natural waterfront 
center of a state three times the size of New York" and "the termi­
nus of all transcontinental railroads."11 Oakland was hurt less than 
San Francisco by the 1906 earthquake. As Oakland's mayor ob­
served, "The earthquake this morning.visited upon our City a 
great calamity, yet it is a source of much satisfaction that we were 
spared from a conflagration and serious loss of life."12 Oakland's 
rapid ascent as a center of trade and industry after the earthquake 
and fire of 1906 brought new concerns to the fore. More than in 
the past, Oaklanders concentrated on building the infrastructure 
needed for the continued development of their city. 
Frank Mott led the city in its growth. What James Phelan was 
for San Francisco, Mott was for Oakland: a business leader who 
saw in politics a way to shape his city's future. A self-made man in 
the hardware business, Mott entered politics as a city councilman 
in 1894. Endorsed by both the Republicans and Democrats, he 
won election as mayor in 1905, a post he held until he stepped 
down ten years later. Like Phelan, Mott saw business and civic 
developments as naturally proceeding hand in hand. At the same 
time that he was mayor, Mott became deeply involved in real estate 
development, serving as the president of the Oakland Real Estate 
Board and the California State Realty Federation. If Mott was 
similar to Phelan in his outlook on civic development, his impact 
was greater. With fewer ethnic and socioeconomic divisions sepa­
rating groups within his city, Mott proved more effective in mak­
ing his desires reality.13 
Enjoying immense popularity throughout Oakland, Mott acted 
as a progressive mayor. One urban historian has called Mott s ad­
ministration "the very model of progressive city government."14 
Mott initiated civil service jobs in the city government and se­
cured adoption of a new city charter. Concerned about city ser­
vices, he reorganized the police and fire departments, built new 
water and sewer lines, placed electric wires underground, and 
installed new street lighting. Deeply interested in parks and civic 
improvements, Mott provided active governmental leadership in 
those areas. In 1905 and 1906, Mott, who been been a leader in the 
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1898 bond campaign, altered the city's method of administering 
its parks and initiated some improvements, including the dredg­
ing of Lake Merritt and the construction of Harrison Boulevard.15 
As was so often the case among Pacific Coast business and politi­
cal leaders, civic pride, a desire to see his city accepted as a mem­
ber of the nations network of cities, motivated Mott. As a result of 
his actions, Mott could tell his fellow Oaklanders with consider­
able justification in his farewell speech in 1915, "We have come up 
out of a minor place to a position of strength, influence, well­
being, comfort, and convenience among our sister cities."16 
In one of his more far-reaching moves, Mott, with the concur­
rence of the city council, invited Charles Mumford Robinson to 
come to Oakland and draw up a plan for the city's future develop­
ment. Robinson was a nationally known proponent of the city 
beautiful. In the late 1890s, Robinson had written a series of arti­
cles about municipal improvements for the Atlantic Monthly, and 
in 1899 he toured European cities to prepare a similar series for 
Harpers Magazine. From those experiences came Robinson's first 
book, The Improvement of Cities and Towns, in 1901, followed by a 
second volume, Modern Civic Art, just a few years later. In those 
widely read works Robinson popularized the idea that people 
could control and improve the physical environments of their cit­
ies. He espoused the notion that civic art joined utility to beauty, 
that there was "nothing effeminate [by which Robinson meant 
weak] and sentimental" about art and civic improvements—an 
argument that won praise from improvement groups and business 
organizations across the nation.17 
One of the national leaders in the city beautiful movement, 
Robinson would eventually prepare some twenty-five city plan­
ning reports and in 1913 would be awarded the Chair of Civic 
Design at the University of Illinois. According to William Wilson, 
the leading historian of the city beautiful movement, Robinson 
"adopted a comprehensive view of the city" in all of his work. That 
is, Robinson "exempted no urban area from beautification ef­
fort."18 Nonetheless, Robinson's vision, while broad for his time, 
was far from truly comprehensive, for many urban concerns sim­
ply lay beyond his ken. 
After visiting Oakland several times in 1905 and 1906, Robinson 
drafted a plan for the city and submitted it to Mott in May 1906. 
Like the plans prepared for other Pacific Coast cities, the Robin­
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son Plan for Oakland sought to cope with the consequences of 
urban growth. "Oakland can hardly fail now to increase even more 
rapidly than heretofore in population and in business," Robinson 
predicted in the preface to his plan. "You have to plan for a great 
city." Robinson further claimed that his plan was comprehensive. 
"Nor shall we be dealing with only esthetic needs," he declared. 
"Modern city building is a science as much as art [and] has to do 
also with social, moral, and industrial problems." As in his plans 
for other cities, Robinson asserted in his plan for Oakland that 
"beauty is not an ornament to be stuck on. Its essence lies in 
its structural utility."19 Robinson certainly saw his plan as address­
ing the social and economic, as well as the aesthetic, needs of 
Oaklanders; for him all three types of concerns were closely 
intermixed. 
In fact, Robinson's plan dealt mainly with the need for parks 
and boulevards. Much of the plan discussed the creation of large 
parks connected by drives and parkways. Robinson stressed the 
urgent need to make a park out of the land surrounding Lake 
Merritt and to build a boulevard around the lake. Robinson also 
called for the development of a three-hundred-acre park in Indian 
Gulch just to the northeast of the lake as a site for "picturesque 
and romantic walks and drives." From Indian Gulch a parkway 
would extend to Dimond Canyon and then on to East Oakland. 
Robinson urged that Oaklanders connect the proposed city park 
system with a still larger county park system. Beyond his sug­
gestions for large parks, Robinson called for numerous smaller 
neighborhood parks and playgrounds as ornamental pieces to 
beautify their parts of the city and as recreation centers. Finally, 
Robinson urged the appointment of a park commission to oversee 
all of the developments.20 
Robinson viewed the parks as helping Oakland both econom­
ically and socially. Noting that "Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle 
have already had the courage to do and plan much more," he 
suggested that the new parks would aid Oakland in its rivalry with 
other Pacific Coast cities. The parks would also benefit property 
owners by serving as firebreaks and by leading to an increase in 
property values. Most important to Robinson, however, was the 
social impact of the parks. The parks would, he thought, "alleviate 
the hard conditions of crowded humanity" and bring together "all 
the people, high and low, rich and poor, without distinction."21 
CITY PLANNING IN OAKLAND AND LOS ANGELES

Charles Robinson's plan for Oakland included a small civic center. From the Robin­
son Plan for Oakland. 
Although most of Robinson's plan dealt with park and boule­
vard proposals, it gave consideration to other matters. Robinson 
suggested the construction of a small civic center consisting of a 
city hall, post office, and police building at the intersection of San 
Pablo Avenue and Fourteenth Street. He also called for regulating 
billboards, removing wires over streets, improving street lighting, 
and replacing wooden street curbs with stone or concrete.22 
Robinson s plan contained nothing revolutionary. Many of his 
ideas for parks had been foreshadowed by Olmsted's concepts 
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forty years earlier. Oaklanders had been talking about the need 
for a civic center for some time by 1906, and the other improve­
ments suggested by Robinson had also long been under discus­
sion. Only twenty pages long, the Robinson Plan for Oakland 
stood in sharp contrast to the ambitious remaking of San Fran­
cisco espoused by Daniel Burnham. It contained no wholesale 
street changes or plans for a grandiose civic center. Even more 
than the Burnham Plan, Robinsons plan ignored the housing 
needs of urban residents and did not intend to alter living arrange­
ments in Oakland. 
The relatively limited nature of the "Robinson Plan for Oak­
land" boded well for its adoption. So did the strong and effective 
political support given by Mayor Mott—again in marked contrast 
to the situation in San Francisco, where political divisions hin­
dered the adoption of the Burnham Plan. Accepting the plan just a 
month after the San Francisco earthquake, Mott passed the plan 
on to the city council with the observation that it "is very compre­
hensive and contains many valuable and important suggestions. I 
commend it to your careful consideration."23 
Civic Improvements in Oakland 
Mott had the city council print and distribute numerous copies 
of Robinsons plan. Then, to gain firsthand knowledge of what 
other cities were doing in the realms of parks and planning, Mott 
spent several weeks touring New York, Boston, Kansas City, Cleve­
land, and Chicago. He returned to Oakland more convinced than 
ever that civic improvements were needed for his city.24 Nor was 
he alone. The Oakland Tribune mounted a campaign to clean up 
the city in late 1906 and early 1907, observing that the condition of 
many of even the city's major streets was "a disgrace to the people 
of Oakland."25 A letter to the editor of the newspaper captured 
the growing desire on the part of Oaklanders for a more beautiful 
city. "Can not a movement be started in Oakland to give houses 
generally a coat of paint and to clean up and repair sidewalks and 
fences," the writer asked "How much cheer would come to vis­
itors if the houses were painted with bright shining colors?"26 
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The first major accomplishments based on Robinsons ideas 
materialized when voters approved a $992,000 bond issue for park 
improvements in 1907. Pushed by Mott, the city council, and vir­
tually all of Oakland's leading businessmen, the bonds provided 
for the acquisition often pieces of property for park purposes, five 
of which bordered upon Lake Merritt.27 Like Robinson, Oak-
landers saw the development of parks as benefiting their city in a 
variety of ways, but they stressed the economic advantages and 
the fact that Oakland needed more and better parks to compete 
with other Pacific Coast cities for immigrants. An editorial in the 
Oakland Tribune summed up many of the reasons Oaklanders had 
come to think favorably of parks: 
One of the positive signs that Oakland is preparing to take her 
position among the great cities of the Pacific Coast is the 
attention being paid to its external environment. . . . To in­
duce growth and expansion people must be brought from the 
outside. To bring people from outside there must be attrac­
tions. . .. That which affords the most beauty and conve­
nience will be the first to attract notice. . . . Oakland can do 
what Southern California has accomplished if it will.28 
The bonds won a five-to-one majority. Oakland had developed 
considerably since bond issues had failed in the 1890s, and the 
passage of the park bonds in 1907 was seen as a matter of civic 
pride. The Oakland Tribune crowed that "the citizens of Oakland 
have demonstrated in a signal and practical manner that the spirit 
of progress dominates the community" and predicted that the 
bonds would "give Oakland a more beautiful and majestic ap­
pearance" that would "stimulate private improvement on a large 
scale."29 Similarly, Mott noted with approval shortly after the elec­
tion that "every municipality with any pretention at all in these 
days is giving much thought and money" to civic improvements. 
Parks, he thought, were "essential" to help "install us in the front 
rank of American municipalities."30 The Chamber of Commerce 
asserted that "the Public Park System of Oakland, as at present 
outlined, is destined to make the city famous."31 In an open letter 
to Oaklanders, Robinson also applauded the passage of the park 
bonds. "Apart from the aesthetic gain to the city," he claimed, 
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parks "will so improve the value of adjacent and neighboring prop­
erty that in the consequent rise in assessment values, they will 
quickly pay for themselves."32 
Oakland continued to develop its parks over the next few years, 
though the city never went as far as Robinson had desired. In 1908 
Oaklanders approved an additional $125,000 in park bonds, mainly 
to improve Lake Merritt.33 A year later they voted to amend their 
city charter to create the park commission that Robinson had 
proposed.34 A separate commission had been set up the previous 
year to develop playgrounds to help boys and girls grow into "strong 
healthy manhood or womanhood" by providing places where they 
could "meet with other children and indulge in the teamwork and 
tribal spirit that results from the playing of games."35 By 1915 Oak­
land possessed thirteen municipal playgrounds and twenty-seven 
schoolyard playgrounds where "athletics, games, plays, dancing 
.. . pageants and festivals" took place.36 
From these beginnings with parks, Mott and his supporters 
moved on to other civic improvements. In his second inaugural 
address in 1907 Mott called upon Oaklanders to unite in a spirit of 
"municipal pride, patriotism and loyalty" to continue improving 
their city.37 Mott had the strong support of business organizations, 
most notably the Chamber of Commerce and the Santa Fe Im­
provement Association, a group of business leaders organized in 
1907 to press for municipal improvements.38 
Most importantly, Mott called for the construction of a new city 
hall. Civic pride continued to motivate him and his business sup­
porters. Calling Oakland's present structure "unsafe" and "totally 
inadequate," Mott thought that "with the present growth and 
standing of our city it is in addition a serious reflection on us."39 
At Mott's urging, Oakland residents approved $1.15 million in 
bonds for a new city hall in 1909. Designed by a New York archi­
tectural firm, the structure was to thrust upward eighteen stories 
as a skyscraper near the site for a civic center suggested in Robin­
son's plan. Revolutionary in design for its time, the city hall was, 
Mott noted with approval, "out of the ordinary and conventional 
style" and would "attract notice everywhere and will put Oakland 
in the front ranks of modern cities."40 President William Howard 
Taft laid the cornerstone in 1911 after a delay that had been prompted 
by the Oakland Tribune to protest the employment of eastern ar­
chitects. City hall was completed three years later.41 
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The Oakland Civic Auditorium helped prepare the city for the Panama-Pacific International 
Exhibition. From the Hegeinann Plan for Oakland and Berkeley. 
Following their approval of the city hall bonds, Oaklanders 
voted favorably in 1911 on a $500,000 bond issue to fund the con­
struction of a civic auditorium. Business groups campaigned vigor­
ously for the bonds as being necessary for their city's economic 
advance. The auditorium was expected to help bring conventions, 
(many were expected to meet in conjunction with visits to San 
Francisco's Panama-Pacific International Exposition), capital, and 
businesses to Oakland. More generally, its backers claimed that 
the auditorium was needed to keep Oakland abreast of its urban 
rivals and to win acceptance for their city as a leading American 
metropolis. "If Oakland is to take its place in the ranks of pro­
gressive and up-to-date cities it must positively have such a build­
ing," the president of the Santa Fe Improvement Association as­
serted. "If it is desired to attract capital here and increase the 
population, then must Oakland have an auditorium."42 The secre­
tary of the Chamber of Commerce came out for the bonds for 
much the same reasons. The auditorium would be "a good invest­
ment" by attracting people to Oakland.43 Oakland's residents ap­
proved the bonds, only to discover over the next three years that 
cost overruns made it impossible to construct the type of audi­
torium they desired for $500,000.44 
As a consequence, the city council returned to the voters in 
1914 to request an additional $500,000 to complete the structure. 
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Once again business groups led the campaign. The Chamber of 
Commerce organized a Progress and Prosperity Committee as its 
"militant arm" to work for the bonds; and the committee divided 
the city into wards, with a business leader in charge of the cam­
paign for the bonds in each ward. Working with Mayor Mott and 
the councilmen, the businessmen launched a massive educational 
movement on behalf of the bonds.45 As in 1911, those favoring the 
bonds appealed to the civic pride of Oaklanders. "The world is 
coming this way next year [a reference to the Panama-Pacific In­
ternational Exposition] and Oakland cannot afford to have a steel 
structure proclaiming that the city is too poor to put a cover on its 
ribs," observed one. To leave the auditorium unfinished would, 
another noted, be "humiliating and discrediting to its citizen­
ship."46 The economic arguments—that the passage of the audi­
torium bonds would "make more work and more wages and better 
business"—were rolled out once again.47 The bonds won approval 
by the scant majority of 139 votes out of 23,577 cas^ (unlike the 
park bonds and most other bonds, they required only a simple 
majority). Mayor Mott found the election result "most gratifying." 
After learning that the bonds had passed, members of the Cham­
ber of Commerce and the Commercial Club "organized a parade, 
and headed by bands of music, marched through the business 
streets of the city."48 
With more limited aims and benefiting from the strong backing 
of their mayor and city council, planning proponents more fully 
accomplished their goals in Oakland than did their counterparts 
in San Francisco. They made considerable progress: a new park 
system was laid out, a new city hall and a new auditorium were 
built, and smaller civic improvements were made. Nonetheless, 
Oaklanders were no more successful than San Franciscans in 
adopting a truly comprehensive plan for their city, as can be seen 
in their failure to follow a plan drafted by Werner Hegemann for 
the development of Berkeley and Oakland. 
Hegemann came to the United States in 1912 at the request of 
the People's Institute of New York "to cooperate with American 
cities in the promotion of planning projects." Hegemann was 
already well known as the secretary of the Committee for the 
Architectural Development of Greater Berlin and as the general 
secretary of city planning exhibits in Berlin and Diisseldorf. As he 
traveled through cities of the East Coast and Midwest giving lec­
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tures and preparing planning reports, his reputation grew. Soon 
after his arrival in the East Bay in October 1913, he was invited by 
the city councils of Oakland and Berkeley to "inspect and report 
on conditions" in those cities. Published in 1915 under the joint 
auspices of governmental bodies—the city governments of Oak­
land and Berkeley, the Civic Art Commission of Berkeley, and the 
Board of Supervisors of Alameda County—and private business 
and civic organizations—the Oakland Chamber of Commerce, 
the Oakland Commercial Club, and the City Club of Berkeley— 
the Hegemann Plan was quite different from the Robinson Plan 
for Oakland.49 
Hegemann was less interested in aesthetics and more con­
cerned than Robinson with the economic and social conditions in 
the cities he studied and planned for. "If civic art is the sublime 
flower that can finally be hoped for," Hegemann explained, "the 
necessary roots, stems and leaves must be found in the economic, 
social, hygenic and recreation life of the communities."50 Accord­
ingly, most of his plan for Oakland and Berkeley consisted of de­
tailed suggestions for the coordinated development of harbor 
improvements, changes in railroad routes, and the construction of 
commercial streets. All of the changes were needed, Hegemann 
asserted, to allow the East Bay to compete successfully as a center 
of trade and industry with San Francisco. Beyond those matters, 
Hegemann called for the creation of complete civic centers in 
Oakland and Berkeley and the development of a regional park 
system along the lines put forward by Robinson. Finally, Hege­
mann urged the building of better housing for the working classes, 
noting that "the settlement of the problems of housing for the 
masses of the population in the long run determines the fate of a 
city, its health, beauty, civic spirit, political texture."51 
While portions of the Hegemann Plan were implemented over 
the years, the plan never won adoption as a unified, comprehen­
sive guide for the development of the East Bay. In part, that failure 
was due to World War I, which disrupted planning efforts. It re­
sulted as well from alterations occurring in the city planning 
movement itself. In 1915 the California legislature passed a City 
Planning Enabling Act that permitted municipalities to estab­
lish city planning commissions. The commissions could advise 
city governments on changes needed for the development of the 
cities. The legislation also allowed city councils to zone areas for 
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Major improvements in traffic flow were part of the Hegemann Plan for Oakland 
and Berkeley. 
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residential, commercial, and industrial use. (Los Angeles already 
possessed zoning ordinances, and a decision of the California Su­
preme Court upheld their validity in 1913.) Further legislation two 
years later strengthened the zoning powers of municipalities.52 
Zoning became the vogue across America by the time of World 
War I. As the urban historian Mellior Scott has observed, at that 
time "popular interest began to focus on one phase of city plan­
ning—zoning to protect single-family residential areas from inva­
sion by factories, stores, and apartment houses."53 Zoning dif­
fered from the type of planning put forward by Burnham and 
Robinson. Zoning did not necessarily envision organically unified 
cities integrated around civic centers, functionally laid-out streets 
and harbors, and parks and boulevards. In the cities of some states, 
zoning could proceed before the preparation of any overall city 
plans. In Wisconsin and Minnesota, for example, zoning districts 
were established in cities simply upon the petitions of property 
owners.54 Many in the nation's city planning movement deplored 
the spread of zoning for distracting attention from what they 
viewed as the real social and economic problems their cities 
faced. As Frank Backus, a New Yorker who specialized in the legal 
aspects of city planning, explained in 1914, "So far what we have 
done along districting lines has been, practically, housing without 
city planning instead of housing as an element of city planning, so 
little has districting been a part of the planning of the city as a 
whole, so little has it been used to aid in the solution of more 
general city problems."55 
In California citywide land use plans—plans setting aside areas 
for residential, commercial, and industrial use—generally had to 
accompany the establishment of zoning districts within cities. 
Nonetheless, the spread of zoning led to a major shift in emphasis 
in city planning away from comprehensive plans encompassing 
civic centers, new streets and harbors, and parks and boulevards. 
It was not that zoning destroyed what had already had been ac­
complished along those lines, as it was that the growing interest in 
zoning precluded further elaboration after the war. Zoning pro­
posals tended to be initiated by real estate men interested pri­
marily in protecting their private investments and developments; 
they were often supported, however, by home owners eager to 
protect their property values. The embrace of zoning represented 
something of a turning away from planning as a weapon in the 
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Werner Hegemann's plan called for much of the East Bay to be developed as a 
unified geographic region. From the Hegemann Plan for Oakland and Berkeley. 
81 
CITY PLANNING IN OAKLAND AND LOS ANGELES

fight for urban dominance on the Pacific Coast toward the use of 
city planning as a tool to solve specific, limited urban problems. 
Taking their lead from the residents of Los Angeles, Oaklanders 
adopted a zoning ordinance in 1914. Introduced to the city council 
by Mayor Mott, the ordinance set up an industrial zone within which 
manufacturing concerns would be located. As explained by Mott, 
the ordinance was "aimed at the inclusion of all industries within 
definite areas for the protection of people who desire their homes to 
be located far from the annoyances of shops and factories."56 
City Planning Begins in Los Angeles 
In Los Angeles, as in Oakland, one of the original goals of city 
improvements and planning was the protection of suburban dis­
tricts for private homes. As we have seen, Los Angeles developed 
in part as a result of health and real estate booms. Like Oakland, 
and in contrast to San Francisco, Los Angeles was a residential 
city of private homes: and the preservation and furtherance of the 
"rurban" characteristic of the city was one of the aims of many 
planners. In 1915 a widely distributed pamphlet put out by the 
Chamber of Commerce observed that "here may be found beau­
tiful rural homes, whose owners are within touch of social life, and 
enjoy the best features of the city and country combined."57 As 
Los Angeles entered the twentieth century, however, the commer­
cial and industrial bases that it developed also called for attention. 
The congestion of the downtown area in particular attracted no­
tice and generated attempts to relieve it. 
Parks, which had figured so prominently in the planning move­
ment in Oakland, were of lesser significance in Los Angeles. Some 
wealthy citizens donated lands to the city for park purposes. The 
three thousand acres given by Griffith J. Griffith in 1891 became 
the basis for the city's outstanding Griffith Park. Perhaps because 
the city expanded outward rapidly via real estate subdivisions, how­
ever, no park movement as intense as Oakland's materialized. 
Rather, most residents hoped to find a bit of nature in their own 
backyards. 
Nonetheless, in 1911 a plan to construct a major parkway won 
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Like Oakland, Los Angeles was a city of bungalows. From the Robinson Plan for Los Angeles. 
consideration. It would extend along the Arroyo Seco River from

the Angeles National Forest through Pasadena to Los Angeles,

where it would join a metropolitan parkway system. In his report

on the proposed system, Laurie Cox, the landscape engineer who

designed it, argued that the parkway would add to "the health and

happiness of the citizens and to the prosperity of the municipality

itself." Moreover, it would help place Los Angeles on par with

"Boston, Chicago, Kansas City, Washington, Minneapolis, Phila­

delphia" and other metropolises as a leading American city.58 Cox

presented his report to the Los Angeles Park Commission at

a mass meeting presided over by the City Club, a nonpartisan

organization pushing for progressive politics. Those at the meet­

ing resolved that the City Club appoint a committee to work with

city officials for park improvements, and over the next few years a

number of improvements were made. As early as the summer of

1912, the San Francisco Examiner could report with envy that Los

Angeles "has been going forward, and at an amazing pace" in the

construction of parks. San Franciscans could, the newspaper con­

CITY PLANNING IN OAKLAND AND LOS ANGELES 
eluded, "gain a lesson in civic progress" from this "'noble' park 
plan."59 
In the end, Los Angeles's park and parkway plans were only 
incompletely implemented. Most disappointing to many park pro­
ponents was the failure to turn Wilshire Boulevard within Los 
Angeles into a parkway. It became, instead, a commercial highway 
strip. By 1930 the park system of Los Angeles consisted of fifty-
three hundred acres and compared favorably in size to those of 
other Pacific Coast cities. However, as the leading historian of Los 
Angeles, Robert Fogelson, has concluded, it "fell far short of the 
planners' aspirations."60 
Rather than originate in a park and boulevard movement, the 
planning campaign in Los Angeles found its origins in other sources. 
One was the attempt by leading businessmen and professionals, 
banded together as the Municipal Art Commission, to work for the 
beautification of Los Angeles. Another lay in zoning. Los Angeles was 
one of the first cities in America to adopt citywide zoning codes. 
The Robinson Plan for Los Angeles 
Beautification and improvement efforts began in 1903 with the 
establishment of the Municipal Art Commission. Including within 
its membership the nationally respected architect John Parkin­
son, the commission both tried to bring about alterations on its 
own and sought to advise the city government on the need for 
changes. The commission tried to secure better cleaning and 
lighting for public streets and sought to influence the design of 
public buildings. Members of the commission also tried through 
speeches and publications to popularize the cause of civic im­
provements.61 In addition to their actions as members of the Mu­
nicipal Art Commission, merchants, real estate developers, and 
bankers labored through their own business organizations to 
improve their city. From its founding in 1903, the Los Angeles 
Realty Board worked to clean up vacant lots, limit the height of 
buildings, and promote public art.62 In 1905 a group of downtown 
businessmen sought to donate land valued at $200,000 to the city 
for a civic center, only to be rebuffed by the city government, 
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which had not yet decided what shape a center should take or at 
what site it should be built.63 
As it developed, the city planning campaign became associated 
with the more general progressive reform movement in Los Ange­
les. "City and regional planning," Fogelson has written, "emerged 
as an integral part of progressivism in Los Angeles after 1900."64 
That many of the same people, such as City Club president Meyer 
Lissner, were active in both progressive politics and city planning 
is not surprising. City planning shared certain goals with urban 
progressivism in Los Angeles: the creation of a populace unified 
by a sense of community, economic growth for the city, and better 
living conditions for its residents. As it unfolded during nearly two 
decades in Los Angeles, progressivism came to embrace devices 
designed to make city politics more efficient and honest by taking 
political control away from machine politicians. In addition, it 
endorsed some forms of municipal ownership of public utilities, 
and the passage of ordinances aimed at closing saloons, ending 
prostitution, and eliminating racetrack betting.65 
The combined efforts of the Municipal Art Commission and 
the business groups popularized the cause of planning and im­
provements in Los Angeles. Dana Bartlett, a minister born in 
Maine who was serving as a clergyman and social worker in Los 
Angeles, caught well the desires of many involved in the civic 
improvement movement.66 In a book he published in 1907 titled 
The Better City, he observed, "Ugliness has no commercial or eth­
ical value." Rather, a beautiful city would be prosperous and would 
have a favorable moral impact upon its inhabitants. Bartlett called 
for the planting of trees to make Los Angeles "a forest city," the 
building of streets along the natural contours of the land rather 
than along the design of a gridiron, and the development of parks, 
including one along the Arroyo Seco River.67 
In early 1906, the Municipal Art Commission recommended 
that Charles Robinson be retained by the city government to "lay 
out a plan for the beautifying of Los Angeles and the surrounding 
country." After some further discussion among themselves, mem­
bers of the commission convinced the city council to hire Robinson 
in the spring of 1907. With the council's approval, the commission 
invited Robinson to visit Los Angeles and offer "such suggestions 
and recommendations for its improvement and beautification as 
were practicable in the limited time allotted." In the meantime, 
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the commission solicited and received suggestions on improve­
ments from the mayor, the park commission, the city forester, the 
Chamber of Commerce, the Real Estate Board, the Architects and 
Engineers Association, and the Merchants' and Manufacturers' 
Association. Robinson accepted the invitation and came to Los 
Angeles for three weeks in November 1907. After touring the city 
with members of the commission and considering the suggestions 
forwarded to him from other groups, Robinson presented his 
ideas to a meeting of the Municipal Art Commission in late 1907.68 
Like his plan for Oakland, Robinson's plan for Los Angeles was 
limited in scope. While he gave consideration to street and trans­
portation improvements, Robinson again dealt mainly with pro­
posals for parks, boulevards, and a civic center. Robinson restricted 
his efforts in another way as well. He looked only at "those portions 
of the city in which conditions were most rapidly becoming fixed," 
that is, "the business district and all the more thickly settled parts of 
Los Angeles."69 Although restricted in those ways, the Robinson 
Plan was not limited in any financial sense. "I set myself no goal in 
dollars to be expended," Robinson noted in the introduction to his 
plan. "I assumed that Los Angeles was big enough and rich enough, 
and brave enough and had enough confidence in itself, to do what 
was necessary and worthwhile." Robinson did not, however, expect 
all of his proposals to be implemented at once. "Some of them will 
stretch over a term of many years," he thought.70 
In looking at the downtown, Robinson found an area that had 
grown up "in a swift and unsystematic" way, a district that was 
"jammed and crowded into narrow streets . . . unrelieved by open 
spaces." He proposed to remedy the situation partially through 
the construction of a union railroad station where the Alameda 
station then stood on Central Avenue. The new station would, 
Robinson thought, both "impress strangers" through a "dignified 
and splendid" entrance and relieve traffic congestion in the down­
town area.71 To further dignify and open up the downtown, Rob­
inson urged the construction of a civic center, consisting of a post 
office, county courthouse, city hall, and several smaller struc­
tures, at the intersection of Temple, Spring, and Main streets. 
Open spaces and gardens would separate the buildings. Robinson 
noted that a private bank was already going up on one of the sites 
in the area for which he proposed the center but concluded that 
"it has at least the merit of rising like a warning finger . .  . as if to 
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Charles Robinson's plan anticipated a new public library and civic center. From the Robinson 
Plan for Los Angeles. 
caution the citizens of Los Angeles that if they desire to gain big

effects and do big things in the building of their city it is not safe to

delay the acquirement of the necessary land."72 Robinson be­

lieved that the civic center would function in part "to dignify and

emphasize the historic old Plaza" inherited from Spanish times,

which was located just a few blocks away. He lamented that the

"quaint little Plaza" was neglected and urged its connection to a

large hillside park that he proposed developing nearby.73

From his consideration of the downtown, Robinson proceeded

to recommend a park and boulevard system. He called for a large

Central Park between Fifth and Sixth streets. Here would be

located an art gallery and public library on a hill, with buildings

whose "white columns showing from below against the blue Cal­

ifornia sky" would have a "Grecian" effect.74 Boulevards would

spread out to connect parks as "links in the chain" throughout Los

Angeles. The boulevards would serve two purposes. They would
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be places of rest and repose as "pleasure drives," and they would 
be "utilitarian to the extent that they are to furnish convenient 
and easy access between the various residential sections and be­
tween these and the business section."75 Figueroa Street, Sunset 
Boulevard, Occidental Boulevard, Los Feliz Road, Wilshire Bou­
levard, and a drive along Arroyo Seco all attracted Robinsons 
attention as possible parkways. 
Robinson also dealt with smaller, less encompassing matters. 
He proposed better street lighting for the downtown district, the 
beautification of street intersections and the entrances to tunnels, 
and the abolition of fences separating private residential lots as a 
way of making "one park of many . . . for the good of all." The 
planting of trees, and improvements to playgounds and school­
yards "because of the effect on children and through them on 
homes," also won Robinson's support.76 Robinson especially de­
cried the imposition of "Chicago-like gridiron street systems" on 
the varied topography of Los Angeles through "the mistaken 
greed and ignorance of real estate speculators." Robinson thought 
that such developers failed to understand that "beautiful winding 
roads that follow the contour" could both beautify Los Angeles 
and increase the value of their private real estate holdings, and he 
called upon city officials "to check the tendency."77 
Robinson closed his report by urging the residents of Los An­
geles make their city the " 'Paris of America,'" a city with a "gay 
outdoor life." It was necessary, Robinson wrote in conclusion, "not 
to be simply big; but to be beautiful as well."78 As did his plan for 
Oakland, Robinson's plan for Los Angeles differed considerably 
from the Burnham Plan for San Francisco. While both Burnham 
and Robinson were interested in beautification, Burnham was 
more the engineer. The detailed street designs of the Burnham 
Plan were for the most part absent in the Robinson Plan for Los 
Angeles. Nor was there any real attempt to understand the func­
tional relationships between the different elements of a city that 
lay at the heart of the Burnham Plan. 
As in his designs for Oakland, Robinson was conservative in his 
planning for Los Angeles. Robinson claimed that he planned for 
"the city as a unit," but he envisioned few of the major urban 
changes called for by Burnham for San Francisco or by those who 
sought to remake Portland and Seattle.79 Robinson appealed to 
the civic pride of the residents of Los Angeles in seeking the 
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Charles Robinson's plan called for the construction of numerous boulevards. From 
the Robinson Plan for Los Angeles. 
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acceptance of his plans there. Only through planning could Los 
Angeles join cities across the nation as an equal. After noting that 
St. Paul, St. Louis, Denver, and other cities were preparing for the 
future through city planning, Robinson concluded that the "time 
for carrying out the plans rests with the business sense and civic 
pride of the citizens of Los Angeles."80 
Progress on the implementation of Robinson's plan for Los Ange­
les was, however, painfully slow. Planning proponents lacked the 
political push of a Mayor Mott to bring the plan to fruition. Nor was 
there the sense of urgency that existed in San Francisco after its 
disaster. The Municipal Art Commission accepted Robinson's re­
port on Los Angeles enthusiastically and voted immediately to for­
ward the plan to the mayor and city council. There the plan lay. Not 
until 1909 did the city government appropriate funds to publish and 
distribute copies of the plan.81 Only in August 1910 did the city 
council pass a resolution urging the mayor to appoint a committee 
to "consider the needs of the City" and to "develop a comprehen­
sive plan whereby Los Angeles may develop her material improve­
ment along artistic as well as practical lines."82 The mayor set up a 
fifteen-member committee a short time later, but, strapped for 
funds and hurt by political infighting, it accomplished nothing. 
In 1911 at the instigation of the harbor commissioner and at the 
invitation of the city council, Bion Arnold (the same engineer who 
prepared a transportation plan for San Francisco) drew up a plan 
for transportation improvements in the Los Angeles region. Meyer 
Lissner, a member of the Los Angeles Board of Public Utilities, 
and thus by city ordinance also a member of the Board of Harbor 
Commissioners, was instrumental in having the report prepared. 
Designed to allow Los Angeles "to reap the benefit from its har­
bor which it should receive when the Panama Canal is opened," 
the plan encompassed suggestions for a municipal railroad, local 
street railroads, interurban railroads, and mass transit facilities.83 
Arnold argued forcefully for the economic benefits of his plan. He 
claimed that "there is nothing that will advertise a city better, 
affect the value of real estate more widely and leave a more lasting 
impression on a community than a comprehensive City and Dis­
trict Plan." However, little came of his efforts.84 Further abortive 
attempts to establish city planning commissions took place in 1913 
and 1917, but not until 1920 was such a commission set up, then 
mainly to deal with zoning matters.85 
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The accomplishments of those desiring city planning along the 
lines of Robinson's ideas for Los Angeles were therefore limited. 
Parks were created, but only on a piecemeal basis. The city never 
acquired a park and boulevard system similar to that recommended 
by Robinson. For years controversies engulfed efforts to construct 
a civic center, as different groups argued about location, cost, and 
design. Typical was the failure of a bond issue in 1912 to build a 
new city hall on Temple Square, near where Robinson had recom­
mended. Though favored by downtown real estate interests, the 
proposition generated opposition in the form of "conservative 
business sentiment" that thought that Los Angeles was already 
heavily bonded for other purposes. The city hall bonds failed to 
win approval.86 When voters did finally approve a $7.5 million 
bond issue to build a civic center in 1922, they chose a compro­
mise site deemed by the historian Fogelson as having serious "aes­
thetic shortcomings."87 
Planners proved more successful in winning new supplies of 
water for their city, thereby allowing its continued expansion. 
While businessmen led attempts to implement Robinson's plan 
and were in the forefront of zoning efforts in Los Angeles, city 
officials spearheaded the drive to acquire water. As accurately 
portrayed in the movie Chinatown, ex-mayor Fred Eaton and 
city water engineer William Mulholland secretly purchased 
water rights for Los Angeles in the Owens River Valley during 
the early 1900s (a select group of businessmen, probably tipped 
off about those moves, purchased land at the southern end of the 
terminus for a projected aqueduct from the Owens River Valley 
to Los Angeles). Pushed by city officials and backed by most 
business interests, nearly $25 million in aqueduct bonds won 
approval from the city's voters. Completed in 1913, the aqueduct 
amply supplied the water needs of Los Angeles for years; and the 
city successfully implemented a policy of water-based expansion 
that increased its size from 43 to 442 square miles between 1906 
and 1930. Project funding also greatly increased the debt of city 
residents, as "Los Angeles deliberately taxed and spent its way 
to growth."88 By 1913 city property taxes, on a per capita basis, 
were the fourth highest in the United States. As funding strained 
their resources, the residents of Los Angeles demurred for a time 
from paying for what they viewed as less essential projects such 
as the civic center. 
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Los Angeles as a Pioneer in Zoning 
Zoning represented another major approach to city improve­
ment and planning. Real estate speculation played an important 
role in the development of Los Angeles. By 1930 Los Angeles was 
home to more than 6 percent of the nation s real estate agents, and 
one-seventh of the city's work force was directly involved in con­
struction and real estate activities.89 Real estate men were more 
important in city planning activities in Los Angeles than in any 
other Pacific Coast center. Relying first on voluntary measures, 
they soon turned to zoning ordinances to try to control the shape 
of their city's growth. In zoning they saw a precise form of plan­
ning that was more effective in protecting residential develop­
ments than was comprehensive planning, which involved civic 
centers, parks, and streets. They saw as well a means that they 
thought was less expensive. 
Real estate developers had long used restrictive covenants to 
protect the value of lots in their subdivisions in Los Angeles, but it 
was in 1904 that they first succeeded in having the city council 
pass an ordinance creating a residential district in which some 
industrial activities were prohibited. While largely ineffective in 
practice, the ordinance suggested the possibilities of control in­
herent in land-use zoning.90 
In 1908 the residents of Los Angeles replaced their zoning ordi­
nance of four years before with two much more extensive ones. 
The ordinances are now accepted by many urban historians as the 
beginning of modern zoning in the United States, preceding the 
better known New York statute by eight years. While the first of 
the 1908 ordinances mapped out three large areas in Los Angeles 
in which most industrial operations would be forbidden, the sec­
ond ordinance defined the areas in which industries would be 
allowed. Strongly pushed by the Los Angeles Realty Board as one 
way to revive temporarily slumping sales in real estate, the ordi­
nances were intended to assure prospective lenders and home 
purchasers that Los Angeles would be a residential paradise of 
spacious homes in quiet, clean surroundings.91 
Business opposition to the ordinances, especially that of Los 
Angeles s budding industrialists, limited their effectiveness. Seven 
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major industrial districts, mainly along the Los Angeles River, 
were soon set up, with most of the rest of the city zoned for resi­
dential use. The zoning survived court tests to provide a model for 
the spread of zoning to Oakland and some other California cit­
ies.92 Within Los Angeles, however, the results of zoning soon 
disappointed zoning advocates. The problem, from the viewpoint 
of those favoring the strict enforcement of zoning, was that the 
city council granted too many exemptions—more than one hun­
dred by 1915, ranging in scope from a single city lot to a large 
section of the central business district.93 
As the number of exemptions grew, some realtors initiated a 
movement to revise the zoning ordinances. A precipitating factor 
was the invasion in 1919 of the west side residential neighborhoods 
of Wilshire and West Lake by a clothing factory. At a meeting in 
1920, a coalition of business groups formed to press for stricter 
zoning: members of the Chamber of Commerce, who were con­
cerned that enough land be set aside for industrial purposes, the 
Realty Board, whose members wanted to protect residential areas, 
and members of other business groups. Together they called on 
the city council to set up a City Planning Commission to reconcile 
matters. The city council passed an enabling ordinance, and in 
1921 the mayor appointed a fifty-one-member City Planning Com­
mission composed of representatives from seventeen business and 
civic groups.94 One of the first actions the commission took was to 
devise a new zoning plan based on five types of districts: single-
family residential, multiple-family residential, commercial, light 
industrial, and heavy industrial.95 
In taking that action, the City Planning Commission thrust Los 
Angeles back into its position as a "zoning pioneer," for Los Ange­
les became America's first large city to establish a separate cate­
gory for single-family residences.96 The goal the Realty Board had 
of preserving Los Angeles as a residential city was, nonetheless, 
only partly met. The growth of the city continued to outstrip ef­
forts to control it. Only small parts of the city were actually zoned 
for single-family residential use. Moreover, zoning exemptions 
continued to be made. Throughout the 1920s, the City Planning 
Commission spent more than 80 percent of its time processing 
applications for zoning changes or exemptions, and most requests 
won approval. The only partial success of the Realty Board is not 
surprising. Its two hundred members in 1921 were only part of the 
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real estate profession in Los Angeles. More speculative devel­
opers and builders opposed zoning restrictions. Then too other 
business groups did not fully embrace strict zoning. As they had in 
San Francisco, divisions among businessmen hindered the devel­
opment of city planning—in this case in the form of zoning—in 
Los Angeles.97 
The City Planning Commission did, however, prepare the way 
for future planning efforts in Los Angeles. In 1923 some of its 
members participated in the formation of the Los Angeles Re­
gional Planning Commission, one of the first regional planning 
bodies established in the United States. Two years later, the City 
Planning Commission was itself changed into a smaller, ade­
quately funded body with heightened political clout.98 According 
to its director, the commission was designed to be "a coordinating 
medium through which all agencies . . . which contribute to the 
physical development of the community shall be focussed in a 
single attack upon the task of building a city of tomorrow."99 
Brave words those. As in times past, however, population and 
spatial growth continued to outpace planning efforts. The rapid 
adoption of the automobile combined with a land boom in the 
1920s to thwart attempts to control the city's decentralized expan­
sion. Then too the residents of Los Angeles, for the most part, 
wanted that type of growth. The suburban bungalow with its own 
yard remained the ideal. Not surprisingly, a 1925 proposal to spend 
$133 million on public transit facilities, including twenty-six miles 
of subway lines and eighty-five miles of elevated tracks, got no­
where.100 In 1949 an urban planner could still lament, "Is it unrea­
sonable to expect that some planning agency representing the 
entire Los Angeles area should be preparing a master plan for the 
future development of the whole area?"101 
The California Harbor Controversy 
Even as they grappled with the issues of parks, streets, and 
civic centers, the business leaders of Oakland and Los Angeles 
worked through politics to improve their harbors. In these en­
deavors they were joined by their counterparts in San Francisco. 
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Efforts to improve harbors were often a part of the general plan­
ning work of the cities—as they were, as well, in Seattle and Port­
land. Although they were not included in Robinsons plans for 
Oakland and Los Angeles, many planning advocates saw better 
harbor facilities as a necessary component of comprehensive city 
planning. Planning proponents envisioned better harbor facilities 
connected to improved intracity street and transportation systems 
as a way of making more efficient the economic workings of their 
cities. Proponents, especially merchants and shippers, thought 
improved harbors would bring prosperity to them and their cities. 
They believed the improvements would also win national recogni­
tion for their cities and move them ahead of their urban rivals on 
the Pacific Coast. 
Planning advocates viewed harbor improvements as especially 
important in light of the imminent completion of the Panama 
Canal. Only if their cities were well prepared, could they take 
advantage of the tremendous increase in trade and immigration 
they were sure would result from the opening of the canal. As the 
completion of the Panama Canal neared, rivalry intensified for the 
ocean trade passing through California; and that rivalry led to a 
spate of harbor improvements. 
San Pedro, which landlocked Los Angeles annexed as its outlet 
to the ocean in 1908, possessed only an unprotected roadstead. In 
addition to the physical problem of constructing a harbor, there 
was the obstacle of the Southern Pacific Railroad. That corpora­
tion, which had brought prosperity to Los Angeles with one hand, 
threatened to throttle it by its control over the harbor at San Pedro 
with the other. In a twenty-year contest involving lengthy court 
battles and lobbying in the state and national legislatures, the 
Southern Pacific attempted to maintain its hold over Los Angeles s 
outlet to the sea. In 1911, however, the California State Supreme 
Court ruled in favor of the city and against the railroad that the 
tidelands were state property. Meanwhile, construction of an 
artificial harbor had been started by Los Angeles, and in 1910 an 
outer breakwater had been completed. The future of Los Angeles 
seemed assured, for all that remained to be done for the city to 
possess its own harbor was to transfer the title to the tidelands 
from the state to the city.102 
Oakland faced an analogous situation. In 1910 court decisions 
and political actions led by Mayor Mott broke the control that 
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Southern Pacific had long held over that city's waterfront, and the 
city's residents readily approved bond issues for harbor improve­
ments. In 1911 a leading San Francisco newspaper enviously called 
Oaklanders' actions "a bold stoke that seems to partake almost of 
egotism" and urged San Francisco merchants to emulate their 
fellows across the bay.103 As in the case of Los Angeles, all that 
remained to be done was to pass ownership of the tidelands from 
the state to the city.104 
San Francisco merchants viewed the development of rival har­
bors at Los Angeles and Oakland with alarm and, like other Pa­
cific Coast businessmen, hoped to improve their harbor to pre­
pare for the opening of the Panama Canal. As one advocate of 
harbor improvements lamented in 1911, San Francisco's facilities 
"are inadequate to handle the commerce of the port." He warned, 
"Unless San Francisco sees fit during the next four years to pro­
vide additional dockage facilities, the vast trade of the Panama 
Canal will have to go elsewhere."105 As another explained, "All 
seaports are competitors with all other seaports on the same coast." 
Noting that "Los Angeles and Oakland have adopted the policy of 
taxation" to pay for harbor improvements, he urged San Fran­
ciscans to do the same.106 
Making any changes to the San Francisco waterfront was com­
plicated, however, because a State Board of Harbor Commis­
sioners appointed by the governor controlled the port. Moreover, 
bond issues for the improvement of San Francisco's harbor had to 
win approval from the state legislature and then gain a majority in 
a statewide referendum. When San Francisco had been the only 
major port in California, this system had worked fairly well; but, 
as other ports rose to prominence, San Franciscans complained 
that state regulation hurt them. San Franciscans feared that they 
might lose control of the board and recognized as well that, as 
time went on, they would have less and less control over the pas­
sage of bond issues essential to their port's development.107 
The contest for California's ocean traffic exploded in the 1911 
state legislative session. When representatives from Los Angeles 
and Oakland introduced a bill tranferring the state-held tidelands 
to their cities, San Franciscans rallied as a unit in opposition, 
believing that, should the measure pass, Oakland and Los Angeles 
might set port charges lower than their own. The deadlock was 
resolved in a private meeting between representatives of the Los 
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Angeles Chamber of Commerce and the business organizations of 
San Francisco. San Franciscans agreed to withdraw their opposi­
tion in return for pledges of support on future bond issues for 
improvements to their harbor and for backing San Francisco as 
the site for a world s fair in 1915. Several days after the conference, 
members of San Francisco's merchant bodies wired their city's 
political representatives in Sacramento to vote for the tidelands 
measure, and it passed without dissent. Nonetheless, the compro­
mise worried San Francisco merchants, and with good reason.108 
Even as the political situation remained uncertain, merchants in 
Oakland and Los Angeles worked with city officials to improve 
their cities' harbors. In Los Angeles five bond elections between 
1909 and 1932 raised $30 million to improve the city's harbor (the 
bonds won a needed two-thirds vote in each election). The funds 
financed the building of breakwaters, wharves, piers, docks, bridges 
and highways—all designed, as the Harbor Bond Campaign Com­
mittee of 1919 put it, to "make Los Angeles one of the great seats of 
world commerce."109 Oaklanders, led by Mott, similarly approved 
bond issues to improve their harbor. Their activities proved success­
ful. Within little more than a decade, Los Angeles handled the most 
freight tonnage of any Pacific Coast port and was third (after New 
York and Philadelphia) in terms of freight tonnage nationally.110 
Oakland was not far behind, rapidly overhauling San Francisco. 
While the goal of comprehensive city planning encompassing 
parks, civic centers, new streets, and improved harbors was im­
perfectly realized in Oakland and Los Angeles, the results of their 
early planning efforts were, nonetheless, substantial. Oaklanders 
probably accomplished the most, in part because their goals were 
more modest than in Los Angeles, at least initially. Even more 
importantly, those supporting civic improvements and planning 
received strong, steadfast political support from their city's busi­
nessman mayor, Frank Mott. Then, too, Oakland's growth slowed 
a bit after 1910, giving residents a chance to catch up with and 
control their city's expansion—in marked contrast to the continu­
ing very rapid growth in Los Angeles. Nonetheless, achievements 
in Los Angeles were meaningful, especially in realms of harbor 
construction and the acquisition of new water supplies—items 
that nearly all Los Angeles residents could agree were absolutely 
necessary for their city's future growth. 
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Seattle and the Bogue Plan

In March 1912, members of Seattle's city council presented to 
the voters a city plan prepared by the engineer Virgil Bogue. Like 
Daniel Burnham in his planning for San Francisco, Bogue thought 
big in his efforts to remake Seattle. The Bogue Plan envisioned a 
metropolis of one million, a city with four times the population 
Seattle then possessed. The plan encompassed harbor improve­
ments, major changes in the city's street and transportation sys­
tems, the building of a civic center in a new part of town, and the 
construction of an extensive park and boulevard system. Alto­
gether the Bogue Plan embraced an area of 150 square miles. One 
of the more detailed city plans drawn up in the Progressive Era, 
the Bogue Plan was highly engineered, offering technical solu­
tions to many of the problems of growth. 
The experiences of Seattleites with the Bogue Plan reveal a 
great deal both about the origins, development, and demise of city 
planning movements in the Progressive Era. Seattle's planning 
drive, like those in San Francisco, Oakland, and Los Angeles, had 
varied origins. More than in the planning campaigns in California, 
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however, professional architects and engineers led the initial 
phases of the planning movement in Seattle. Nonetheless, busi­
ness groups were important from the first and grew greatly in 
importance as Seattle's planning campaign progressed. Although 
Seattle's business organizations could agree on a general need for 
city planning, they were deeply divided on its specifics. Those 
divisions, together with cleavages separating business bodies from 
other groups in Seattle, prevented the adoption of the Bogue Plan. 
While significant portions of the plan were put in place piece­
meal, the plan as a whole failed to secure approval. The defeat of 
the Bogue Plan, like that of the Burnham Plan in San Francisco, 
illustrates well the limits of Progressive-Era planning in a plu­
ralistic society.1 
Parks and Expositions 
As was the case in Oakland, the initial impetus for planning in 
Seattle revolved around creating a unified system of parks and 
boulevards.2 Seattle acquired its first public parks during the 
1880s, and in 1888 a three-man park board was set up by the city 
government to administer them. In 1892 E. O. Schwagerl—a pro­
fessional engineer, architect, and landscape gardener—became 
Seattle's first superintendent of parks. Schwagerl had helped land­
scape the Paris Universal Exposition in 1867 and the Philadelphia 
Centennial Exposition in 1876, had drafted the plans for park and 
boulevard systems in Cleveland and St. Louis, and had worked on 
cemetery designs in a number of cities.3 
Shortly after assuming his duties in Seattle, Schwagerl put for­
ward a plan for the construction of a system of parks and boule­
vards throughout the city. Central to his plan was a "continuous 
boulevard, from 150 to 300 feet wide" encircling Seattle from 
north to south. From the "grand drive" smaller boulevards and 
parks would branch off at various points. Schwagerl argued for the 
quick adoption of his plan on economic grounds. He claimed that 
with the construction of the boulevard surrounding Seattle "a 
large area of now useless land would immediately become the 
property of capitalists, whose sagacity would at once lead them to 
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make improvements in conformity with the plan decided on by 
the municipal authorities, and a fresh and promising field would 
thus be be opened for enterprise and the profitable employment 
of labor."4 
Schwagerl revealed his ideas at a meeting sponsored by the 
Seattle Chamber of Commerce in September 1892. Attended by 
"representative business men and leading citizens of Seattle," the 
gathering heard Schwagerl outline "his comprehensive plan for a 
system of parks and boulevards" and listened to Seattle's mayor 
speak "very forcibly in favor of it."5 Over the next few years the 
city's park commissioners pressed for the adoption of Schwagerl's 
scheme. In doing so, they broadened their arguments to include a 
mixture of aesthetic, moral, and economic claims— foreshadow­
ing many of the arguments used by Seattle's city planning propo­
nents in the early twentieth century. 
Matters of civic pride and economic development headed the 
commissioners' list of the reasons why Schwagerl's plan should be 
implemented. Parks were needed for Seattle to take its place as a 
major American city and as the leading city of the Pacific North­
west. The commissioners often spoke of "the necessity for the 
City of Seattle to avail itself of the prerogative found indispensable 
in other cities, of having its system of parks and boulevards." They 
frequently commented upon "the enormous importance of a 
proper system of parks" to Seattle whose "destiny" was to be "the 
metropolis of the North Pacific coast." Moreover, like Schwagerl, 
the commissioners believed that parks would spur Seattle's eco­
nomic growth. Parks would boost real estate values by attracting 
"a swarm of people of all trades, professions and vocations" to 
Seattle. Even more importantly, parks would attract capital neces­
sary for Seattle's economic growth, for, the commissioners bluntly 
stated, "park cities become centers towards which money tends."6 
More was at stake than economic growth, for Seattle's aesthetic 
and social development was, the park commissioners believed, 
also involved. After noting that "the natural verdure around Lake 
Washington is still in its maiden beauty," they warned that unless 
actions were soon taken, areas suitable for parks and boulevards 
would be irretrievably lost to the woodsman's axe and urban ex­
pansion. Such an eventuality would be most unfortunate, the 
commissioners continued, for parks were much more than simply 
beautiful ornaments for a city. Like park proponents in Oakland, 
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they saw parks as an uplifting moral force. They claimed, "There is 
probably no factor among civilized nations that ranks so high in 
the real education and refinement of the masses generally as pub­
lic parks and grounds." Parks, they continued, "cleansed the mind, 
[and] so purified the life and rescued the family from the slums 
and the degradation to which they were formerly tending." Parks, 
in short, would be of "incalculable importance . .  . in humanizing 
and refining the community."7 
Despite the prevalence of such sentiments, little immediately 
came of Schwagerl's ideas. New parklands continued to be ac­
quired, but no comprehensive park and boulevard system resulted. 
Seattleites were too preoccupied with more pressing concerns in­
volved in building their city—regrading hills, laying water and 
sewer lines, and extending streets—to construct Schwagerl's uni­
fied scheme of parks. Schwagerl's plan simply appeared too far-
reaching for Seattle's resources. As Schwagerl himself admitted in 
1894, at a time when Seattle was wallowing in the trough ofa nation­
wide business depression, "the general plans proposed during the 
past two years have proved to be so comprehensive and vast in 
extent as to render commencement along these lines too difficult 
for the present." Despite repeated pleas from Schwagerl and the 
park commissioners that "some system should be adopted at once," 
little of significance was accomplished until the twentieth century.8 
Finally, in 1903, acting upon the recommendations of the park 
commissioners, the city council invited John C. Olmsted to visit 
Seattle and design a system of parks and boulevards. A landscape 
architect from Brookline, Massachusetts, John C. Olmsted was a 
son of Frederick Law Olmsted and was by this time well known 
in his own right throughout the United States. After coming to 
Seattle several times, Olmsted prepared a plan quite similar to 
Schwagerl's earlier one. Olmsted's plan consisted of a boulevard 
system twenty-four miles long linking parks throughout Seattle. 
The boulevard would extend along Lake Washington from the city 
limits on the south to the grounds of the University of Washington 
on the north, joining the Bailey Peninsula (now Seward Park), 
Madrona Park, and Washington Park. From the university, the 
boulevard would turn inland to link Ravenna Park, Green Lake, 
Woodland Park, and the Fort Lawton Reservation with Smith s 
Cove on Elliot Bay. Subsidiary boulevards would join yet other 
parks to the system, which would encircle much of Seattle.9 
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Seattleites responded favorably to Olmsted's plan. In October 
1903, the city council officially adopted it, and between 1906 and 
1912 bond issues totaling $4 million to implement the plan won 
public approval. By 1913 much of Olmsted's scheme had been put 
in force. Twenty-five parks, twelve playgrounds, and twenty-five 
miles of boulevards lay within Seattle's boundaries.10 
Several reasons accounted for the success of Olmsted's plan for 
Seattle. Many Seattleites simply desired to live in a beautiful city 
with improved recreational facilities. Economic factors also spurred 
the swift implementation of Olmsted's plan. By the early 1900s, 
Seattle had recovered from the hard times of the 1890s and was in 
a period of rapid economic growth. As a consequence, its citizens 
could better afford the costs of developing a park and boulevard 
system. Businessmen in particular came to view parks as an in­
vestment that would attract settlers and businesses to their city, 
thus ensuring Seattle's future growth. Social factors also help ex­
plain the favorable votes of some Seattleites. Olmsted called for 
the building of playgrounds in working-class areas as a way of 
bringing vaguely defined citizenship values to their residents. 
Middle-class professionals joined businessmen in praising his pro­
posal for the playgrounds as "nurseries of good citizenship" and 
"cradles of democracy" in which children of all backgrounds could 
mix and grow into "beautiful manhood and womanhood."11 
Two business-dominated groups were especially important in 
backing the park movement. Like many reformers in the Pro­
gressive Era across the nation, members of those groups believed 
that by changing their environments, the character of people 
could be altered for the better. The Seattle Recreation and Play­
grounds League was one such group. Middle-class businessmen 
and professionals, many of whom were active in political reform 
movements in Seattle formed the organization in 1912. They ar­
gued that parks and playgrounds should be supported as a way "to 
encourage and foster all recreation and play which will add to the 
health, happiness and moral uplift of our people" while at the 
same time "discouraging and aiding in surpressing those amuse­
ments which tend to deprave."12 The Seattle Playgrounds Associa­
tion, a similar organization established four years earlier, called 
for more parks and playgrounds because of "the known effects of 
play upon normal growth and health, as a preventive of crime, as 
cheaper in dollars and cents than their alternatives—jails, police, 
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and hospitals—and as a Citizen Maker through the ideals of fair 
play and social cooperation inculcated under the stress of action 
in organized games of the playground."13 
Given the varied motives for support, it is not surprising to find 
that all of the park and boulevard bond issues passed by two-to­
one majorities. Of more interest is that while the issues did partic­
ularly well in middle-class suburbs, they faced rougher handling 
in blue-collar wards. The Ballard and Wallingford districts, for 
instance, often gave them only close favorable votes or actually 
defeated them. The workingmen living there could see little im­
mediate advantage in the creation of an elaborate and expensive 
park and boulevard system and may have objected to the implica­
tions of social influence inherent in the scheme.14 
Even as his park and boulevard plans were meeting with suc­
cess at the polls, John Olmsted was called to Seattle to plan a new 
campus for the University of Washington. In mid-1903 he was 
asked to take charge of "the improvement of the large university 
campus in harmony with the proposed system of parks."15 Olm­
sted's campus plan, drawn up over the next two years, stressed the 
need for comprehensive preparations. Olmsted decried the ten­
dency of university officials to follow a "hand-to-mouth policy" of 
piecemeal building and called upon them to follow a "comprehen­
sive, systematic and well-organized arrangement of numerous 
buildings . . . embodying certain general principles and ideas." 
Specifically, he wanted the erection of "imposing and monumen­
tal" buildings on an "important and imposing site" and the re­
placement of native evergreen trees with deciduous ones, because 
he thought that wild evergreens would be "incongruous with the 
formal buildings." Connecting the buildings of the campus to each 
other and to Seattle's park and boulevard system would be a sym­
metrical pattern of walks. Linking the campus to Seattle via park­
ways would, Olmsted hoped, elevate the tone of student life by 
ensuring "direct communication with the greater part of the exist­
ing and future residential districts of the better class of the city."16 
It was on the campus grounds that Seattle's business and politi­
cal leaders sponsored a world's fair, the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Ex­
position, in the summer of 1909. The inspiration for this exposition 
came initially from a group of Alaska's gold-rush pioneers who 
desired to establish an Alaskan exhibit in Seattle, which they did 
in 1905. Support for something larger began in 1906, when fifty 
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Seattle businessmen, mostly merchants, formed an exhibition 
company. The company sponsored the fair three years later. Busi­
ness leaders viewed the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition as a 
major advertisement for their city, a lure to attract capital, indus­
try, and commerce from around the nation.17 
As in the case of park development, more was involved in the 
exposition than economics, however. Like Olmsteds plans for 
parks and boulevards and the new university campus, the fair 
served as a model for planning. The exposition company hired the 
Olmsted Brothers firm to design the fairgrounds. Showing more 
sensitivity to the natural environment than he had in his plans for 
the university campus, John Olmsted produced a plan that took 
advantage of its natural setting. He oriented the central portion of 
the grounds and buildings along a major axis that opened onto a 
vista of Mount Rainier. Secondary axes provided views of Lake 
Union and Lake Washington.18 Nearly four million people came 
to the exposition, and the fair left many with a sense that planning 
could improve their environment. At the conclusion of the exposi­
tion, the Seattle Chamber of Commerce called for the construc­
tion of a Museum of Arts and Sciences as "a natural outgrowth of 
the exposition" and urged the creation of a Fine Arts Association 
to work for civic improvements in Seattle. The chamber also per­
suaded the city council to allocate funds for the preservation of 
the beauty of the fairgrounds and for their integration into Seat­
tle's park system.19 
The Municipal Plans Commission 
The park and exposition campaigns led some Seattleites to be­
gin thinking of additional ways to improve their city. In the early 
1900s, the Washington State Chapter of the American Institute of 
Architects (WSCAIA) took its first steps to promote civic im­
provements. Composed mainly of Seattle architects, the WSCAIA 
had been formed in 1894 and acted as a catalyst in the emerging 
campaign to improve Seattle. In the opening years of the twen­
tieth century, the WSCAIA sponsored an exhibit demonstrating 
advances being made in city planning in Washington, D.C., pre­
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pared revisions to the city's building ordinances, and worked with 
business groups to promote their products throughout the Pacific 
Northwest.20 Civic pride lay behind many of the activities. For 
instance, in early 1907 the WSCAIA joined with the Seattle Manu­
facturers' Association to call for the construction of a new city hall 
because "the needs of the City of Seattle demand the construction 
of a City Hall worthy of the city."21 
From those beginnings, the WSCAIA moved on to propose 
revisions to Seattle's city charter creating an office of the superin­
tendent of buildings separate from the city's board of public works 
and the formation of a commission composed of professional ar­
chitects and builders to advise the city council on "matters per­
taining to municipal improvements which involve artistic consid­
eration." In making those proposals, the WSCAIA cooperated 
closely with business groups in Seattle—the Chamber of Com­
merce, the Manufacturers' Association, and the Commercial 
Club—and with labor organizations, the Building Trades Assem­
bly, and the Master Builders Association.22 Backed by Seattle's 
newspapers as a way "to meet the progressive needs of a growing 
city," the proposals easily won approval by large margins at a city 
election in 1908.23 
Spurred on by their success, in January 1909 members of the 
WSCAIA conferred with representatives of improvement clubs 
and with members of the Pacific Northwest Society of Engineers, 
a well-established organization of building engineers and archi­
tects. In the words of Charles Bebb, the president of the WSCAIA, 
they discussed "ways and means for procuring a comprehensive 
plan for the future development along civic lines of the City of 
Seattle." Noting that Washington, D.C., Cleveland, Boston, San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, and other cities across the nation had 
become deeply involved in planning, Bebb argued that Seattle 
had to follow suite or fall behind its more progressive counter­
parts. The time to begin, he thought, was now. Seattle was still 
young enough to accomplish a great deal. Seattle was not as built 
up, as fully developed, as most eastern cities and thus offered 
more scope to planners. Planning was needed, Bebb argued, "so 
that the future development of the city shall not be left to haphaz­
ard and chance growth and that the public may be assured that all 
the money that will normally be spent each year for improvements 
will be spent with farsighted wisdom." The scheme would not be 
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"new or visionary," he stressed, but "a practical reality" similar to 
what was being adopted in cities across the nation. From that 
meeting came the formation of a Municipal Plans League one 
month later.24 
The Municipal Plans League spearheaded the growing plan­
ning campaign in Seattle. The league called for the preparation 
of a city plan encompassing street and transportation improve­
ments, new harbor facilities, the construction of a civic center, 
and further work on parks and boulevards for Seattle.25 In the fall 
of 1909, league members held several meetings with members of 
business groups. Finally, in late November the Municipal Plans 
League, the WSCAIA, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Com­
mercial Club jointly endorsed a resolution drafted by architect 
Carl Gould, who belonged to the WSCAIA, served on the execu­
tive committee of the league, and had worked with Daniel Burn-
ham on his plan for San Francisco. The resolution called on the 
city council to place before the voters a city charter amendment 
setting up a commission of three experts to draft a plan for Seattle. 
They were to be advised by twenty-one Seattleites represent­
ing the city's business and labor organizations. The city council 
agreed to the request.26 Having achieved unity of purpose 
among themselves, Seattle's architectural and business organiza­
tions next had to convince their city's voters of the need for city 
planning. 
Planning proponents emphasized economic arguments in 
seeking approval for a Municipal Plans Commission. In the words 
of George Walker, a lawyer deeply involved in the campaign, plan­
ning, far from being expensive, meant simply "taking things as we 
find them and planning wisely, conservatively, and economically." 
Moreover, noted Walker, "there is competition among cities just as 
there is in other lines . . . the city that is up-to-date and modern 
leads . . . others fall behind."27 As Walker's arguments suggest, 
perceptions of urban rivalry played a significant role in motivating 
those favoring planning in Seattle. Members of the WSCAIA 
urged the establishment of a planning commission in part because 
"the City of Portland is moving to the same end and there is the 
possibility of our suffering the chagrin of seeing a smaller city 
occupy our natural position of the leading city of the Northwest."28 
W Marbury Somervell, a leading Seattle architect, summarized 
many of the economic reasons put forward in support of planning: 
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It is not enough to tell the taxpayer that he should have a 
more beautiful city, but to show him conclusively that beauty 
and hygiene, and all that goes to make a city useful and 
attractive, mean simply unity of purpose . . . Visitors are im­
pressed; and the municipality is advertised; trade is at­
tracted by the increase in population and more amenable 
conditions of life; values quickly increase with better trade, 
and at the same time the [tax] rates are kept at a lower 
level.29 
Social and moral factors also influenced advocates of planning. 
Gould hoped that planning would promote "the cause of civic 
unity."30 The Reverend Mark Mathews, a well-known Protestant 
minister and a fiery advocate of moral reform in city politics, may 
have had the same thing in mind when he called for the establish­
ment of the planning commission because "the improvements of 
the city ought to have in view the whole city, and the city ought to 
be developed as a whole."31 Similarly, the Seattle Post-Intelli­
gencer, a leading newspaper, backed the creation of a planning 
commission so that "Seattle may grow along definite and harmo­
nious lines."32 
Business and labor organizations jointly backed the proposal. 
Members of the Chamber of Commerce and the Commercial 
Club pushed for it, observing that "the plans are not necessarily 
for immediate fulfillment, but are to serve as a guide for years to 
come."33 Numerous neighborhood improvement clubs, now linked 
in the Federated Improvement Clubs, came out for it. The Work­
ingmen's League, a body of unionized workers formed to support 
labor candidates for city offices, pressed for the measure "to cre­
ate a better understanding in the minds of the public as to the 
future development of a great city." The president of the Seattle 
Central Labor Council urged workers to stand "shoulder to shoul­
der" with their city's business organizations in backing the mea­
sure.34 Important political support came from R. H. Thomson, 
Seattle's city engineer. Thomson had won local acclaim for reshap­
ing Seattle by lowering its hills, which had stood as formidable 
barriers to the city's expansion. As Thomson later noted, "I put in a 
great deal of labor in securing this Municipal Plans Commission."35 
Favored by a broad spectrum of business, professional, and la­
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bor organizations and facing no organized opposition, the city 
charter amendment setting up a Municipal Plans Commission won 
a resounding victory at the polls, passing by a margin of 13,852 to 
7,371 votes.36 At that time, nearly all Seattleites could agree that 
city planning could be beneficial. Inspired by the development of 
their parks and boulevards and by what they had recently seen at 
the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition, they hoped to create an 
improved urban environment. 
A strong progressive movement was developing in city politics, 
and city planning became loosely associated with progressivism.37 
In Seattle progressivism came to revolve around two major clusters 
of issues: first, whether Seattle should have a "moral" government 
embodying values of hard work, temperance, and the abolition of 
vice and, second, whether the city's public utilities, including street 
railroads, should be municipally owned. The twin issues of moral 
reform and municipal ownership merged in 1911 when the city's 
mayor, Hiram Gill, was recalled from office. Gill had championed 
Seattle as a "wide-open" town, even to the extent of directly involv­
ing the city government and city funds in the building of a gigantic 
house of prostitution. At Gill's direction, the city council rerouted 
streets and granted a franchise to a new street railroad line to serve 
the bordello. Like members of San Francisco's Union Labor party, 
Gill and city councilmen associated with him were also suspected 
of taking numerous bribes from private street railroads and other 
utility companies in return for giving them franchises. 
To combat "Gillism," a group of middle-class businessmen 
formed the Public Welfare League at a meeting sponsored by the 
Commercial Club in 1910. The members thought Gill's actions were 
creating an unsavory national image for Seattle and that that image 
was retarding economic growth by scaring away businessmen and 
capital that might otherwise move to Seattle. Gill was, one of the 
league's petitions claimed, "a menace to the business enterprises 
and moral welfare" of Seattle.38 Gill badly misjudged the changing 
desires of most of Seattle's businessmen. In an address to the Cham­
ber of Commerce in April 1910, he discussed what he viewed as the 
proper relationship between government and business: 
I recognize, first and foremost, that men are in business with 
one primary aim, to make money. They are not running their 
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businesses to display pretty show windows, keep their side­
walk clean, or improve the ethical tone of the community. 
Their primary object is to get the dollar into the cash regis­
ter, and because it is the businessmen who make the pros­
perity of the city, I believe the city government should do all 
in its power to help the businessmen get the money. . .  . A 
"City Beautiful" will be encouraged so long as it is a "City 
Practical" and a "City Economical."39 
Such appeals, which had been persuasive in earlier times, no 
longer sufficed. Seattle was no longer a frontier outpost, and its 
business leaders wanted national recognition and continued 
growth for their city. Gill was an anachronism who would have to 
go. In a hotly contested election in 1911 the league succeeded in 
removing Gill from office by convincing many of Seattle's pros­
perous workers, as well as the city's burgeoning groups of middle-
class businessmen and professionals, to vote against him. Only 
less-prosperous, downtown workers and the business leaders who 
benefited directly from Gill's political favors supported him. This 
was the zenith of progressivism. 
As in San Francisco, Oakland, and Los Angeles, city planning 
became partially linked to progressivism in Seattle. Many of the 
same people, especially middle-class businessmen, supported 
both movements. Many of those joining the Public Welfare 
League and an earlier reform group, the Municipal Ownership 
Party (established in 1905), were also active in the Municipal 
Plans League, which pressed so strongly for the creation of the 
Municipal Plans Commission. Moreover, many of those same 
Seattleites became members of the Municipal League, a body of 
middle-class businessmen and professionals organized in 1910 to 
work for a broad spectrum of progressive reforms in the city 
government.40 Businessmen supported reform politics and city 
planning for many of the same reasons. They wanted to improve 
Seattle's image nationally and on the Pacific Coast, thus allowing 
Seattle to attract new immigrants, business firms, and capital. 
Moral and social issues also ran through both movements. By 
closing down Seattle's "restricted area" of saloons and gambling 
houses, and by backing city planning measures, many Seat­
tleites, again especially middle-class businessmen, hoped to 
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create a homogeneous society open to their values and way of 
life. 
Shortly after Seattle's 1910 municipal elections, at about the 
same time that the campaign to recall Gill was beginning, the 
Municipal Plans Commission took form. As stipulated by the city 
charter amendment, the commission consisted of twenty-one 
members: three city councilmen, the city engineer Thomson, 
a representative of the King County commissioners, a mem­
ber of the board of education, a member of the park board, and 
fourteen citizens chosen by business, labor, and architectural 
organizations. The fourteen citizens included representatives 
from the Chamber of Commerce, the Manufacturers' Association, 
the Commercial Club, the Seattle Real Estate Association, the 
Waterfront Owners, the Steam Railway Companies, the Seattle 
Clearing House Association, the Central Labor Council, the Car­
penters Union, the WSCAIA, and the Pacific Society of Civil En­
gineers.41 
Unlike the situation in San Francisco where the AAISF oper­
ated separately and independently from the city government, 
the Municipal Plans Commission was, by the city charter 
amendment, part of the city government in Seattle, if only for a 
limited time. Although differing in their official roles, the two 
organizations were similar in their functions. Both were only 
advisory; neither could mandate actions for their city govern­
ments to follow. Before being put into practice, their recommen­
dations had to be approved in city elections. Businessmen, 
especially merchants, were active participants in both bodies, 
for through them they hoped to work out their planning desires. 
The Municipal Plans Commission moved quickly to select the 
three experts who would undertake the actual planning. A com­
mittee composed of Thomson, C. J. Smith of the Chamber of 
Commerce, and Frank Mullen of the city council initially con­
sidered five planners, landscape architects, and engineers. Dis­
regarding its original charge to choose three experts jointly to 
prepare a plan for Seattle, the committee picked Virgil Bogue to 
assume command of the preparation of the entire city plan by 
himself. Bogue had been contacted initially to undertake only 
the planning of new streets and harbor facilities. He accepted 
the position in September, 1910 in return for a salary of $1,500 
per month.42 
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The Bogue Plan for Seattle 
Bogue was particularly well qualified for the engineering tasks 
at hand. A graduate of the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Bogue 
had worked briefly for F. L. Olmsted, Sr. He had then gone on to 
design a route for the first railroad to cross the Andes and had 
located the Northern Pacific Railroad's route through the Cascade 
Mountains just east of Seattle. Perhaps most significantly, Bogue 
had, as a consulting engineer to the King County Board of Tide­
land Appraisers, drafted a plan for the development of Seattle's 
harbor in 1895. Although sixty-four years old in 1910, Bogue was 
full of life and eager to accept new challenges.43 
Bogue probably owed his choice to Thomson, Seattle's city 
engineer. Both men had the same mentality. Thomson was an 
engineer with little feeling for Seattle's topography. Rather than 
work with them, Thomson preferred to level Seattle's hills by 
using hydraulic cannons to wash them into Puget Sound. As the 
historian William Wilson has observed, "Thomson's sympathy 
with the natural environment was limited to allowing water to run 
downhill."44 Bogue thought in the same way; and it is no surprise 
that, while the report he ultimately drafted was in some repects an 
engineering marvel, it took little account of the topography of 
Seattle's natural features. Although most Seattleites were pleased 
with the choice of Bogue, not all were. The members of the WSCAIA 
initially felt a sense of betrayal, for Bogue was too much of an 
engineer and not enough of a planner for their tastes.45 Perhaps 
because of such feelings John Olmsted was retained, after further 
negotiations, as a consultant to advise Bogue on parks and boule­
vards.46 
Bogue came to Seattle to begin his work in September 1910. 
Upon his arrival, Bogue emphasized that planning would foster 
Seattle's growth in the most economical way by eliminating waste 
in general and by aiding in meshing the city's street system with 
its harbor facilities in particular. True to his engineering back­
ground, Bogue was especially happy to find that Thomson's work 
in regrading hills and laying out new streets could be incorporated 
directly into his planning ideas.47 
The actual work of preparing the city plan proceeded rapidly, 
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given the magnitude of the task. Assisted by a few close subordi­
nates, Bogue was in overall charge of the planning effort. How­
ever, the twenty-one-member Municipal Plans Commission, now 
divided into committees dealing with specific topics, remained 
important. Both Bogue and the commission also frequently con­
ferred with the WSCAIA, the Pacific Northwest Society of En­
gineers, the Chamber of Commerce, and other business and pro­
fessional bodies. Private citizens—Joseph Blethen, the editor of 
the Seattle Times, Edmund Meany, a well-known professor of his­
tory at the University of Washington, and George and C. A. Kin-
near, prominent real estate men with interests in the southern end 
of the downtown district—also received hearings from commit­
tees of the commission. After the appropriate committee of the 
Municipal Plans Commission dealt with a particular topic, the mat­
ter was referred to the commission as a whole and to Bogue to 
ensure that specific decisions would fit into the plan Bogue was 
drafting for the city. Considerable local input from organized groups 
went into the preparation of the Bogue Plan, in marked contrast to 
the way the Burnham Plan was prepared for San Francisco.48 
Central to the Bogue Plan were transportation improvements. 
Most important was the creation of a system of arterial highways 
and radial streets, adjusted only slightly for Seattle's hilly topogra­
phy, to speed the flow of traffic around Seattle's congested busi­
ness district and to connect a proposed civic center with the rest 
of the city. A new Central Avenue would form a north-south axis 
for Seattle's revised street system. It would extend from the estab­
lished downtown district to the civic center just southwest of 
Lake Union, then continue along the west shore of Lake Union 
and run in a northerly direction past Green Lake to the county 
line. Numerous tunnels would slice through Seattle's hills to facili­
tate traffic movement between previously separated parts of the 
city. The plan also made detailed recommendations for the loca­
tion of steam railroad lines, including the construction of a new 
union passenger station several blocks north of the proposed civic 
center, the construction of a ninety-one-mile-long rapid transit 
system, and the extension of interurban and ferry service to link 
Seattle to its surrounding area. It included recommendations for 
electric street railroads to connect Seattle's increasingly dispersed 
neighborhoods with its downtown district, proposed civic center, 
and waterfront.49 
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Virgil Bogue called for a new union train station. From the Bogue Plan for Seattle. 
Harbor improvements also attracted great attention from Bogue 
and the Municipal Plans Commission. Seven one-thousand-foot 
piers would turn Harbor Island, at the time undeveloped mudflats 
at the south end of Seattle's port on Elliot Bay, into a major com­
mercial complex. Two fifteen-hundred-foot piers would add to the 
importance of Smith's Cove at the northern end of Elliot Bay. In 
between those complexes two systems of docks—one for ferries 
and Alaska steamers, the other for Seattle's fleet of small ships ply­
ing the waters of Puget Sound—would transform the central water­
front. Lake Union and the southern end of Lake Washington were 
slated to become industrial areas, while the northern end of Lake 
Washington was designated a residential and vacation region.50 
To serve as the focal point for Seattle, Bogue designed a civic 
center to be located several miles north of the established business 
district at the intersection of Fourth Avenue and Blanchard Street. 
The area was just being made accessible by Thomson's leveling of 
Denny Hill. Bogue believed the site possessed a number of advan­
tages over a downtown location: the availability of relatively cheap 
land, a location near what he thought would be the future center of 
Seattle's population, and easy transportation access to the rest of 
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Virgil Bogue's plan included a new civic center; this view looks south along the proposed Centra 
Avenue. From the Bogue Plan for Seattle. 
the city. Bogue called for a six-building center grouped together 
in an imposing manner and having impressive views of Mount 
Rainier to the south and the Olympic Mountains to the west.51 
Finally, the Bogue Plan envisioned a system of parks, boule­
vards, and municipal ornaments for Seattle and the surrounding 
region. For the most part, Bogue followed Olmsted's ideas within 
Seattle's city limits. Outside of Seattle Bogue desired the creation 
or improvement of twenty-two parks ranging in size from 15 to 475 
acres, partially linked by boulevards and parkways. Municipal 
decorations—concourses, esplanades, the beautification of traffic 
intersections, and a tall obelisk facing Puget Sound at Duwamish 
Head—would further enhance Seattle.52 
Bogue and the members of the Municipal Plans Commission 
hoped their plan would both foster Seattle's economic growth and 
unite the city spatially. Improvements in the city's harbor and 
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transportation layouts and the meshing of those two systems would, 
they anticipated, put Seattle ahead of its urban rivals as the Pacific 
Coast's commercial and manufacturing center. After noting that 
Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco, and Portland were all 
planning major harbor and transportation improvements, Bogue 
warned that unless Seattle responded to those challenges the city 
would "surely fall behind other competitors for the accumulation 
of worldwide trade." Speed was essential, Bogue contended, in 
light of the imminent completion of the Panama Canal. Transpor­
tation improvements were needed, not simply for their economic 
stimulus, but also because they would bring Seattle's rapid spatial 
expansion under control. The arterial highways and the unified 
electric street railroad system would, planning advocates thought, 
tie together Seattle's various neighborhoods.53 
The civic center and the parks were also intended to be unify­
ing forces. Bogue and the members of the Municipal Plans Com­
mission believed that an impressive civic center would inspire 
Seattleites with a sense of common purpose very similar to the 
civic patriotism that James Phelan had hoped planning would 
bring to San Francisco. At the civic center "large gatherings of 
citizens" could congregate for "pageants and for the formal recep­
tion of delegates from other cities or foreign countries." The civic 
center would mold personalities along useful paths. After observ­
ing that "environment in youth has enormous influence on the 
personal and civic education of future citizens," Bogue applauded 
civic centers for their ability to uplift the minds and spirits of 
urbanites.54 The same concern for a united populace imbued with 
common values motivated Bogue's desire for a park and boulevard 
system. Like John C. Olmsted and his supporters, Bogue declared 
that parks and playgrounds would instill citizenship values in 
Seattleites: 
The taxpayer now knows by statistics of unquestioned ac­
curacy that the maintenance of places of healthful exercise, 
amusement, and self-improvement for those who would oth­
erwise pass their formative years in adverse, and possibly 
degrading circumstances, is more profitable than that of 
reformatory institutions for children and penitentiaries for 
adults. . . . At least a three-fold benefit accrues to the public 
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from the development of public playgrounds, viz.: the arrest 
of disease and vice, a constantly decreasing prison-roll, the 
preparation of useful, law-abiding citizens. . . . Those who 
learn to play well will be more apt to work with a purpose.55 
The Bogue Plan dealt with many facets of Seattle's develop­
ment; it was much more than simply a scheme for the city's beau­
tification. More of an engineering document than the Burnham 
Plan for San Francisco or the Robinson plans for Oakland and Los 
Angeles, the Bogue Plan was particularly detailed in its analysis of 
the harbor and transportation needs of Seattle. Yet the Bogue Plan 
had shortcomings. Like most city plans drafted in the Progressive 
Era, it said little about the housing needs of most people. More­
over, the proposals for transportation improvements rode rough­
shod over Seattle's hilly terrain and would soon be made partially 
obsolete by the widespread adoption of the automobile. 
The Fight for the Bogue Plan 
Bogue presented his completed plan to the Municipal Plans 
Commission for that body's final approval in August 1911. With 
only three negative votes—cast by members representing the city 
council and the county commissioners, who may have been wor­
ried about the cost of implementing Bogue's ideas—the commis­
sion accepted the Bogue Plan. The commission then submitted 
the plan to the city council with the request that it be embodied in 
a city charter amendment for public ratification in the March 1912 
city election. Should the charter amendment pass, city officials 
would be required to follow the Bogue Plan as a mandatory guide 
in laying out the future development of Seattle. The city council 
agreed to place the Bogue Plan on the ballot. With its work seem­
ingly complete, the Municipal Plans Commission disbanded in 
late 1911.56 
Many business, professional, and labor bodies found immediate 
praise for the Bogue Plan. The secretary of the Chamber of Com­
merce observed that "the great cities of the future will not be 
116

SEATTLE AND THE BOGUE PLAN

creatures of chance. Early preparations will smooth the way and 
hasten their advancement." Bogue's ideas, he concluded, repre­
sented "excellent progress" particularly because "Bogue has 
always kept in mind the minimizing of expense . .  . so as not to 
saddle the community with an unwieldy burden."57 Members of 
the WSCAIA, who had harbored doubts about Bogue, now ap­
plauded his "sincere appreciation of the needs for a comprehen­
sive plan" and elected him as an honorary member of their organi­
zation.58 Thomson, Bogue's initial sponsor, called his work "most 
excellent."59 The Seattle Central Labor Council, the powerful 
clearinghouse for Seattle's strong craft unions, commended the 
plan and allocated a small sum to help publicize it.60 Nonetheless, 
opposition to the work of Bogue and the Municipal Plans Com­
mission materialized even as the Bogue Plan was being prepared. 
Although planning advocates were able to defeat the early threats 
to their ideas, this opposition boded ill for the adoption of the 
Bogue Plan. 
Most serious were challenges from businessmen desiring to 
have Seattle build a new city hall at the south end of the city's 
established business district rather than to the north as specified 
in the Bogue Plan. By 1910 the city government had outgrown its 
old headquarters. The city council placed on the ballot—the same 
one that presented the proposal for a Municipal Plans Commis­
sion to Seattleites—a bond issue to purchase land for a new city 
hall site at Third Avenue and Yesler Way at the southern end of 
Seattle's downtown district. Those favoring the adoption of the 
Bogue Plan quickly rallied to oppose the bond issue.61 
The campaigns for and against the bonds to buy land for a new 
city hall sorely divided Seattle's business community. On one 
level, the issue developed into a struggle between businessmen 
with real estate interests in the southern section of Seattle's down­
town district and businessmen in other parts of the city. Those 
with property downtown desired the immediate construction of 
the city hall near their properties as a way of increasing their real 
estate values. Businessmen elsewhere in the city favored waiting 
until the Bogue Plan incorporating a new city hall as part of a civic 
center was drafted before reaching any decision. At a second 
level, the bond issue began dividing Seattle business leaders into 
those favoring a dense downtown of skyscrapers like New York 
(the southern downtown area was already heavily constructed and 
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could only grow up) and those who favored a more dispersed 
downtown area, with the city hall in a new part of town.62 
Poorly defined, those issues were only just emerging in 1910. 
While the Chamber of Commerce backed the proposal for the 
Municipal Plans Commission, it also supported the proposal to 
buy land for a city hall in the established downtown area. The 
bonds passed by a vote of 11,975 *0 7,108.63 (Seattle's bonds re­
quired only a simple majority favorable vote to go into effect.) 
Following up on their initial success, the south-end businessmen 
worked to win public approval for additional bonds to build the 
city hall on the land just purchased. However, opposition from the 
Municipal Plans Commission, the Municipal League, and some 
fifty improvement clubs and church groups defeated the proposed 
bonds in late 1910.64 A renewed attempt to commit Seattleites to a 
southern location for the city hall met the same fate in 1911. As 
Charles Allen, an architect who headed the City Plan Committee 
of the Municipal League, explained, the bonds "would jeopardize 
the integrity of the Bogue Plan" and should be killed. Members of 
the Municipal League, working with Seattle's Ministerial Fed­
eration, an organization of Protestant churches, mounted a mas­
sive campaign against the bonds. They advertised in Seattle's 
newspapers, distributed pamphlets denouncing the bonds, and 
spoke against them at numerous public meetings.65 Such oppo­
sition, combined with a willingness on the part of most Seattle­
ites to wait and see what the Bogue Plan entailed, defeated the 
bonds.66 
With the conclusion of the votes on the city hall bond issues, 
the battle lines over city planning were drawn. Those favoring the 
Bogue Plan had demonstrated an ability to organize and turn back 
efforts to subvert it. They had not, however, yet shown an ability to 
win public approval for their specific planning ideas. The contests 
over the locations of the city hall were simply preliminaries to the 
main fight over the acceptance of the Bogue Plan as a guide for 
Seattle's growth. 
Planning advocates initiated their campaign for public ap­
proval of the Bogue Plan during the late summer and fall of 1911, 
with the Municipal League leading the fight. The league s mem­
bers spoke at meetings of local improvement clubs and sponsored 
mass rallies to publicize the plan. The organization financed the 
printing and distribution of ten thousand copies of the plan and 
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took out advertisements in Seattle's newspapers in support of the 
Bogue Plan. The WSCAIA worked closely with the Municipal 
League in providing lecturers for groups that wanted to learn 
about the plan and set up exhibits about it at libraries and other 
public places. Additional professional and business organizations, 
most notably the Commercial Club and the Pacific Northwest 
Society of Civil Engineers, worked for the plan.67 
Those favoring adoption of the Bogue Plan stressed its antici­
pated economic benefits. They repeatedly argued that planning 
would decrease the cost of providing public utilities and services 
for Seattle, thus helping keep taxes low. In a well-worn claim, they 
asserted that a planned city, in addition to being a functionally 
integrated city, would also be a beautiful city; and they saw beauty 
as having a definite economic value in attracting visitors and new 
residents to Seattle.68 
The transportation and harbor improvements of the Bogue 
Plan won special praise as bound to spur economic growth. With 
the completion of the Panama Canal approaching, Seattle's plan­
ning advocates, like those in San Francisco, claimed that it was 
necessary to rearrange their city's port facilities and internal 
transportation network to handle the expected increase in trade. 
Failure to do so would, they warned, entail the risk of having that 
commerce travel through the harbors of Seattle's rivals, San Fran­
cisco and Portland. "Other cities on the Pacific Coast are spend­
ing millions to attract the commerce incident to the opening of 
the Panama Canal," reported the City Plans Committee of the 
Municipal League. "What chance has Seattle in competition if it 
does not plan for the proper utilization of its natural advantages as 
a seaport?"69 
A flyer widely distributed by the Municipal League during the 
closing days of the campaign summarized the perceived economic 
advantages of planning: 
What the plan means: 
1.	 Economy in transportation. We probably lose today 
$500,000 a year in hauling freight over heavy grades—that 
is, we lose interest on an investment of over $8,000,000. 
2.	 The saving of the wasteful practice of doing work over 
again when once done. . . . 
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3.	 Prevention of high rents in a monopolized business area. 
High rents increase the cost of goods to the people. 
4.	 Prevention of congestion of business and traffic with its 
great loss in time and money to the travelling public and 
carriers of freight. 
5.	 Taking the direction of the city's growth out of the hands of 
real estate speculators and putting it in the hands of the 
people. 
6.	 The most efficient development of the harbor and the pro­
vision of factory sites . . . 
7.	 The opening of Seattle to access by new railroads. 
8.	 Decreasing the ultimate cost of necessary work by pro­
ceeding in a systematic manner instead of haphazard. 
9.	 The making of a city beautiful as well as a city useful. As an 
advertisement alone the adoption of the plan would pay 
for itself many times.70 
While economic arguments dominated the presentations of 
those working for the Bogue Plan, social considerations were also 
important. Thomson, the powerful city engineer, lent his support 
because he thought the plan was needed "to produce a sanitary 
city" and to "so arrange the streets and parks of the city that there 
shall be the best opportunities afforded for light and air and the 
best opportunities afforded for the laborer to come quickly from 
his home to the places of recreation." Thomson also found praise 
for the civic center for bringing "culture and refinement" to work­
ingmen.71 The City Plans Committee of the Municipal League 
anticipated that the plan would promote the cause of civic unity 
because it would "harmonize the conflict of purposes" and secure 
for the people "conditions adapted to the maximum of productive 
efficiency, of health and enjoyment of life."72 
Undergirding many of the arguments in favor of the Bogue Plan 
was the issue of civic pride, a desire on the part of planning propo­
nents to see Seattle recognized as the premier metropolis of the 
Pacific Coast and as a leading national center. In an advertisement 
placed in Seattle's leading newspapers, members of the Municipal 
League noted that planning advocates in Portland were "united 
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toward making that city the tourist headquarters and convention 
city of the Northwest as well as making it as attractive as possible 
for its permanent residents." They urged Seattleites to counter 
those actions by working "along the lines of public spirit, common 
sense, and progress."73 Similarly, they observed that San Fran­
cisco's Board of Supervisers was supporting the building of a new 
city hall and argued that Seattle's officials should do no less.74 By 
the same token, an editorial in the Town Crier noted that, should 
the Bogue Plan be implemented, "we would become the talk of the 
country as having the most beautiful and useful civic center in 
the world" and concluded that "the value of this as an advertise­
ment will alone be worth more than the cost of the ground and the 
buildings."75 The secretary of the Municipal League perhaps best 
summarized that type of sentiment when he called for a favorable 
vote for the Bogue Plan, because "no obstacles should be allowed 
at this time to cast their shadow before a city with a future, the 
brightest of all, on the Pacific Coast."76 
Businessmen owning property in the south end of Seattle's 
downtown district mounted the most vocal and best organized 
opposition to the plan. Their opposition reached a climax with the 
formation in February 1912 of a Civic Plans Investigation Commit­
tee. The committee issued a widely read pamphlet that attacked 
the Bogue Plan as too expensive, impractical, and inflexible. In 
particular, the committee opposed the plan for placing the civic 
center north of the established business area. To do so would, its 
members claimed, upset the flow of business transactions and 
impede Seattle's economic growth. As in the past, they pressed for 
the building of a new city hall on the land the city already owned 
in the southern section of Seattle's established business district at 
Third Avenue and Yesler Way.77 
While downtown businessmen rallied most strongly against the 
Bogue Plan, other groups and individuals opposed it as well. 
George Cotterill—a well-known engineer who had worked on the 
Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition and who ran successfully as a 
reform candidate for mayor in 1912—had long supported the idea 
of city planning but now came out against the plan as too rigid and 
costly.78 In fact, considerable opposition developed among Seat­
tleites along the lines that the Bogue Plan, as a mandatory guide 
for civic improvements, would prove inflexible and expensive. 
Representatives of organized labor opposed the plan in part for 
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Virgil Bogue's proposed civic center would have been constructed in a new section of Seattle. 
From the Bogue Plan for Seattle. 
those reasons. The leaders of the Central Labor Council urged its 
members to vote against the plan. They believed it might prove be 
too difficult to alter in the future and they thought that the park and 
boulevard system should be developed separately from the plan.79 
Some business organizations that had earlier favored the Bogue 
Plan saw less need for it in 1912. Of great importance in that re­
gard were efforts to develop Seattle's harbor.80 Intercity rivalry 
was of utmost significance. Perceiving that "it is useless to hope 
for great results from the opening of the Panama Canal unless the 
harbor is large," members of the Portland Chamber of Commerce 
secured passage for a city charter amendment creating a Portland 
Commission of Public Docks in 1910.81 Authorized to sell up to 
$2.5 million in bonds, the commission opened the city's first pub­
licly owned docks for business in 1914 and 1915. Seattle's business 
leaders were awakened by the challenge. "San Francisco, Los 
Angeles, San Diego, and Portland are spending millions of dollars 
in harbor improvements," argued Seattle merchants. "Seattle must 
meet this competition."82 The Chamber of Commerce, Com­
mercial Club, and numerous neighborhood improvement clubs 
responded by successfully pushing for the passage of a $2,275 
million harbor bond issue in late 1910. During the next two years 
those organizations won approval for the establishment of a Seat­
tle Port Commission to develop their city's harbor, together with 
additional bonds recommended by the new commission to build 
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up the harbor.83 The establishment of the Port Commission and 
the passage of the bond issues seemed to negate the need for the 
harbor proposals in the Bogue Plan. 
Bereft of much of its former support and opposed by powerful 
individuals and organizations, the Bogue Plan went down to a 
crushing defeat at the polls. The final tally at the March 1912 elec­
tion was 24,966 votes against the plan, with only 14,506 in favor of 
it. In none of Seattle's fourteen wards did the plan receive a favor­
able vote.84 As the vote favoring the establishment of the Muni­
cipal Plans Commission in 1910 had shown, most Seattleites 
approved of the general idea of city planning; but many of those 
same people voted against the Bogue Plan when they came to 
view it as threatening their specific interests. Downtown busi­
nessmen disliked the proposal to place the civic center in a newly 
developing area to the north, and other businessmen came to see 
the plan's harbor proposals as irrelevant or redundant. Labor lead­
ers objected to some of the specifics of the plan. 
Equally important was the feeling on the part of many that the 
plan was simply too rigid. The mandatory nature of the Bogue 
Plan set it apart from most city plans of the period, which were 
only advisory. Some members of the Municipal League—for in­
stance, Carl Gould, who had watched the piecemeal defeat of the 
Burnham Plan in San Francisco—liked the mandatory feature of 
the Bogue Plan. Most Seattleites did not. They thought that aspect 
of the plan would deprive the city government of the ability to 
change with the times in planning for the future.85 
The matter of expense also troubled Seattleites. Planning advo­
cates argued in vain that building a planned city would in the long 
run be less expensive than constructing an unplanned one. Typ­
ical of the many who called for the defeat of the Bogue Plan was 
one opponent who decided to vote against it because "Seattle has 
more immediate needs that should have the support of her energy 
and of her tax and bond paying powers. Let us have payrolls and 
health [a reference to the need for better water and sewer sys­
tems] now—luxury and art as we can afford them."86 Writing in 
the same vein was a Minnie Frazier, who described herself and her 
husband as "Independent, Non-Partisan, Insurgent Radicals." As 
she explained to Joe Smith, a reformist newspaperman and politi­
cian, "We shall vote No on Bogue Plans. No on Park Bonds. Lux­
uries can wait while necessities are lacking."87 
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Their position was understandable. As a result of the efforts 
being made to regrade Seattle's hills, put in new water and sewer 
lines, and build parks, Seattleites were heavily taxed. By 1915 Seat­
tle trailed only San Francisco of all the major cities in the United 
States in terms of per capita revenue receipts and outlays.88 
In a sense, the defeat of the Bogue Plan mirrored the collapse 
of Seattle's progressive movement. Just as most Seattleites could 
agree that city planning in the abstract was a good idea, only to 
vote against it when presented with a concrete planning proposal, 
so, too, did many Seattleites defect from the progressive campaign 
when presented with specific proposals that threatened to injure 
their individual interests. New issues arose after 1911 to drive a 
wedge between the properous workers and the middle-class busi­
nessmen and professionals, and by the First World War the city's 
reform coalition had shattered and progressivism had died. In 
fact, Hiram Gill, who had been recalled from office in 1911, cham­
pioned the cause of organized labor to win a stunning reelection 
as Seattle's mayor in 1914.89 
Later Planning Efforts 
City planning and improvement efforts continued in Seattle 
after the defeat of the Bogue Plan but in less comprehensive 
forms. While some public attempts at planning continued, private 
work increased in importance. Moreover, whether public or pri­
vate, the efforts became more limited in scope. The idea of overall 
city planning quickly eroded. 
No sooner had the Bogue Plan been defeated than the struggle 
over where to build a city hall was renewed. Opposing groups 
succeeded in having the city council place two very different mea­
sures on the ballot in the fall of 1912. Businessmen from the south 
end of the downtown district pushed a proposal for a $950,000 
municipal building-county courthouse at Third and Yesler. Mem­
bers of the WSCAIA and the Municipal League countered with a 
proposition for a similar structure costing $1.4 million at the more 
northerly location designated in the Bogue Plan. The south-end 
businessmen formed a Public Buildings Improvement Association 
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to press for their location as the most economical and convenient. 
"The city needs factories and payrolls," the head of the organiza­
tion argued, "and factories do not come to cities which waste their 
money and overtax their people." He concluded, "It is not classi­
cal art that has made for the greatness of the United States, it is 
commerce and industry."90 
Those backing the northern location formed a Civic Center 
Association and responded by drawing a more positive connec­
tion between art and trade. One member of the Municipal League 
and the Civic Center Association observed, "I believe a few beau­
tiful buildings grouped together would do more than any other 
single factor in attracting to Seattle the population which is now 
on the eve of moving to the Pacific Coast."91 Urging the passage of 
bonds for a city hall at the northern site, a leading member of the 
Chamber of Commerce noted that Seattle had recently lost a pro­
posed Ford Motors assembly plant to Portland and predicted that 
"if Seattle will not plan ahead . . . she will lose out in scores of 
similiar cases."92 Nonetheless, those favoring the northern loca­
tion were on the defensive after the defeat of the Bogue Plan and 
proved unconvincing to most Seattleites. The southern site was 
chosen, and construction of the municipal building-courthouse 
was finished at that location in 1916.93 
The final act of Seattle's prewar public city planning drama was 
played out in 1914. In that year the Municipal League spearheaded 
a drive to have the city build a large civic auditorium similar to the 
one being constructed in Oakland. Proponents of the auditorium 
claimed that it would place Seattle ahead of other Pacific Coast 
cities in attracting visitors and settlers and that it would help unite 
Seattle socially by providing an arena in which massive civic cele­
brations could be staged. By 1914 Seattle was in the grips of a 
recession, however. Most Seattleites, even some members of the 
Municipal League, thought that the proposed auditorium was an 
unnecessary luxury and defeated the proposal for it at the polls.94 
With their failure to secure adequate backing for their public 
proposals, planning advocates explored private spheres of endeavor. 
During the summer of 1912, the Seattle Garden Club, the Real 
Estate Association, and local improvement clubs mounted a drive 
to clean up Seattle's vacant lots and plant them with vegetables. At 
ceremonies inaugurating the campaign, Mayor George Dilling and 
Mayor-elect Cotterill spoke favorably of the movement, and the pres­
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ident of the Garden Club drove his team of blooded horses at the 
plow. The Municipal League soon became involved in the campaign 
because, as one member explained, "it is not just for respectable 
people to be obliged to live next to a human pig-sty." The movement 
waxed and waned over the next few years until the Garden Club 
ended its active sponsorship in 1916, noting with satisfaction that 
"indications of the activity of the club are apparent throughout the 
city."95 Suggesting new directions that planning would take in the 
future—a growing concern with social conditions—the Municipal 
League also cooperated with the WSCAIA and the Seattle Central 
Council of Social Agencies in trying to improve the quality of life for 
Seattleites through various private associations.96 
By far the most comprehensive building actions involved the 
University of Washington. In 1861 the university had received ten 
acres of what would become the heart of Seattle's business district 
as a gift; and for years the university was located on that tract. 
However, as the surrounding area became settled and developed, 
the university moved in 1894-95to a n e w  s i t e- I*s present location 
is on Lake Washington several miles to the northeast, where the 
Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition was held. The move left the uni­
versity with the question of what to do with its downtown lands. 
The university chose to keep and develop the property as a source 
of rental income. Throughout the Progressive Era, the university's 
board of trustees worked with a private company, the Metropol­
itan Building Company, to develop the university lands as a single 
unit. A number of skyscrapers, most notably the White-Henry-
Stuart Building, went up on the land.97 
The coming of World War I halted attempts at comprehensive 
city planning in Seattle. When planning was revived with the 
creation of a City Planning Commission by the city council in 
1924, the methods and goals of planners differed from those of the 
prewar years. Planners in Seattle, as was true of those across Amer­
ica, were more concerned in the 1920s with zoning, as pioneered 
in Los Angeles, and with the details of altering transportation 
networks to meet the needs of the automobile than with creating a 
functionally unified city.98 Virgil Bogue's conception of a compre­
hensive plan for Seattle eroded. 
Nonetheless, the Bogue Plan left a lasting imprint upon Seattle. 
While never implemented in its entirety, the Bogue Plan had an 
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impact upon the city's development. Numerous individual im­
provements, especially in parks, transportation facilities, and har­
bor facilities were made over the years. In fact, most of the park 
plans were ultimately implemented. Perhaps even more impor­
tantly, the Bogue Plan kept alive the concept of planning. When 
Seattleites considered planning anew after World War II, some 
looked back on the Bogue Plan favorably "as an instance of scan­
ning the palm of an entire city and attempting to forecast its future 
existence."99 In 1972 the head of the Seattle Department of Hu­
man Resources wondered in an article written for one of the city's 
leading newspapers, if "in an age o subdivisions and domed sta­
diums, can we look back on the Civic Idea and not yearn for that 
nobler vision?"100 
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was true in the other Pacific Coast cities, the tremendous 
growth that occurred in Portland deeply concerned the residents 
of that metropolis in the opening years of the twentieth century. In 
a letter to Portland's mayor in 1912, a leading member of the Port­
land Medical Society voiced a complaint heard with increasing 
frequency. "During the last five years," he observed, "there has 
been a great increase in the quantity of smoke overhanging the 
city."1 Later in the same year the head of a local engineering com­
pany made another oft-heard complaint. He noted, "The City of 
Portland, due to its wonderful growth, is already finding the con­
gestion of its streets a handicap to its increase."2 
Like urbanites in other Pacific Coast cities, Portland's resi­
dents came to view city planning as a way to control the effects of 
growth.3 Portlanders went farther than the residents of Seattle, 
San Francisco, Oakland, and Los Angeles, however, in adopting a 
city plan as a guide for the future evolution of their city. Business 
leaders were in the forefront of the campaign. In backing civic 
improvements and planning, they equated public advances with 
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private progress. Merchants especially thought that planning would 
create an environment in which their firms could prosper. Like 
their counterparts elsewhere on the Pacific Coast, they viewed 
beauty as having a definite economic value. "The day has come 
when the artistic sense is a factor with men who have means to 
invest," an influential Portland newspaper editorialized in 1909. 
"The savage who sheltered himself in caves cared nothing for lines 
of beauty, but the latter day man of capital is not a savage," con­
cluded the paper, "His tepee was good enough for the purposes of 
the aborigine, but not for the men with big bank accounts."4 
The Origins of Planning: 
Parks and Expositions 
As it had in Oakland and Seattle, city planning began in Port­
land with efforts to establish a park and boulevard system. The 
Oregon state legislature set up a park board for Portland in 1900, 
and the board immediately called for the creation of "a park sys­
tem embracing riverside, mountains and plains . . . connected by 
wide boulevards." Such a system, board members thought, would 
benefit Portland economically and socially. "The beautifying of 
the city as a whole, the increased healthfulness of the people, the 
higher values to all property, the opening of beautiful suburbs and 
the true expansion of the commonwealth itself are involved," they 
claimed. Civic pride was also at stake. A park system would, they 
thought, "go far to make this the most beautiful city in the world"— 
strong words, considering that just a generation before Portland 
had been a stump town hacked out of a forest wilderness.5 None­
theless, several years later Portland still possessed only 136 acres 
of parklands at ten dilapidated sites.6 
Accomplishments began in 1903, when the park board invited 
John C. Olmsted of the Olmsted Brothers—who was visiting Seat­
tle to design a new park system there—to come south and draw up 
a park plan for Portland as well. For a five-thousand-dollar fee, 
Olmsted readily accepted the invitation. Olmsted reported that 
Portland needed a "park-system" composed of "park squares, play­
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grounds, small or neighborhood parks, large or suburban parks, 
scenic reservations, boulevards, and parkways." Particularly im­
portant would be a series of waterfront parks along the Willamette 
River. West of the river there would be a parkway along the crest 
of the West Hills, while large parks would be developed in the 
rapidly growing region east of the river. A set of parkways would 
loop from Sellwood to Mount Tabor and the Columbia River and 
then back to the Willamette at the University of Portland.7 
Portlanders would, Olmsted thought, benefit economically, so­
cially, and morally from his proposed system. Property owners 
would reap monetary rewards from the "increased valuations" 
that would occur on "lands bordering upon various parks and 
parkways." Portland as a whole would be improved by the ten­
dency of parks to "draw to the city wealth, the taxation of which 
may more than repay the city for the outlay." Moreover, parks 
were, he argued, "a power for educating the people to better 
things . . . they improve public taste." In short, parks could be 
"exceedingly important factors in developing the healthfulness, 
morality, intelligence, and business prosperity" of the residents of 
Portland.8 
As in Seattle, little came immediately of Olmsted's ideas, for 
Portlanders found themselves drawn into the vortex of more press­
ing events. Instead, smaller local developments—school garden 
and playground movements—preceded unified park planning. 
The proponents of gardens and playgrounds strongly believed 
they could change the character of children by changing their 
environment. In 1906 Portland's superintendent of schools began 
encouraging children to plant school gardens, an action that won 
praise for instilling in the children "an interest in productive oper­
ations, habits of useful industry instead of mischievous idleness." 
Proponents claimed, "Every unfolding flower and maturing root 
in which the children are interested will help to make better men 
and women of them, and so will help to make the next generation 
better than this."9 
Closely allied to the school garden program was a playground 
movement. Sponsored by the Portland Woman's Club, the YMCA, 
and the People's Institute, this campaign, which also began in 
1906, had strong middle-class backing. Advocates viewed play­
grounds as instrumental in improving the health and morals of 
children: "It is certain, had any of the plans laid out eight years 
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ago materialized there would not be so many boys and girls in 
their teens on probation or pleading before the juvenile court."10 
Public playgrounds also won support as "the great equalizer" 
where children of all classes and races could play together and 
develop "common interests."11 A private group, the People's Insti­
tute, received public funding to operate the playgrounds initially 
and reported in 1908 that "Americans, Syrians, Chinese, Japanese, 
Italians, Swedish, Irish, French, Indians, and English" were using 
them. It is unclear whether or not blacks were allowed in.12 In 
Portland the playground drive was more than a middle-class move­
ment. In 1911 the city's Socialist party passed a resolution calling 
for the "creation of sufficient parks and playgrounds for the use 
and pleasure of our people and children."13 Enjoying broad-based 
support, the park board established eight playgrounds by 1912, 
and an estimated 300,000 children attended them during that 
14 year.
From those scattered beginnings, park advocates turned to 
Olmsted's more comprehensive park and boulevard scheme. In 
December 1906, a group of business and civic leaders came to­
gether as the Initiative of One Hundred to work for a $1 million 
park bond issue to be voted on in the following year. According to 
a newspaper report, park proponents argued that by constructing 
a park system Portland had "the greatest opportunity to make 
itself famous with the least expense to itself. They were concerned 
that Portland might fall behind other cities "favorably known 
through their fine parks."15 
John C. Ainsworth, one of Portland's leading businessmen, led 
the fight for the park bonds. Ainsworth had interests in banking, 
transportation, and manufacturing, and would be very active in 
the city planning campaign. Of well-established "old" wealth, 
Ainsworth would take a role in Portland's city improvement and 
planning movements over the coming decade roughly similar to 
those played by James Phelan in San Francisco and Frank Mott in 
Oakland. Like his business counterparts to the south, Ainsworth 
saw private business enterprises and public planning efforts as 
going together hand in hand. He viewed the political arena as a 
necessary place in which to work out ideas for the commercial 
advance of Portland. Like Phelan, Ainsworth harbored a sense of 
civic pride and patriotism. He once observed, "I think our trouble 
in the United States has been that we have judged success far too 
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much by the money making yardstick." In fact, he concluded, 
"The leaders of art and literature and religion and humanity have 
occupied far more imposing places in the worlds history than men 
whose only claim to distiction has been in wealth accumulation."16 
Not all businessmen favored the bonds, however. Opposition 
came from the United East Side Clubs, prefiguring a later split in 
Portland's business community on the implementation of city 
planning measures. The rapidly expanding East Side lacked city 
services already in place in the well-established West Side (the 
Willamette River separated Portland into two parts). East Side 
businessmen and residents consequently urged that bonds for more 
immediate necessities—streets, bridges, water, and sewers—be 
given precedence over the park bonds. Despite East Side opposi­
tion, the park bonds, which needed only a simple majority, won 
approval by a vote of 6,666 to 4,359.17 
During the next six years, the mayor and the park board (now 
headed by E. T. Mische, who had worked for Olmsted's firm) used 
the bond funds to expand Portland's park system. They developed 
new parks and laid out some boulevards to link them. Boulevards 
were especially important, one proponent claimed, because they 
would preserve "the natural beauties of one of the finest of the 
Western gateways of the city."18 Nonetheless, opposition to the ex­
pansion of parks and boulevards surfaced. The widening of the 
boulevards displaced some residents, leading the Portland Labor 
Press to protest that "for a long time the industrious poor have 
been hit by this thing and robbed by that without being able to 
detect the holder of the bludgeon or catch the thief."19 Such op­
position had only a limited effect. More serious was a lack of funds, 
for the $1 million did not go far enough. Most of the money went 
into developing neighborhood parks. Although Portland pos­
sessed fifteen parks and thirteen playgrounds by 1913, the city had 
scarcely begun to put together the park system called for by Olm­
sted and still trailed Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle in the 
number of parkland acres available on a per capita basis.20 
If parks were one inspiration for planning in Portland, the Lewis 
and Clark Exposition of 1905 was a second. Although the immedi­
ate and direct impact of the exposition upon city planning was 
quite limited, its long-range impact, like that of the Alaska-Yukon-
Pacific Exposition on Seattle four years later, was substantial. The 
park movement and the exposition jointly inspired Portland's 
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planning advocates with a sense that they could control and alter 
their urban environment for the better. 
The Lewis and Clark Exposition owed its existence to J. M. 
Long of the Portland Board of Trade, who organized a provisional 
committee in 1900 to discuss the staging of a Northwest Industrial 
Exposition. A bit later the Oregon Historical Society, led by the 
editor of the Oregonian, suggested the date and the theme. At the 
end of 1901, a private corporation, funded mainly by Portland's 
merchants and bankers, came into being to run the fair. A federal 
appropriation of $475,000 passed in 1904 provided additional 
funding, and the exposition was constructed on swampy ground 
around Guild's Lake near the Willamette River just to the north­
west of Portland. The exposition opened on June 1,1905, and by 
the time it closed its gates four and a half months later, 2.5 million 
people had visited it.21 
As with Seattle's fair four years later, the main goals of those 
putting on the Lewis and Clark Exposition were to win national 
recognition for their city and to advertise the products of its busi­
nesses. One exposition advocate argued as early as 1901 that "a 
dominant desire connected with the proposed fair is that through 
it the Pacific Northwest shall be brought into larger and closer 
trade relations with the rest of the world, more particularly the 
nations of the Orient."22 Another Portlander, who would become 
a proponent of city planning, later recalled that "the purpose of 
the Lewis and Clark Exposition in 1905 was to advertise the city 
and promote its growth." In fact, "the slogan shouted and printed 
at the time was 'Portland great, Portland fine! Five hundred thou­
sand in Nineteen-nine!'"23 
As would also be the case in Seattle, however, there was more to 
Portland's world's fair than economics, for the exposition exposed 
Portlanders to the idea of organized beauty. John C. Olmsted laid 
out the grounds for the Lewis and Clark Exposition. His formal 
design resembled that of Chicago's Columbian Exposition of 1893. 
A strong northerly axis was oriented to views of the Willamette 
River and Mount St. Helens. Whitewashed buildings of the Span­
ish Renaissance style were grouped between the river, Guild's 
Lake, and hills to the west, creating an impressive overall visual 
effect. Portland's mayor called it "a diamond set in a coronet of 
emeralds."24 
The diamonds soon turned to dust. The physical structures 
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composing the exposition were only temporary. As early as 1903, 
members of the park board predicted that because the fair was 
constructed on land leased, not owned, by the city "most of the 
improvements will either disappear or revert to private use."25 
That prediction proved accurate. At the close of the fair, manufac­
turers developed the exposition site as an industrial district, and 
during the next few years even Guild's Lake was filled in and put 
to business use. Lacking the necessary funds, the city council 
passed up the possibility of turning the area into a park as desired 
by Olmsted. The apparent inability of Portlanders to capitalize on 
the fair has led the historian H. Kimbark MacColl to conclude that 
the Lewis and Clark Exposition was "a colossal missed chance."26 
That assessment is only partly correct, for the exposition along 
with the park movement helped prepare the way for later city 
planning efforts. Both the exposition and the park work stressed 
the need for systematic, rather than piecemeal, approaches to the 
environment; and both combined beauty with economic gain. 
Utility and beauty, which would be the two dominant themes in 
Portland's city planning campaign, were present in those earlier 
movements. 
The Bennett Plan 
Sustained, organized efforts to improve Portland through plan­
ning began shortly after the closing of the exposition. In 1906 
members of the Board of Trade, acting in consultation with Mayor 
Harry Lane, formed a Committee of One Hundred. Composed of 
representatives from each precinct of Portland, the committee 
consisted almost solely of business and professional men.27 At its 
first meeting, Francis McKenna, a leading Portland real estate 
developer who had supported establishing the committee, stated 
that its goals were the municipal construction of a beltline railroad 
along Portland's waterfront on the Willamette River, the building 
of public docks, and the creation of a system of parks and boule­
vards throughout the city. Within a week, municipal ownership of 
coal gas and light plants had been added to the Committee of One 
Hundreds plans. They intended much more than beautification. 
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McKenna, who became the committee's president, explained, 
"The objects of the organization are to promote the moral, social, 
and financial welfare of Portland."28 
Sometimes led by the Committee of One Hundred, but often 
working through smaller neighborhood associations, Portland res­
idents labored to improve their city over the next four years. Civic 
pride underlay their moves. "Portland is an expanding city," ob­
served the city's leading newspaper, the Oregon Journal. "It is no 
longer a provincial town." Improvements were needed because 
"the plant with which it has been operating is not big enough for 
the city that is to be." The journal, which Ainsworth controlled, 
concluded by comparing Portland to a business. "In private busi­
ness, when the plant is outgrown it is added to, or discarded alto­
gether, and a larger and more modern one is provided. The rule 
has to be applied to municipal life or the corporation can not 
enlarge."29 
Civic improvements assumed several forms. Street widening 
and paving attracted attention from Portlanders who were wor­
ried lest their city "be left far in the rear of Pacific Coast progress," 
especially when compared with street improvements being un­
dertaken in Seattle.30 Neighborhood improvement clubs tried to 
restrict the erection of billboards and overhead street wires.31 At 
the urgings of the clubs, the city constructed new bridges across 
the Willamette River to join the west and east sides of Portland.32 
Campaigns for better service from street railroad companies en­
livened local politics. In 1909, for example, the Peninsula Devel­
opment League, the United East Side Push Clubs, the Seventh 
Ward League, and the Holladay and Irvington Associations joined 
forces in a partially sucessful drive for improved streetcar service. 
Charles K. Henry, a real estate developer who headed the move­
ment, explained its purpose: "What is the use of subscribing as I 
and others have done for country clubs, beautifying the city, live­
stock shows, etc., if we cannot get adequate car service?"33 
At the same time, there was a growing perception that only city 
planning could solve Portland's problems. The Oregon Journal 
published editorial after editorial on the benefits of planning. The 
newspaper argued that Portlanders could win national recogni­
tion for their city through planning. An editorial asserted, "Port­
land has reached a size now that justifies it in moving out and up 
on broader and higher lines, the end in view being the most gener­
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ally attractive city in the United States."34 Noting that Portland 
could also best keep up with its urban rivals on the Pacific Coast 
through planning, the newspaper called for more paved streets, 
public docks, the construction of a civic center, and additional 
parks and boulevards. The newspaper also argued repeatedly that 
an improved city would instill Portlanders with higher moral val­
ues and lessen the incidence of crime. As one editorial explained: 
"The moral benefit more than pays for all the cost of city beau­
tification. Crime and vice do not flourish amid broad avenues and 
open thoroughfares. . . . Crime cannot live among beautiful things, 
so every new civic building, every new statue, every additional 
foot of park or playground means a big gain for health and mo­
rality."35 
New organizations—some ephemeral, others long-lived—arose 
to push the cause of civic improvement and planning. A Better 
Citizenship Association, a loose federation of religious leaders 
formed to "promote civic righteousness," came and went with 
little lasting impact upon Portland.36 More important was the 
organization in 1909 of the Architectural League of the Pacific 
Coast. In its founding year a local branch of the league, the Port­
land Architectural Club, working in conjunction with the Port­
land Art Association, sponsored an exhibit "to stimulate a civic 
pride and an appreciation of things beautiful."37 The club's presi­
dent also called for the drafting ofa plan for parks, boulevards, and 
public buildings. Local architects won praise for building several 
planned communities. Most notable was the construction of Mis­
sion Villa, a group of apartments for eight hundred people sur­
rounded by parks and playgrounds. Made available to persons of 
moderate means, the complex won approval from the Portland 
Labor Press as a "fraternal village."38 
From scattered movements, Portlanders went on to form the 
City Beautiful Committee in the fall of 1909. Oregon Senator 
Jonathan Bourne was particularly important in establishing the 
committee. Bourne had known Daniel Burnham when Burnham 
was working on his plan for Washington, D.C., and did his best to 
convince Portland's business leaders to set up the City Beautiful 
Committee as a means of implementing Burnham's concepts in 
their city. Attending the first meeting of the City Beautiful Com­
mittee were Portland's leading merchants, realtors, architects, 
publishers, and insurance men. Ainsworth, perhaps the most 
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influential member of the committee, provided continuity with 
the earlier Committee of One Hundred. The City Beautiful Com­
mittee immediately started raising money to bring a planner to 
Portland to draw up a city plan.39 However, securing the funds 
had to await further organizational changes. J. R. Wetherbee, the 
president of the Commercial Club and a member of Portland's 
park board, led the effort to establish a new body to campaign for 
city planning. Ainsworth and Charles Merrick, an insurance bro­
ker, assisted Wetherbee. All of those men had been active in ear­
lier planning or improvement organizations. The new interim 
body, called a "city practical committee" by the Portland press, 
soon gave way to a more long-lasting organization.40 
That organization was the Civic Improvement League. About 
one hundred prominent businessmen and professionals—de­
scribed by the Oregon Journal as composing "the largest and most 
influential financial interests in Portland"—participated in the 
founding of the league on December 7,1909. For permanent of­
ficers they chose men well versed in Portland's planning move­
ment: Wetherbee as chairman, William Killingsworth (a Portland 
realtor) as vice-chairman, Merrick as secretary, and Ainsworth as 
treasurer. A fifteen-member executive committee drawn from the 
ranks of Portland's leading insurance men, architects, bankers, 
merchants, and lawyers would advise the league's officers and 
help carry on the day-to-day work. Like San Franciscans, who had 
formed the Association for the Improvement and Adornment of 
San Francisco to work for the Burnham Plan, Portlanders thus 
chose a private association to press for city planning.41 
From the outset, league members stressed the practical bene­
fits of planning. As one newspaper supporting the league observed, 
"the Civic League of Portland meditates no topsy-turvey upheaval 
in the city in order to construct the Greater Portland." The league, 
it continued, "simply designs to formulate a plan which may be 
followed by systematic and economic installing of improvements 
as the city grows. . . . People are not to pay more taxes as a result of 
planning, but less."42 The need for harbor improvements, better 
streets, a civic center, and more parks was discussed at the found­
ing of the league. 
The Civic Improvement League quickly raised twenty thou­
sand dollars to fund planning, with large contributions from Port­
land's major lumber, manufacturing, real estate, and banking com­
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panies. Ainsworth and Bourne gave generously and were very 
active in persuading others to contribute.43 The league engaged 
Edward H. Bennett to prepare the plan for a fee of five hundred 
dollars per month. A 1902 graduate of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts, 
Bennett had assisted Burnham in drawing up city plans for San 
Francisco and Chicago. Thirty-five years old in 1909, this English 
architect was at the height of his powers. With the hiring of Ben­
nett, the secretary of the league could report just one week after 
that body's founding that "we are getting along splendidly in our 
work."44 
In contrast to the situation in most other Pacific Coast cities, 
the planning movement in Portland developed with less in the way 
of clear-cut ties to urban progressivism. Over the years, political 
fiqures of various persuasion backed the planning campaign and 
none came out publicly against it. Even Mayor Joseph Simon (1910­
11), a standpat conservative who opposed city ownership of Port­
land's docks, backed the nascent city beautiful movement. A. G. 
Rushlight, who succeeded Simon as mayor, quickly became a tire­
less campaigner against vice and prostitution as well as a strong 
proponent of the municipal ownership of public utilities and docks. 
He also actively backed the adoption of the Bennett Plan in a 
manner reminiscent of Mayor Frank Mott s support for planning 
in Oakland. In short, city planning attracted political support of 
various hues in Portland.45 
Given a free hand, Bennett worked on his plans for Portland 
throughout 1910. He labored mainly on his own, with the help of 
only a few assistants. The consideration of local ideas that charac­
terized the preparation of Seattle's Bogue Plan was less evident in 
the drafting of a plan for Portland. As Merrick later observed, one 
of Bennett's more prominent characteristics was "his unwilling­
ness to accept suggestions or direction." Bennett, he recalled, 
"gave all of us to understand that he had been employed to draw 
the plan and that he did not welcome any suggestion from any 
contributor."46 
Bennett presented preliminary sketches to the Civic Improve­
ment League in February 1911 and final ones at the end of the 
summer. The experiences of San Francisco with planning clearly 
influenced Bennett. Upon presenting his final sketches, he noted 
that San Franciscans were seriously considering the construction 
of a civic center in preparation for the Panama-Pacific Interna­
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tional Exposition and concluded that "there can be no reason for 
doubting that the Portland plan will prove as valuable [as the 
Burnham Plan for San Francisco]."47 
Like his mentor, Burnham, Edward Bennett thought in large 
terms. He planned for Portland's future as a city of two million 
people, a metropolis roughly ten times as populous as the Port­
land that existed in 1911. Like Burnham, Bennett believed that the 
different functions of a city should be segregated by area. Plan­
ning would further the separation and at the same time link the 
functions of the city in the interests of economic efficiency. "The 
ideal," Bennett wrote, "is the organic city with its parts and activi­
ties closely related and well defined, but not conflicting; wisely 
and economically builded, not a cluster of villages, each with its 
center, and with boundaries accidentally merged."48 
Central to the Bennett Plan was the rebuilding of Portland's 
harbor on the Willamette River. As in the other Pacific Coast cit­
ies, the finishing of the Panama Canal acted as a spur to action, for 
Bennett thought that the "completion of the Panama Canal will 
bring a large marine business here." Bennett called for the deep­
ening of the river channel, the public construction and ownership 
of new piers and warehouses, and the building of a beltline rail­
road to serve the waterfront—goals very similar to those held by 
the Committee of One Hundred as early as 1906. Bennett's belief 
in the need to segregate the different functions of Portland was 
most apparent in his treatment of waterways. The Bennett Plan 
encouraged the movement of shipping and manufacturing to the 
northwest, downstream from the established downtown district, 
thus freeing Portland's central waterfront for freight wagons and 
railroads supplying downtown wholesalers. Bennett argued that a 
modernized port would help Portland socially as well as econom­
ically, for, he claimed, his plan would eliminate saloons and broth­
els, which exerted "a subconscious influence upon citizenship 
[that] is extremely bad."49 
To link Portland with its harbor and to improve communica­
tions within the city, Bennett envisioned major transportation 
changes. Like many other planners, he viewed streets as "ar­
teries . .  . for the life blood of the city, its traffic." Bennett called 
for the superimposition of radial traffic arteries stretching twenty 
miles to the southeast upon Portland's existing gridiron street plan 
and urged the construction of additional bridges and tunnels to 
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downtown Portland. From the Bennett Plan for Portland. 
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improve communications between Portland s east and west sides.50 
Noting that "the commercial supremacy of the City may in time be 
dependent upon a small fraction of a cent per ton for handling," 
Bennett also sought to improve railroad traffic into Portland. He 
concluded that "great railroad clearing and transfer yards" should 
be located on the Columbia Flats in touch with the docks de­
signed for deep sea shipping."51 
Bennett recommended a civic center consisting of a new court­
house, a city hall, a public library, and other buildings for the area 
around Portland's Lownsdale and Chapman squares. "The group­
ing of important public buildings," claimed Bennett, would be 
useful "both for convenience in the administration of municipal 
affairs and for nobility of purpose." Bennett also called for the 
building of a union railroad station to be linked by boulevards to 
the center of the city and the civic center, "thus producing a har­
monious, highly efficient grouping of superb beauty," and the 
creation of a "recreation center" composed of a public audito­
rium, an academy, and a museum of fine arts near the Multnomah 
Club in downtown Portland.52 
Finally, Bennett wanted major additions to Portland's system of 
parks and boulevards to "make of Portland preeminently the City 
Beautiful . . . encouraging the highest standard of citizenship." 
Bennett promoted the creation of both "great woodland or forest 
reserve areas" and "small neighborhood parks" needed for the 
"daily refreshment of the people." Bennett's concern about en­
vironmental influences upon people led him to consider combin­
ing parks with housing. Influenced by England's Garden City 
experiments, Bennett called for the opening of park-like suburbs 
for the working classes. "Modern transportation makes it possible 
to live in the outskirts, though work be in the center, and for each 
citizen to obtain thus a maximum of ground at a minimum cost," 
he noted. Workers, thought Bennett, "should always be provided 
with room for sunlight and air and charming surroundings. The 
cost is no greater. The efficiency of the citizenship of the people 
who live therein is vastly increased."53 
Bennett viewed his plan for Portland as helping the city's resi­
dents economically. Above all, it would allow them to handle the 
rapid expansion of their city then occurring and to prepare for 
future growth. "No city of the Pacific Coast with hope for expan­
sion beyond present limits has failed to provide itself with a plan," 
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Edward Bennett's plan called for new parks to be established on the east and west 
sides of Portland. From the Bennett Plan for Portland. 
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Bennett explained. Planning would accomplish those goals at 
the lowest possible cost, for, Bennett asserted, "the cost will be 
measurably less than in haphazard growth."54 Appealing to Port­
land's business leaders, Bennett compared a city to a business 
and claimed that planning benefited both. "The most successful 
businessman is he who has the most orderly and best directed 
'plant,'" Bennett claimed. "The same principle may be applied 
to the city."55 
While he stressed the economic aspects of planning, Bennett 
also valued highly the expected social benefits. A well-planned 
city with parks, boulevards, and a civic center would, he thought, 
inspire Portlanders with citizenship values and lessen friction 
between different groups in the city. Bennett predicted, "The 
greater City will result in higher citizenship" because "it militates 
alike against the selfish interest and the narrow view."56 
The Campaign for the Bennett Plan 
The first political test of Bennett's ideas came in the summer 
of 1911 as he was putting the final touches on his sketches for 
his plan. In June Portlanders voted on a $600,000 bond issue 
to build a public auditorium at an undecided site. The audito­
rium proposal won especially strong support from the Commer­
cial Club, whose members were Portland's leading merchants 
and bankers, as a way of attracting conventions. Its business 
backers argued that the auditorium would further "Portland's 
development into a convention city of national possibilities."57 
Not all favored the bond issue, however. Some segments of 
organized labor opposed it, because they feared it would be 
built with nonunion labor and because it threatened to raise 
their taxes.58 The bonds won approval by a vote of 13,915 to 
10,771.59 
From thats auspicious start, Portlanders advanced the cause of 
planning through the formation of yet another private association. 
In September 1911, the Civic Improvement League called a meet­
ing of representatives from business organizations and neigh­
borhood improvement clubs to set up a broadly based orga­
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nization to secure public approval for the Bennett Plan. Some one 
hundred business and civic leaders attended the conference, 
including officers of the Chamber of Commerce and the Com­
merce Club, but no representatives of organized labor.60 From 
that and other meetings emerged the Greater Portland Plans 
Association (GPPA) several months later. 
As its founders had hoped, the GPPA was composed of a broad 
spectrum of Portland's business, professional, and political lead­
ers—a body of considerable potential clout indeed. Merrick was 
chosen president, and John Haak (a lumberman), M. G. Munley, 
Dr. Andrew Smith, John Carroll (the editor of the Evening Tele­
gram), Charles Morden (the assistant manager of the Oregonian), 
and Edmund Sawyer (an entrepreneur engaged in a variety of 
enterprises) won election as vice-presidents. Bankers, merchants, 
and lawyers composed the new organization's executive board 
(Wetherbee was a member). Many of those belonging to the GPPA, 
such as Ainsworth, had been members of earlier planning organi­
zations in Portland; but the GPPA also included the city's mayor, 
park superintendent, and city engineer in its ranks.61 
With their organization perfected, members of the GPPA 
turned to the question of how to win public approval for the adop­
tion of the Bennett Plan. Like so many reformers in the Progres­
sive Era, they placed their faith in the value of education. One 
GPPA leader observed, "It is only necessary to explain to any 
intelligent person the scope and intent of the plan to secure his or 
her heartiest support and commendation."62 To that end, GPPA 
members sponsored numerous talks before local improvement 
clubs and held mass rallies complete with torchlight parades to 
publicize the Bennett Plan. The mayor declared February 29, 
1912, to be Greater Portland Day. At 10:30 that morning, signaled 
by blasts of factory whistles, scores of GPPA canvassers spread out 
through the city to sign up new members and to win financial 
support for their organization. The GPPA persuaded the city gov­
ernment to publish twenty-five thousand copies of the plan and to 
distribute them to organizations of all types. Finally, in August 
1912, the GPPA won inclusion for the Bennett Plan on the ballot 
for city elections to be held three months later.63 
During the fall, the members of the GPPA redoubled their 
efforts. Boasting that their organization had more than four thou­
sand members, they sent out letters to all of Portland s business 
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groups asking for public declarations of their support. The results 
were gratifying. At a mass meeting in late October, every major 
business group came out in support of the plan, including the 
Commercial Club, Chamber of Commerce, Rotary Club, the Ad 
Club, the Transportation Club, and the Progressive Merchants' 
Association. Businessmen were particularly susceptible to the 
economic arguments made by their colleagues in the GPPA, for, 
like Bennett, members of the GPPA stressed the monetary bene­
fits they expected to result from planning. They argued that only 
through systematic planning could Portland prepare for the in­
creases in commerce and immigration expected to come from the 
opening of the Panama Canal and thus stay abreast of its urban 
rivals, Seattle and San Francisco. Nor, they claimed, would plan­
ning prove expensive. To the contrary, by avoiding costly blunders 
as Portland grew, GPPA members asserted that planning would 
lower their city's tax rates, thus creating an attractive business 
environment likely to draw new industry to Portland. Planning 
champions claimed, "The plan involves no extraordinary expendi­
tures, but simply seeks to adapt the units of improvement to a 
coherent plan as the city grows."64 
Running through the arguments of the members of the GPPA 
and the businessmen supporting them was a belief that their city 
was destined for greatness. A desire for acceptance of Portland as 
a regional leader and as a national city of some substance moti­
vated planning proponents in Portland, just as it did those in Seat­
tle. A poem published by the GPPA caught well these wishes: 
Wake up a bit, my Portland friend,

And as you boost for farm and tillage,

Don't overlook the fact meanwhile

That Portland's not a brushwood village.

And great as Portland is today,

It's just as well to figger

That she will keep on year by year,

Still getting bigger, bigger, bigger.

When she is in the million class,

Say, fellow, wouldn't it be bitter
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If we had left her streets and squares 
So doggone small they wouldn't fit her? 
Then hit the highway to the polls 
And fix our city's weal forever. 
Endorse the Bennett Plans and be 
A first class little boosting lever.65 
No organized resistance to the adoption of the Bennett Plan 
surfaced. The Portland Central Labor Council, which claimed 
eight thousand members, remained neutral on the issue. After 
listening to the president of the GPPA discuss the Bennett Plan in 
early February 1912, Central Labor Council members expressed 
their general approval of it. Two months later they passed a resolu­
tion calling for the construction of a proposed city library "in 
accord with the plans promulgated by the Greater Portland Plans 
Association." They also agreed, however, with the Oregon State 
Grange that good county roads were more important than "high­
ways and boulevards . .  . in order that a few pleasure seekers may 
enjoy themselves." In the end they decided that the Bennett Plan 
was "of no importance whatever at this time" and recommended 
neither a favorable nor a negative vote on it.66 
The Bennett Plan won approval at the polls by the overwhelm­
ing majority of 16,202 to 7,996.67 The ballot issue called upon the 
city council to follow the Bennett Plan in "making public im­
provements of any kind . . . as far as in their judgment is practica­
ble and advantageous" [italics added]. With the economy of their 
city booming, all groups could agree that planning was needed 
for Portland to take full advantage of the opportunities for ex­
pansion. The splits among different business groups and be­
tween business organizations and other groups that had hin­
dered the adoption of city plans in San Francisco and Seattle did 
not surface in Portland in 1912. The qualifying phrase "as far as 
in their judgment is practicable and advantageous" made the 
Bennett Plan seem more flexible than many other city plans. It 
was the lack of such flexibility that, in part, killed Seattle's Bogue 
Plan that same year. 
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The Erosion of the Bennett Plan 
Whether the Bennett Plan could be implemented remained to 
be seen, however. The very flexibility of the plan raised questions 
for the future. In fact, signs in the 1912 election hinted that dis­
agreements would soon make putting it into practice difficult. 
A $2 million park bond issue closely associated with the Ben­
nett Plan went down to defeat in 1912. Business leaders, including 
the heads of the Commercial Club and the Chamber of Com­
merce, argued for the park bonds because parks were likely to 
attract visitors and settlers to Portland. Lecturers for Portland's 
newly created Social Service Council also pointed out that, as 
alternatives to saloons and pool halls, playgrounds would improve 
the morals of young people.68 However, many Portlanders viewed 
the expansion of their city's park system as an unnecessary ex­
pense. Claiming that the park bonds would become a "mother of 
real estate graft" and that "the workingman has to pay all taxes 
directly or indirectly and will have to pay for this," the Central 
Labor Council urged their defeat.69 The final tally was 9,346 fa­
vorable to 15,406 negative votes.70 
The simultaneous approval of the Bennett Plan and the defeat 
of the park bonds should have given planning advocates pause. 
The Bennett Plan passed because Portlanders viewed it as a gen­
eral guide that would aid the private business development of 
their city. The park bonds lost, for they were seen as a specific 
issue that would cost, not save, money. However, difficulties seemed 
far away to planning proponents in 1912. Elated by their victory in 
winning approval for the Bennett Plan, they expected nothing but 
continued successes in the future. 
The strong organization forged by the GPPA continued to oper­
ate after the 1912 election. In 1913 the GPPA began publishing its 
own journal, Greater Portland, to promote the cause of planning. 
More than in the past, GPPA members stressed the moral and 
social benefits that they saw in planning. One planning advocate 
wrote, "There is nothing that will so elevate citizenship, promote 
civic pride and self respect as to act together in adopting units of 
the city's inevitable growth to a systematic plan."71 Parks and play­
grounds were seen as especially useful. The lack of enough mod­
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ern playgrounds was, in the minds of advocates of a planned city, 
"linked to juvenile delinquency and inefficiency in school." More­
over, it was expected that the problem would worsen as immi­
grants of very diverse backgrounds thronged to Portland with the 
opening of the Panama Canal. "If Portland is going to handle 
the tremendous physical, moral, and social problems incident to 
the coming of a large number of immigrants it will have to do 
better," noted one GPPA member.72 Portlanders welcomed con­
tinuing growth for their city, but only if they could control its 
social and economic consequences. 
While placing a new emphasis on the social advantages of plan­
ning, GPPA members continued to claim economic benefits. The 
newly elected president of the GPPA, who was the head of the 
Sherman Clay Company, summarized what many believed. "In 
the building of a great city it is essential that we have a plan," he 
asserted, "that we have broad arteries for trade, that we have ade­
quate and suitable docks, that we improve our harbor, that we 
develop our terminal yards so our shipping may be carried on 
properly." He concluded, "We should get away from the idea some 
have put forth that the Bennett Plan is for a city beautiful, and 
commence to talk in a sane and practical way about a city prac­
tical—the Bennett Practical Plan."73 
Despite the continued work of the GPPA, the implementation 
of the Bennett Plan never occurred. The concept of comprehen­
sive city planning began eroding less than a year after the 1912 
election, as foretold by the failure of the park bond issue. While 
Portlanders could—like Seattleites—agree that having a planned 
city was valuable in the abstract, they were no more successful 
than other Pacific Coast urbanites in putting their plans into prac­
tice. They soon divided on the specific proposals in the Bennett 
Plan. The GPPA did succeed in having a city planning commission 
set up in July 1913 to advise the city council on the implementation 
of the Bennett Plan. The commission succeeded in having the 
federal government construct a new post office in conformance 
with the Bennett Plan, but it met defeat on other major issues. The 
commission failed to win locations prescribed in the plan for the 
building of an art gallery and a civic auditorium, failed to secure 
approval for new street plans, and incurred defeat on park issues. 
The difficulty in locating the civic auditorium, the bonds for 
which had been approved by voters two years before, proved most 
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damaging. Like the siting of the civic center in Seattle, choosing 
the location for the auditorium in Portland split businessmen into 
warring camps. East Side and West Side businessmen argued for 
the siting of the auditorium on their sides of the Willamette River. 
After a protracted and bitter dispute, they agreed on a compro­
mise site unrelated to the Bennett Plan.74 Nearly as serious was 
the defeat of the plan's proposal to widen Burnside Street, an 
avenue Bennett had designated to become one of Portland's major 
traffic arteries. Property owners along Burnside Street, working 
through their own local improvement organization, opposed the 
efforts of the GPPA to alter Burnside, for they feared that any 
changes might decrease their property values.75 
Capping those disappointments was the failure to win approval 
for $2 million in park bonds in a renewed campaign in the fall of 
1913. Park advocates put foward the familiar arguments in favor of 
the bonds. Chamber of Commerce officers emphasized that the 
bonds would be a "good investment for the city" by bringing peo­
ple to Portland.76 With the completion of the Panama Canal fast 
approaching, proponents stressed that parks would help integrate 
the expected massive influx of immigrants with the rest of the 
city's population. In a letter sent to all of Portland's ministers, the 
superintendent of parks claimed that the passage of the park bonds 
"will be one of the most favorable steps ever taken in the City of 
Portland toward the solution of many of our social problems and 
toward the prevention of social evils that must necessarily threaten 
the city upon the opening of the Panama Canal."77 Nonetheless, 
the bonds were again defeated, this time by the resounding vote of 
15,781 to 23,4O2.78 While no organized opposition to the bonds 
existed, most Portlanders probably reasoned that other projects 
were more urgent than park and boulevard extensions. 
With those setbacks, the planning commission established by 
the GPPA in 1913 ceased to function just one year later, and city 
planning advocates in Portland, paralleling what was then taking 
place in Seattle, turned to more limited projects. Portland's 
schools sponsored an "earth education" movement that gave 
prizes to the best school gardens.79 City officials joined with 
neighborhood improvement clubs in drives to clean up vacant 
lots and to eliminate public nuisances.80 Like their counterparts 
in Pacific Coast cities to the north and the south, Portland's real­
tors also worked with streetcar companies in the years just be­
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fore World War I to develop middle-class suburbs around the 
fringes of their city.81 
By 1914 the implementation of the Bennett Plan was at a stand­
still. The outbreak of war disrupted the economy of the Pacific 
Northwest and plunged Portland into a recession, distracting 
Portlanders from city planning.82 Even before the war, however, 
divisions separating different groups had greatly limited the abil­
ity of Portlanders to put the Bennett Plan into practice. 
Looking back over his work for the Bennett Plan in 1945, one 
former planning advocate lamented that Portland derived "little 
more" from the plan "than some beautiful illustrations, now al­
most forgotten."83 That judgment was too harse. If Portlanders 
proved incapable of implementing all aspects of the Bennett Plan, 
they did benefit from the adoption of parts of it and from civic 
improvements made independently of the plan. Many of the parks, 
street and transportation improvements, harbor facilities, and 
civic buildings first suggested by Bennett won approval over the 
years. As in Seattle, individual accomplishments typified the leg­
acy of Progressive-Era city planning in Portland. 
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Patterns and Stages in

City Planning

A he study of city planning on the Pacific Coast contributes to 
our understanding of American history in three ways. Most impor­
tantly, it refines our knowledge of the Progressive Era, and es­
pecially the politics involved in city planning during that period. It 
also extends our understanding of the development of western 
cities at the close of their frontier periods of growth. Finally, it 
enhances our knowledge of the ways by which businessmen have 
tried to shape their social, political, and economic environments 
in the United States. 
Progressive-Era City Planning 
Many historians have concluded that an appropriate way to 
view the Progressive Era is to see that period as one in which 
Americans were reordering their lives in the wake of disruptions 
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caused by rapid industrialization and urbanization. The city plan­
ning movements on the Pacific Coast represented efforts to take 
advantage of opportunities and handle problems resulting from 
the economic transformation that was occurring in that region as 
elsewhere in the United States. A major theme was the replace­
ment of a personal, face-to-face society by a more highly organized, 
bureaucratic society. Businesses run by management hierarchies, 
nationwide labor unions, farm cooperatives, and professional 
organizations spread across the land. Professional expertise came 
to count for more than personal connections in American life, and 
informal ways of doing things gave way to working through formal, 
bureaucratic organizations. 
The businessmen who were so important to Pacific Coast city 
planning partook of the growing organization of American life, 
and the organizational synthesis approach to modern American 
history helps explain their actions. Even such well-known busi­
ness leaders as James Phelan of San Francisco and John Ainsworth 
of Portland found it essential to work through organizations to 
achieve their goals. Chambers of commerce, commercial clubs, 
boards of trade, and other business organizations were very im­
portant in supporting planning. Local improvement clubs, which 
drew much of their strength from neighborhood businessmen, 
proliferated in all of the cities. Citywide organizations soon fol­
lowed. Businessmen set up some, such as the Association for the 
Improvement and Adornment of San Francisco, as a way to work 
around the established political system, which they viewed as un­
responsive to their wishes. Others, such as the Greater Portland 
Plans Association, worked within the established political system. 
Those opposed to planning, such as the south-end businessmen in 
Seattle, also worked through organizations. Nor were business­
men alone. Professionals—especially architects, engineers, and 
lawyers—formed their own organizations, such as local chapters 
of the American Institute of Architects, to work in coalition with 
the business groups. 
With its stress on the growing desire for order and efficiency, 
the organizational synthesis approach to history explains well the 
thoughts and attitudes of the businessmen in the forefront of the 
planning campaigns on the Pacific Coast. Confronted with the 
burgeoning growth of their cities, businessmen viewed planning 
as a key method to channel the forces of change. They argued that 
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only city planning could ensure the orderly and efficient develop­
ment of their cities. Only through planning by experts, they be­
lieved, could the construction of new harbor facilities, street and 
transportation systems, and civic centers be properly coordinated 
so that their cities would function as harmonious entities rather 
than as discordant collections of separate parts. Further, business­
men anticipated that such integrated developments would save 
tax dollars spent on public services while simultaneously boosting 
private profits by providing facilities that would encourage the 
development of trade and manufacturing. 
Such developments would, business leaders thought, help put 
their cities on the map as part of America's urban network and aid 
them greatly in their rivalries with other Pacific Coast cities. They 
were proud of their cities and sought, through planning, recogni­
tion for them as the equals of cities in other, longer settled sec­
tions of the country. They hoped such recognition would serve 
them well in their continued quest for growth. People, capital, 
and businesses would all, they anticipated, gravitate to attractive, 
well-designed centers. At the same time, they were conscious of 
the ties their cities maintained with their regional hinterlands and 
were always concerned about the actions of their neighbors. Inter­
city rivalry motivated many of those engaged in planning. Only 
through the adoption of well-modeled plans, they argued, could 
their cities either catch up with or move ahead of other cities on 
the Pacific Coast. 
A desire to maintain their influence over new groups entering 
their cities also led businessmen to spearhead planning move­
ments. Businessmen saw parks, municipal ornaments, and civic 
centers as tools by which they might harmonize the often clashing 
values of the many different groups in their cities. Through plan­
ning they hoped to unite neighborhoods separated by ethnic, eco­
nomic, and geographic barriers. Planning came to mean building 
functional cities whose residents were bound together by a sense 
of civic unity and civic patriotism. 
In their leadership and support of the planning campaigns, 
businessmen blurred the boundaries separating public from pri­
vate actions. They saw no sharp separation between what they 
were doing to build up their business enterprises as private cit­
izens and what they could accomplish through politics. Public 
planning was for most of them an extension of their private work. 
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Thus, for example, Frank Mott became deeply involved in real 
estate development even as he sponsored city planning as Oak­
land s mayor. 
The city planning movements were often associated with pro­
gressivism.1 Business leaders like Phelan in San Francisco were 
often active in the progressive campaigns of their cities, and many 
of the same business groups that backed planning (such as the Mu­
nicipal League in Seattle) were also deeply involved in progressive 
reforms. That situation was hardly surprising. City planning pro­
ponents shared many assumptions and goals with Progressive-Era 
reformers. Most fundamentally, reformers and planners believed 
that people could be changed—and changed for the better—by 
altering their environments. People, they thought, could deter­
mine their own futures, could progress to new levels of develop­
ment. Businessmen in the city planning movements believed that 
parks, boulevards, and civic centers would inspire all citizens with 
a vaguely defined sense of order and morality. 
As illustrated in the works of the historian William Wilson and 
other scholars, the early city planning movement was much more 
than an aesthetic attempt to beautify cities. In his study of the city 
beautiful movement in five cities across the nation, Wilson con­
cluded that "for all its idealistic rhetoric the movement was im­
bued with the courage of practicality, for it undertook the most 
difficult task of all, to accept human material where found, to take 
the city as it was and to refashion it into something better."2 On 
the Pacific Coast, as well, businessmen favored planning because 
it sought to come to grips with what they saw as urban problems 
and opportunities. Nonetheless, the plans were inadequate for the 
tasks at hand. While viewed as comprehensive by people in the 
Progressive Era, the plans did not in reality deal with all urban 
problems. The planning focused more on the needs of the cities 
than on the needs of all of the people in them. They touched only 
lightly on housing, for instance. Only the Bogue Plan addressed 
anything approaching the full range of urban problems. 
City planning on the Pacific Coast originated in diverse sources 
and passed through several definite stages. Planning often began 
with the efforts of business groups—especially merchants or real 
estate men—to improve certain sections of their cities, often the 
downtown districts. Street lighting and cleaning frequently headed 
the list of early civic improvements. Municipal decorations, street 
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tree plantings, and water fountains were often included in the first 
stage of development. 
From scattered local actions, planning proponents began think­
ing in terms of citywide improvements, a second stage in plan­
ning. The creation of park and boulevard systems was often the 
initial attempt to deal with city problems at more than the neigh­
borhood level. The establishment of park systems, rather than 
simply individual parks, introduced people to the idea that they 
could shape their urban environments. In the park movements, 
too, urbanites were first exposed to the idea that beauty could 
have economic utility, a major theme put forward by the busi­
nessmen involved in the planning movement. Expositions—the 
Lewis and Clark Exposition, the Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition, 
and the Panama-Pacific International Exposition—also spurred 
the development of planning. Like the world's fair in Chicago in 
1893, the expositions awakened city dwellers to the possibilities of 
coordinated building. 
From those efforts Pacific Coast businessmen moved on to a 
third stage in planning, the preparation of what they saw as com­
prehensive plans for their cities. It was this development that most 
clearly separated the city beautiful movements from earlier efforts 
at civic improvement. Sometimes working on their own, some­
times in conjunction with city officials, business-dominated orga­
nizations hired planners to come to their cities and draft guides 
for their future growth. 
Variety characterized the resulting plans. Charles Robinson's 
plans for Oakland and Los Angeles dealt mainly with parks and 
boulevards, while Virgil Bogue s plan for Seattle emphasized new 
designs for that city's streets, transportation system, and harbor. 
In general, those plans prepared after 1909—a major transition 
point in planning history, when the city beautiful movement gave 
way to a city functional movement—were more highly engineered 
than the earlier plans. The plans for Portland and especially for 
Seattle dealt more with the details of harbors and streets than 
with parks and boulevards. Too much, however, should not be 
made of that division. All of the plans addressed the same major 
items and possessed the same basic goals. The differences among 
the plans were differences of degree, not kind. 
The political contests over the acceptance of the plans com­
posed the fourth stage. Business groups achieved only partial suc­
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cess in their efforts to secure public acceptance and adherence to 
the plans. The degrees to which they succeeded in winning ap­
proval for the plans depended on several factors. Those plans with 
limited goals were more likely to be implemented than those that 
sought to remake the cities in major ways. Robinson's plan for 
Oakland won greater acceptance than Burnham's plan for San 
Francisco. Those plans put forward as suggested, rather than 
mandatory, guides for the development of cities were more likely 
to be approved. Bogue's rigid plan for Seattle went down to defeat 
at the polls, while Bennett's flexible plan for Portland secured 
public acceptance. Political support could prove crucial in win­
ning approval for planning. Mayor Frank Mott's strong backing of 
the Robinson Plan for Oakland helped obtain implementation for 
much of the plan. 
The pattern of stages in the development of city planning in 
Pacific Coast cities, while discernable, was far from tidy. Different 
stages overlapped each other or were entirely absent in some cit­
ies. For instance, the park and boulevard movement, which was so 
important in all of the other Pacific Coast cities, was of only lim­
ited significance in San Francisco. Each city possessed its own 
pattern of development, making the planning movement complex. 
Western City Planning 
The distinctive features of each city also make it hard to gener­
alize about the development of Seattle, Portland, Oakland, San 
Francisco, and Los Angeles as western cities; but some observa­
tions are possible through an examination of their planning move­
ments. Despite their origins as "instant cities," the Pacific Coast 
metropolises were coming to resemble their eastern and mid-
western counterparts by 1900 and 1910. The historian Lawrence 
Larson has argued that as early as the 1880s the towns of the trans-
Mississippi West faced many of the same problems, and derived 
many of the same solutions, as eastern towns and cities. Larson 
has shown that as they matured, western centers came increas­
ingly to resemble other cities in their architecture and cultural 
character. 
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In most respects the planning movements that occurred in the 
Pacific Coast cities were similar to those going on elsewhere in 
the United States in the same time period. The same basic stages 
and patterns of development can be found in the cities that Wilson 
has studied.3 Well-established eastern planners, a tightly knit group 
of professionals who knew each other closely, prepared the plans 
for the western cities: John Olmsted, Daniel Burnham, Charles 
Robinson, Edward Bennett, and Virgil Bogue. Only Bogue had 
any particular knowledge of western cities, and even Bogue had to 
accept Olmsted as a partner. Not surprisingly, the plans drafted for 
the Pacific Coast cities differed little from those drawn up for 
cities elsewhere in America. The eastern planners were interested 
in turning Pacific Coast cities into "ideal" cities. Blindered by 
their previous training and work, they could do only what they 
had learned from their earlier experiences. Most made little effort 
to adjust their plans to take advantage of—or even acknowledge 
the existence of—the western environment. San Francisco and 
Portland would, in their visions, have become Washington, D.C., 
Chicago, or Paris. In the hilly Pacific Coast cities, for example, 
arterials and circumferentials would ride roughshod over the 
topography. In Seattle, even the native evergreen trees were to be 
replaced with deciduous trees from the East. 
In its association with progressivism, city planning on the Pa­
cific Coast also resembled planning in other regions of the United 
States. As Wilson and other scholars have demonstrated, planning 
and progressivism often went hand in hand in eastern and mid-
western cities. In cities as diverse as New York, Chicago, Har­
risburg, and Kansas City, city planning was associated with some 
aspects of urban progressivism. (Such an association was not, how­
ever, ubiquitous. Robert W. Speer, the city boss of Denver, was the 
single most important person in his city's planning movement.) In 
that respect, as in many others, city planning on the Pacific Coast 
was far from unique. Planning advocates there shared many of the 
same motivations of those operating elsewhere in America. The 
search for social harmony in their cities and the quest for recogni­
tion of their cities as urban centers of regional importance and 
national repute ran through the thoughts of many engaged in 
America s planning movement.4 
However, a major event distinguished Pacific Coast planners 
from their national colleagues and motivated them. The tremen­
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dous importance of the coming completion of the Panama Canal 
in leading businessmen, especially merchants, into planning move­
ments was a unique element on the Pacific Coast. The eagerness 
of business leaders in cities up and down the coast to prepare for 
the opening of the canal and their fears that their counterparts in 
rival cities would use the canal to get ahead of them lent an ur­
gency to the involvement of businessmen in the planning cam­
paigns not found everywhere in America.5 
Progressive-Era Businessmen 
Businessmen sought to shape their social and cultural environ­
ments in a number of ways during the Progressive Era. They reas­
serted control over their individual factories through scientific 
management, or Taylorism, and created new management struc­
tures. So, too, they tried to develop city planning as a tool with 
which to control the vagaries of their urban environments. 
That businessmen were active in city planning should not come 
as a surprise. Although Americans have conventionally viewed 
businessmen as opponents of planning, historians have recently 
shown that some businessmen have worked for certain types of 
planning throughout the twentieth century. In fact, recent schol­
arship suggests that business involvement in planning has been 
pervasive.6 Businessmen often turned to politics for the some­
times contradictory goals of trying to stabilize their competitive 
business environments, of seeking to win competitive advantages 
over each other, and of attempting to smooth out the ups and 
downs of the business cycle.7 The roles businessmen played in city 
planning should, thus, be most properly viewed as part of a larger 
picture: the efforts of businessmen to use planning to seek ad­
vancement for their firms. 
Businessmen wanted to encourage the social and economic 
growth of their cities. They were boosters. The thought of uncon­
trolled growth, however, disturbed many of them; and they hoped 
through planning to channel growth along paths that they desired. 
Growth with harmony was one of their primary goals. They wanted 
to replicate in their cities what they saw as the harmonious func­
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tioning of the many different parts of the pieces of machinery in 
their factories. Predictability and stability were their goals. 
The limited success of businessmen in shaping their urban en­
vironments on the Pacific Coast is worth stressing in conclusion. 
In his examination of the city beautiful movement, Wilson con­
cludes that planning accomplished a great deal. In addition to 
"tree-shaded boulevards, undulating parks, and graceful neo­
classical buildings rich in ornament," the city beautiful movement 
"left a legacy of civic activism" and brought the professional plan­
ning expert to the fore.8 All true, both on the Pacific Coast and 
nationally. As commercial cities, those on the Pacific Coast, like 
those studied by Wilson, possessed large middle classes of busi­
nessmen and professionals eager for planning. Moreover, in con­
trast to industrial cities in which planning was less successful, 
they did not have "a higher proportion of laborers likely to be 
skeptical of sweeping improvement plans."9 It is important, how­
ever, to remember that in their major goal—the implementation of 
what they saw as comprehensive city plans—businessmen failed. 
The Pacific Coast cities contained too many different groups with 
different values for agreements to be reached on most aspects of 
city planning. 
Planning was defeated in the political arena. All of the groups 
involved could agree that city planning in the abstract was valu­
able, but they reached few agreements on the concrete details. 
Various groups of businessmen fought each other. No monolithic 
business community existed in any of the Pacific Coast cities. In 
Seattle the issue of where to site the civic center split the business 
community. In Portland East Side and West Side business groups 
fought over how best to develop their city. In San Francisco the 
basic issue of how fast and by what means to rebuild after the 
earthquake and fire proved divisive. Moreover, divisions between 
business organizations and other groups killed the planning pros­
pects. Labor organizations often opposed what business groups 
wanted. That type of division was most apparent in San Francisco, 
but it was significant in other cities as well, particularly Portland 
and Seattle. In the end, the city plans, which looked so beautiful 
to their proponents on paper, won only partial acceptance. 
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The way that businessmen had pre­
viously interacted with these other par­
ties greatly affected their success in 
obtaining their goals, but ultimately, 
Blackfbrd claims, politics lay at the heart 
of planning. The proposed plans were 
accepted or rejected in heated citywide 
elections in which, to be successful, busi­
nessmen had to convince others to vote 
with them—a feat they achieved in only 
one city. Nevertheless, these plans were 
often later adopted in some piecemeal 
fashion, and Blackford concludes his 
study with an analysis of the legacy of 
Progressive Era city planning for later 
periods. 
The Lost Dream makes significant 
contributions to our understanding of 
city planning in America and particularly 
in the American West. 
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